Dialogues

Do you not conceive that to be the meaning of them? Cratylus Yes; that is assuredly their meaning, and the true meaning. Socrates Let us revert to ἐπιστήμη (knowledge) and observe how ambiguous this word is, seeming rather to signify stopping the soul at things than going round with them; and therefore we should leave the beginning as at present, and not reject the ε (compare 412 A), but make an insertion of an ι instead of an ε (not πιστήμη, but ἐπιιστήμη). Take another example: βέβαιον (sure) is clearly the expression of station and position, and not of motion. Again, the word ἱστορία (enquiry) bears upon the face of it the stopping (ἱστάναι) of the stream; and the word πιστὸν (faithful) certainly indicates cessation of motion; then, again, μνήμη (memory), as anyone may see, expresses rest in the soul, and not motion. Moreover, words such as ἁμαρτία and σύμφορα, which have a bad sense, viewed in the light of their etymologies will be the same as σύνεσις and ἐπιστήμη and other words which have a good sense (compare ὁμαρτεῖν, συνιέναι, ἔπεσθαι, συμφέρεσθαι); and much the same may be said of ἀμαθία and ἀκολασία, for ἀμαθία may be explained as ἡ ἄμα θεᾠἰόντος πορεία, and ἀκολασία as ἡ ἀκολουθία τοῖς πράγμασιν. Thus the names which in these instances we find to have the worst sense, will turn out to be framed on the same principle as those which have the best. And anyone I believe who would take the trouble might find many other examples in which the giver of names indicates, not that things are in motion or progress, but that they are at rest; which is the opposite of motion. Cratylus Yes, Socrates, but observe; the greater number express motion. Socrates What of that, Cratylus? Are we to count them like votes? and is correctness of names the voice of the majority? Are we to say of whichever sort there are most, those are the true ones? Cratylus No; that is not reasonable. Socrates Certainly not. But let us have done with this question and proceed to another, about which I should like to know whether you think with me. Were we not lately acknowledging that the first givers of names in states, both Hellenic and barbarous, were the legislators, and that the art which gave names was the art of the legislator? Cratylus Quite true. Socrates Tell me, then, did the first legislators, who were the givers of the first names, know or not know the things which they named? Cratylus They must have known, Socrates. Socrates Why, yes, friend Cratylus, they could hardly have been ignorant. Cratylus I should say not. Socrates Let us return to the point from which we digressed. You were saying, if you remember, that he who gave names must have known the things which he named; are you still of that opinion? Cratylus I am. Socrates And would you say that the giver of the first names had also a knowledge of the things which he named? Cratylus I should. Socrates But how could he have learned or discovered things from names if the primitive names were not yet given? For, if we are correct in our view, the only way of learning and discovering things, is either to discover names for ourselves or to learn them from others. Cratylus I think that there is a good deal in what you say, Socrates. Socrates But if things are only to be known through names, how can we suppose that the givers of names had knowledge, or were legislators before there were names at all, and therefore before they could have known them? Cratylus I believe, Socrates, the true account of the matter to be, that a power more than human gave things their first names, and that the names which are thus given are necessarily their true names. Socrates Then how came the giver of the names, if he was an inspired being or God, to contradict himself? For were we not saying just now that he made some names expressive of rest and others of motion? Were we mistaken? Cratylus But I suppose one of the two not to be names at all. Socrates And which, then, did he make, my good friend; those which are expressive of rest, or those which are expressive of motion? This is a point which, as I said before, cannot be determined by counting them. Cratylus No; not in that way, Socrates. Socrates But if this is a battle of names, some of them asserting that they are like the truth, others contending that they are, how or by what criterion are we to decide between them? For there are no other names to which appeal can be made, but obviously recourse must be had to another standard which, without employing names, will make clear which of the two are right; and this must be a standard which shows the truth of things. Cratylus I agree. Socrates But if that is true, Cratylus, then I suppose that things may be known without names? Cratylus Clearly. Socrates But how would you expect to know them? What other way can there be of knowing them, except the true and natural way, through their affinities, when they are akin to each other, and through themselves? For that which is other and different from them must signify something other and different from them. Cratylus What you are saying is, I think, true. Socrates Well, but reflect; have we not several times acknowledged that names rightly given are the likenesses and images of the things which they name? Cratylus Yes. Socrates Let us suppose that to any extent you please you can learn things through the medium of names, and suppose also that you can learn them from the things themselves⁠—which is likely to be