Dialogues

a long oration, and refusing to answer what you are asked, I am compelled to stay and listen to you, and may not go away? I say rather, if you have a real interest in the argument, or, to repeat my former expression, have any desire to set it on its legs, take back any statement which you please; and in your turn ask and answer, like myself and Gorgias⁠—refute and be refuted: for I suppose that you would claim to know what Gorgias knows⁠—would you not? Polus Yes. Socrates And you, like him, invite anyone to ask you about anything which he pleases, and you will know how to answer him? Polus To be sure. Socrates And now, which will you do, ask or answer? Polus I will ask; and do you answer me, Socrates, the same question which Gorgias, as you suppose, is unable to answer: What is rhetoric? Socrates Do you mean what sort of an art? Polus Yes. Socrates To say the truth, Polus, it is not an art at all, in my opinion. Polus Then what, in your opinion, is rhetoric? Socrates A thing which, as I was lately reading in a book of yours, you say that you have made an art. Polus What thing? Socrates I should say a sort of experience. Polus Does rhetoric seem to you to be an experience? Socrates That is my view, but you may be of another mind. Polus An experience in what? Socrates An experience in producing a sort of delight and gratification. Polus And if able to gratify others, must not rhetoric be a fine thing? Socrates What are you saying, Polus? Why do you ask me whether rhetoric is a fine thing or not, when I have not as yet told you what rhetoric is? Polus Did I not hear you say that rhetoric was a sort of experience? Socrates Will you, who are so desirous to gratify others, afford a slight gratification to me? Polus I will. Socrates Will you ask me, what sort of an art is cookery? Polus What sort of an art is cookery? Socrates Not an art at all, Polus. Polus What then? Socrates I should say an experience. Polus In what? I wish that you would explain to me. Socrates An experience in producing a sort of delight and gratification, Polus. Polus Then are cookery and rhetoric the same? Socrates No, they are only different parts of the same profession. Polus Of what profession? Socrates I am afraid that the truth may seem discourteous; and I hesitate to answer, lest Gorgias should imagine that I am making fun of his own profession. For whether or not this is that art of rhetoric which Gorgias practises I really cannot tell:⁠—from what he was just now saying, nothing appeared of what he thought of his art, but the rhetoric which I mean is a part of a not very creditable whole. Gorgias A part of what, Socrates? Say what you mean, and never mind me. Socrates In my opinion then, Gorgias, the whole of which rhetoric is a part is not an art at all, but the habit of a bold and ready wit, which knows how to manage mankind: this habit I sum up under the word “flattery”; and it appears to me to have many other parts, one of which is cookery, which may seem to be an art, but, as I maintain, is only an experience or routine and not an art:⁠—another part is rhetoric, and the art of attiring and sophistry are two others: thus there are four branches, and four different things answering to them. And Polus may ask, if he likes, for he has not as yet been informed, what part of flattery is rhetoric: he did not see that I had not yet answered him when he proceeded to ask a further question: Whether I do not think rhetoric a fine thing? But I shall not tell him whether rhetoric is a fine thing or not, until I have first answered, “What is rhetoric?” For that would not be right, Polus; but I shall be happy to answer, if you will ask me, What part of flattery is rhetoric? Polus I will ask and do you answer? What part of flattery is rhetoric? Socrates Will you understand my answer? Rhetoric, according to my view, is the ghost or counterfeit of a part of politics. Polus And noble or ignoble? Socrates Ignoble, I should say, if I am compelled to answer, for I call what is bad ignoble: though I doubt whether you understand what I was saying before. Gorgias Indeed, Socrates, I cannot say that I understand myself. Socrates I do not wonder, Gorgias; for I have not as yet explained myself, and our friend Polus, colt by name and colt by nature, is apt to run away.116 Gorgias Never mind him, but explain to me what you mean by saying that rhetoric is the counterfeit of a part of politics. Socrates I will try, then, to explain my notion of rhetoric, and if I am mistaken, my friend Polus shall refute me. We may assume the existence of bodies and of souls? Gorgias Of course. Socrates You would further admit that there is a good condition of either of them? Gorgias Yes. Socrates Which condition may not be really good, but good only in appearance? I mean to say, that there are many persons who appear to be in good health, and whom only a physician or trainer will discern at first sight not to be in good health. Gorgias True. Socrates And this applies not only to the body, but also to the soul: in either there may be that which gives the appearance of health and not the reality? Gorgias Yes, certainly. Socrates

And now I will endeavour to explain to you more clearly what I mean: The soul and body being two, have two arts corresponding to them: there is the art of politics attending on the soul; and another art attending on the body, of which I know no single name, but which may be described as having two divisions, one of them gymnastic, and the other medicine. And in politics there is