Dialogues

of us? Cratylus Nay, surely there is a significance to both of us. Socrates In as far as they are like, or in as far as they are unlike? Cratylus In as far as they are like. Socrates Are they altogether alike? Cratylus Yes; for the purpose of expressing motion. Socrates And what do you say of the insertion of the λ? for that is expressive not of hardness but of softness. Cratylus Why, perhaps the letter λ is wrongly inserted, Socrates, and should be altered into ρ, as you were saying to Hermogenes and in my opinion rightly, when you spoke of adding and subtracting letters upon occasion. Socrates Good. But still the word is intelligible to both of us; when I say σκληρὸς (hard), you know what I mean. Cratylus Yes, my dear friend, and the explanation of that is custom. Socrates And what is custom but convention? I utter a sound which I understand, and you know that I understand the meaning of the sound: this is what you are saying? Cratylus Yes. Socrates And if when I speak you know my meaning, there is an indication given by me to you? Cratylus Yes. Socrates This indication of my meaning may proceed from unlike as well as from like, for example in the λ of σκληρότης. But if this is true, then you have made a convention with yourself, and the correctness of a name turns out to be convention, since letters which are unlike are indicative equally with those which are like, if they are sanctioned by custom and convention. And even supposing that you distinguish custom from convention ever so much, still you must say that the signification of words is given by custom and not by likeness, for custom may indicate by the unlike as well as by the like. But as we are agreed thus far, Cratylus (for I shall assume that your silence gives consent), then custom and convention must be supposed to contribute to the indication of our thoughts; for suppose we take the instance of number, how can you ever imagine, my good friend, that you will find names resembling every individual number, unless you allow that which you term convention and agreement to have authority in determining the correctness of names? I quite agree with you that words should as far as possible resemble things; but I fear that this dragging in of resemblance, as Hermogenes says,43 is a shabby thing, which has to be supplemented by the mechanical aid of convention with a view to correctness; for I believe that if we could always, or almost always, use likenesses, which are perfectly appropriate, this would be the most perfect state of language; as the opposite is the most imperfect. But let me ask you, what is the force of names, and what is the use of them? Cratylus The use of names, Socrates, as I should imagine, is to inform: the simple truth is, that he who knows names knows also the things which are expressed by them. Socrates I suppose you mean to say, Cratylus, that as the name is, so also is the thing; and that he who knows the one will also know the other, because they are similars, and all similars fall under the same art or science; and therefore you would say that he who knows names will also know things. Cratylus That is precisely what I mean. Socrates But let us consider what is the nature of this information about things which, according to you, is given us by names. Is it the best sort of information? or is there any other? What do you say? Cratylus I believe that to be both the only and the best sort of information about them; there can be no other. Socrates But do you believe that in the discovery of them, he who discovers the names discovers also the things; or is this only the method of instruction, and is there some other method of enquiry and discovery. Cratylus I certainly believe that the methods of enquiry and discovery are of the same nature as instruction. Socrates Well, but do you not see, Cratylus, that he who follows names in the search after things, and analyses their meaning, is in great danger of being deceived? Cratylus How so? Socrates Why clearly he who first gave names gave them according to his conception of the things which they signified⁠—did he not? Cratylus True. Socrates And if his conception was erroneous, and he gave names according to his conception, in what position shall we who are his followers find ourselves? Shall we not be deceived by him? Cratylus But, Socrates, am I not right in thinking that he must surely have known; or else, as I was saying, his names would not be names at all? And you have a clear proof that he has not missed the truth, and the proof is⁠—that he is perfectly consistent. Did you ever observe in speaking that all the words which you utter have a common character and purpose? Socrates But that, friend Cratylus, is no answer. For if he did begin in error, he may have forced the remainder into agreement with the original error and with himself; there would be nothing strange in this, any more than in geometrical diagrams, which have often a slight and invisible flaw in the first part of the process, and are consistently mistaken in the long deductions which follow. And this is the reason why every man should expend his chief thought and attention on the consideration of his first principles:⁠—are they or are they not rightly laid down? and when he has duly sifted them, all the rest will follow. Now I should be astonished to find that names are really consistent. And here let us revert to our former discussion: Were we not saying that all things are in motion and progress and flux, and that this idea of motion is expressed by names?