Eryxias: There are.
Socrates: And these men by the arts which they profess, and in exchange for them, obtain the necessities of life just as we do by means of gold and silver?
Eryxias: True.
Socrates: Then if they procure by this means what they want for the purposes of life, that art will be useful towards life? For do we not say that silver is useful because it enables us to supply our bodily needs?
Eryxias: We do.
Socrates: Then if these arts are reckoned among things useful, the arts are wealth for the same reason as gold and silver are, for, clearly, the possession of them gives wealth. Yet a little while ago we found it difficult to accept the argument which proved that the wisest are the wealthiest. But now there seems no escape from this conclusion. Suppose that we are asked, “Is a horse useful to everybody?” will not our reply be, “No, but only to those who know how to use a horse?”
Eryxias: Certainly.
Socrates: And so, too, physic is not useful to everyone, but only to him who knows how to use it?
Eryxias: True.
Socrates: And the same is the case with everything else?
Eryxias: Yes.
Socrates: Then gold and silver and all the other elements which are supposed to make up wealth are only useful to the person who knows how to use them?
Eryxias: Exactly.
Socrates: And were we not saying before that it was the business of a good man and a gentleman to know where and how anything should be used?
Eryxias: Yes.
Socrates: The good and gentle, therefore will alone have profit from these things, supposing at least that they know how to use them. But if so, to them only will they seem to be wealth. It appears, however, that where a person is ignorant of riding, and has horses which are useless to him, if someone teaches him that art, he makes him also richer, for what was before useless has now become useful to him, and in giving him knowledge he has also conferred riches upon him.
Eryxias: That is the case.
Socrates: Yet I dare be sworn that Critias will not be moved a whit by the argument.
Critias: No, by heaven, I should be a madman if I were. But why do you not finish the argument which proves that gold and silver and other things which seem to be wealth are not real wealth? For I have been exceedingly delighted to hear the discourses which you have just been holding.
Socrates: My argument, Critias (I said), appears to have given you the same kind of pleasure which you might have derived from some rhapsode’s recitation of Homer; for you do not believe a word of what has been said. But come now, give me an answer to this question. Are not certain things useful to the builder when he is building a house?
Critias: They are.
Socrates: And would you say that those things are useful which are employed in house building—stones and bricks and beams and the like, and also the instruments with which the builder built the house, the beams and stones which they provided, and again the instruments by which these were obtained?
Critias: It seems to me that they are all useful for building.
Socrates: And is it not true of every art, that not only the materials but the instruments by which we procure them and without which the work could not go on, are useful for that art?
Critias: Certainly.
Socrates: And further, the instruments by which the instruments are procured, and so on, going back from stage to stage ad infinitum—are not all these, in your opinion, necessary in order to carry out the work?
Critias: We may fairly suppose such to be the case.
Socrates: And if a man has food and drink and clothes and the other things which are useful to the body, would he need gold or silver or any other means by which he could procure that which he now has?
Critias: I do not think so.
Socrates: Then you consider that a man never wants any of these things for the use of the body?
Critias: Certainly not.
Socrates: And if they appear useless to this end, ought they not always to appear useless? For we have already laid down the principle that things cannot be at one time useful and at another time not, in the same process.
Critias: But in that respect your argument and mine are the same. For you maintain if they are useful to a certain end, they can never become useless; whereas I say that in order to accomplish some results bad things are needed, and good for others.
Socrates: But can a bad thing be used to carry out a good purpose?
Critias: I should say not.
Socrates: And we call those actions good which a man does for the sake of virtue?
Critias: Yes.
Socrates: But can a man learn any kind of knowledge which is imparted by word of mouth if he is wholly deprived of the sense of hearing?
Critias: Certainly not, I think.
Socrates: And will not hearing be useful for virtue, if virtue is taught by hearing and we use the sense of hearing in giving instruction?
Critias: Yes.
Socrates: And since medicine frees the sick man from his disease, that art too may sometimes appear useful in the acquisition of virtue, e.g. when hearing is procured by the aid of medicine.
Critias: Very likely.
Socrates: But if, again, we obtain by wealth the aid of medicine, shall we not regard wealth as useful for virtue?
Critias: True.
Socrates: And also the instruments by which wealth is procured?
Critias: Certainly.
Socrates: Then you think that a man may gain wealth by bad and disgraceful means, and, having obtained the aid of medicine which enables him to acquire the power of hearing, may use that very faculty for the acquisition of virtue?
Critias: Yes, I do.
Socrates: But can that which is evil be useful for virtue?
Critias: No.
Socrates: It is not therefore necessary
