Dialogues

does what he thinks best, this is a good, and would you call this great power? Polus I should not. Socrates Then you must prove that the rhetorician is not a fool, and that rhetoric is an art and not a flattery⁠—and so you will have refuted me; but if you leave me unrefuted, why, the rhetoricians who do what they think best in states, and the tyrants, will have nothing upon which to congratulate themselves, if as you say, power be indeed a good, admitting at the same time that what is done without sense is an evil. Polus Yes; I admit that. Socrates How then can the rhetoricians or the tyrants have great power in states, unless Polus can refute Socrates, and prove to him that they do as they will? Polus This fellow⁠— Socrates I say that they do not do as they will;⁠—now refute me. Polus Why, have you not already said that they do as they think best? Socrates And I say so still. Polus Then surely they do as they will? Socrates I deny it. Polus But they do what they think best? Socrates Aye. Polus That, Socrates, is monstrous and absurd. Socrates Good words, good Polus, as I may say in your own peculiar style; but if you have any questions to ask of me, either prove that I am in error or give the answer yourself. Polus Very well, I am willing to answer that I may know what you mean. Socrates Do men appear to you to will that which they do, or to will that further end for the sake of which they do a thing? when they take medicine, for example, at the bidding of a physician, do they will the drinking of the medicine which is painful, or the health for the sake of which they drink? Polus Clearly, the health. Socrates And when men go on a voyage or engage in business, they do not will that which they are doing at the time; for who would desire to take the risk of a voyage or the trouble of business?⁠—But they will, to have the wealth for the sake of which they go on a voyage. Polus Certainly. Socrates And is not this universally true? If a man does something for the sake of something else, he wills not that which he does, but that for the sake of which he does it. Polus Yes. Socrates And are not all things either good or evil, or intermediate and indifferent? Polus To be sure, Socrates. Socrates Wisdom and health and wealth and the like you would call goods, and their opposites evils? Polus I should. Socrates And the things which are neither good nor evil, and which partake sometimes of the nature of good and at other times of evil, or of neither, are such as sitting, walking, running, sailing; or, again, wood, stones, and the like:⁠—these are the things which you call neither good nor evil? Polus Exactly so. Socrates Are these indifferent things done for the sake of the good, or the good for the sake of the indifferent? Polus Clearly, the indifferent for the sake of the good. Socrates When we walk we walk for the sake of the good, and under the idea that it is better to walk, and when we stand we stand equally for the sake of the good? Polus Yes. Socrates And when we kill a man we kill him or exile him or despoil him of his goods, because, as we think, it will conduce to our good? Polus Certainly. Socrates Men who do any of these things do them for the sake of the good? Polus Yes. Socrates And did we not admit that in doing something for the sake of something else, we do not will those things which we do, but that other thing for the sake of which we do them? Polus Most true. Socrates Then we do not will simply to kill a man or to exile him or to despoil him of his goods, but we will to do that which conduces to our good, and if the act is not conducive to our good we do not will it; for we will, as you say, that which is our good, but that which is neither good nor evil, or simply evil, we do not will. Why are you silent, Polus? Am I not right? Polus You are right. Socrates Hence we may infer, that if anyone, whether he be a tyrant or a rhetorician, kills another or exiles another or deprives him of his property, under the idea that the act is for his own interests when really not for his own interests, he may be said to do what seems best to him? Polus Yes. Socrates But does he do what he wills if he does what is evil? Why do you not answer? Polus Well, I suppose not. Socrates Then if great power is a good as you allow, will such a one have great power in a state? Polus He will not. Socrates Then I was right in saying that a man may do what seems good to him in a state, and not have great power, and not do what he wills? Polus As though you, Socrates, would not like to have the power of doing what seemed good to you in the state, rather than not; you would not be jealous when you saw anyone killing or despoiling or imprisoning whom he pleased, Oh, no! Socrates Justly or unjustly, do you mean? Polus In either case is he not equally to be envied? Socrates Forbear, Polus! Polus Why “forbear”? Socrates Because you ought not to envy wretches who are not to be envied, but only to pity them. Polus And are those of whom I spoke wretches? Socrates Yes, certainly they are. Polus And so you think that he who slays anyone whom he pleases, and justly slays him, is pitiable and wretched? Socrates No, I do not say that of him: but neither do I think that he is to be envied. Polus Were you not saying just now that he is wretched? Socrates Yes, my friend, if he killed another unjustly, in which case he is also to be pitied; and