Dialogues

we will suppose, further, that some God makes not only a representation such as a painter would make of your outward form and colour, but also creates an inward organization like yours, having the same warmth and softness; and into this infuses motion, and soul, and mind, such as you have, and in a word copies all your qualities, and places them by you in another form; would you say that this was Cratylus and the image of Cratylus, or that there were two Cratyluses? Cratylus I should say that there were two Cratyluses. Socrates Then you see, my friend, that we must find some other principle of truth in images, and also in names; and not insist that an image is no longer an image when something is added or subtracted. Do you not perceive that images are very far from having qualities which are the exact counterpart of the realities which they represent? Cratylus Yes, I see. Socrates But then how ridiculous would be the effect of names on things, if they were exactly the same with them! For they would be the doubles of them, and no one would be able to determine which were the names and which were the realities. Cratylus Quite true. Socrates Then fear not, but have the courage to admit that one name may be correctly and another incorrectly given; and do not insist that the name shall be exactly the same with the thing; but allow the occasional substitution of a wrong letter, and if of a letter also of a noun in a sentence, and if of a noun in a sentence also of a sentence which is not appropriate to the matter, and acknowledge that the thing may be named, and described, so long as the general character of the thing which you are describing is retained; and this, as you will remember, was remarked by Hermogenes and myself in the particular instance of the names of the letters. Cratylus Yes, I remember. Socrates Good; and when the general character is preserved, even if some of the proper letters are wanting, still the thing is signified;⁠—well, if all the letters are given; not well, when only a few of them are given. I think that we had better admit this, lest we be punished like travellers in Aegina who wander about the street late at night: and be likewise told by truth herself that we have arrived too late; or if not, you must find out some new notion of correctness of names, and no longer maintain that a name is the expression of a thing in letters or syllables; for if you say both, you will be inconsistent with yourself. Cratylus I quite acknowledge, Socrates, what you say to be very reasonable. Socrates Then as we are agreed thus far, let us ask ourselves whether a name rightly imposed ought not to have the proper letters. Cratylus Yes. Socrates And the proper letters are those which are like the things? Cratylus Yes. Socrates Enough then of names which are rightly given. And in names which are incorrectly given, the greater part may be supposed to be made up of proper and similar letters, or there would be no likeness; but there will be likewise a part which is improper and spoils the beauty and formation of the word: you would admit that? Cratylus There would be no use, Socrates, in my quarrelling with you, since I cannot be satisfied that a name which is incorrectly given is a name at all. Socrates Do you admit a name to be the representation of a thing? Cratylus Yes, I do. Socrates But do you not allow that some nouns are primitive, and some derived? Cratylus Yes, I do. Socrates Then if you admit that primitive or first nouns are representations of things, is there any better way of framing representations than by assimilating them to the objects as much as you can; or do you prefer the notion of Hermogenes and of many others, who say that names are conventional, and have a meaning to those who have agreed about them, and who have previous knowledge of the things intended by them, and that convention is the only principle; and whether you abide by our present convention, or make a new and opposite one, according to which you call small great and great small⁠—that, they would say, makes no difference, if you are only agreed. Which of these two notions do you prefer? Cratylus Representation by likeness, Socrates, is infinitely better than representation by any chance sign. Socrates Very good: but if the name is to be like the thing, the letters out of which the first names are composed must also be like things. Returning to the image of the picture, I would ask, How could anyone ever compose a picture which would be like anything at all, if there were not pigments in nature which resembled the things imitated, and out of which the picture is composed? Cratylus Impossible. Socrates No more could names ever resemble any actually existing thing, unless the original elements of which they are compounded bore some degree of resemblance to the objects of which the names are the imitation: And the original elements are letters? Cratylus Yes. Socrates Let me now invite you to consider what Hermogenes and I were saying about sounds. Do you agree with me that the letter ρ is expressive of rapidity, motion, and hardness? Were we right or wrong in saying so? Cratylus I should say that you were right. Socrates And that λ was expressive of smoothness, and softness, and the like? Cratylus There again you were right. Socrates And yet, as you are aware, that which is called by us σκληρότης, is by the Eretrians called σκληρότηρ. Cratylus Very true. Socrates But are the letters ρ and σ equivalents; and is there the same significance to them in the termination ρ, which there is to us in σ, or is there no significance to one