Dialogues

epub:type="z3998:persona">Socrates Whether the rhetorician is or not inferior on this account is a question which we will hereafter examine if the enquiry is likely to be of any service to us; but I would rather begin by asking, whether he is or is not as ignorant of the just and unjust, base and honourable, good and evil, as he is of medicine and the other arts; I mean to say, does he really know anything of what is good and evil, base or honourable, just or unjust in them; or has he only a way with the ignorant of persuading them that he not knowing is to be esteemed to know more about these things than someone else who knows? Or must the pupil know these things and come to you knowing them before he can acquire the art of rhetoric? If he is ignorant, you who are the teacher of rhetoric will not teach him⁠—it is not your business; but you will make him seem to the multitude to know them, when he does not know them; and seem to be a good man, when he is not. Or will you be unable to teach him rhetoric at all, unless he knows the truth of these things first? What is to be said about all this? By heavens, Gorgias, I wish that you would reveal to me the power of rhetoric, as you were saying that you would. Gorgias Well, Socrates, I suppose that if the pupil does chance not to know them, he will have to learn of me these things as well. Socrates Say no more, for there you are right; and so he whom you make a rhetorician must either know the nature of the just and unjust already, or he must be taught by you. Gorgias Certainly. Socrates Well, and is not he who has learned carpentering a carpenter? Gorgias Yes. Socrates And he who has learned music a musician? Gorgias Yes. Socrates And he who has learned medicine is a physician, in like manner? He who has learned anything whatever is that which his knowledge makes him. Gorgias Certainly. Socrates And in the same way, he who has learned what is just is just? Gorgias To be sure. Socrates And he who is just may be supposed to do what is just? Gorgias Yes. Socrates And must not115 the just man always desire to do what is just? Gorgias That is clearly the inference. Socrates Surely, then, the just man will never consent to do injustice? Gorgias Certainly not. Socrates And according to the argument the rhetorician must be a just man? Gorgias Yes. Socrates And will therefore never be willing to do injustice? Gorgias Clearly not. Socrates But do you remember saying just now that the trainer is not to be accused or banished if the pugilist makes a wrong use of his pugilistic art; and in like manner, if the rhetorician makes a bad and unjust use of his rhetoric, that is not to be laid to the charge of his teacher, who is not to be banished, but the wrongdoer himself who made a bad use of his rhetoric⁠—he is to be banished⁠—was not that said? Gorgias Yes, it was. Socrates But now we are affirming that the aforesaid rhetorician will never have done injustice at all? Gorgias True. Socrates And at the very outset, Gorgias, it was said that rhetoric treated of discourse, not (like arithmetic) about odd and even, but about just and unjust? Was not this said? Gorgias Yes. Socrates I was thinking at the time, when I heard you saying so, that rhetoric, which is always discoursing about justice, could not possibly be an unjust thing. But when you added, shortly afterwards, that the rhetorician might make a bad use of rhetoric I noted with surprise the inconsistency into which you had fallen; and I said, that if you thought, as I did, that there was a gain in being refuted, there would be an advantage in going on with the question, but if not, I would leave off. And in the course of our investigations, as you will see yourself, the rhetorician has been acknowledged to be incapable of making an unjust use of rhetoric, or of willingness to do injustice. By the dog, Gorgias, there will be a great deal of discussion, before we get at the truth of all this. Polus And do even you, Socrates, seriously believe what you are now saying about rhetoric? What! because Gorgias was ashamed to deny that the rhetorician knew the just and the honourable and the good, and admitted that to anyone who came to him ignorant of them he could teach them, and then out of this admission there arose a contradiction⁠—the thing which you dearly love, and to which not he, but you, brought the argument by your captious questions⁠—(do you seriously believe that there is any truth in all this?) For will anyone ever acknowledge that he does not know, or cannot teach, the nature of justice? The truth is, that there is great want of manners in bringing the argument to such a pass. Socrates Illustrious Polus, the reason why we provide ourselves with friends and children is, that when we get old and stumble, a younger generation may be at hand to set us on our legs again in our words and in our actions: and now, if I and Gorgias are stumbling, here are you who should raise us up; and I for my part engage to retract any error into which you may think that I have fallen-upon one condition: Polus What condition? Socrates That you contract, Polus, the prolixity of speech in which you indulged at first. Polus What! do you mean that I may not use as many words as I please? Socrates Only to think, my friend, that having come on a visit to Athens, which is the most free-spoken state in Hellas, you when you got there, and you alone, should be deprived of the power of speech⁠—that would be hard indeed. But then consider my case:⁠—shall not I be very hardly used, if, when you are making