Dialogues

against me. But please to refresh my memory a little; did you say⁠—“in an unjust attempt to make himself a tyrant”? Polus Yes, I did. Socrates Then I say that neither of them will be happier than the other⁠—neither he who unjustly acquires a tyranny, nor he who suffers in the attempt, for of two miserables one cannot be the happier, but that he who escapes and becomes a tyrant is the more miserable of the two. Do you laugh, Polus? Well, this is a new kind of refutation⁠—when anyone says anything, instead of refuting him to laugh at him. Polus But do you not think, Socrates, that you have been sufficiently refuted, when you say that which no human being will allow? Ask the company. Socrates O Polus, I am not a public man, and only last year, when my tribe were serving as Prytanes, and it became my duty as their president to take the votes, there was a laugh at me, because I was unable to take them. And as I failed then, you must not ask me to count the suffrages of the company now; but if, as I was saying, you have no better argument than numbers, let me have a turn, and do you make trial of the sort of proof which, as I think, is required; for I shall produce one witness only of the truth of my words, and he is the person with whom I am arguing; his suffrage I know how to take; but with the many I have nothing to do, and do not even address myself to them. May I ask then whether you will answer in turn and have your words put to the proof? For I certainly think that I and you and every man do really believe, that to do is a greater evil than to suffer injustice: and not to be punished than to be punished. Polus And I should say neither I, nor any man: would you yourself, for example, suffer rather than do injustice? Socrates Yes, and you, too; I or any man would. Polus Quite the reverse; neither you, nor I, nor any man. Socrates But will you answer? Polus To be sure, I will; for I am curious to hear what you can have to say. Socrates Tell me, then, and you will know, and let us suppose that I am beginning at the beginning: which of the two, Polus, in your opinion, is the worst?⁠—to do injustice or to suffer? Polus I should say that suffering was worst. Socrates And which is the greater disgrace?⁠—Answer. Polus To do. Socrates And the greater disgrace is the greater evil? Polus Certainly not. Socrates I understand you to say, if I am not mistaken, that the honourable is not the same as the good, or the disgraceful as the evil? Polus Certainly not. Socrates Let me ask a question of you: When you speak of beautiful things, such as bodies, colours, figures, sounds, institutions, do you not call them beautiful in reference to some standard: bodies, for example, are beautiful in proportion as they are useful, or as the sight of them gives pleasure to the spectators; can you give any other account of personal beauty? Polus I cannot. Socrates And you would say of figures or colours generally that they were beautiful, either by reason of the pleasure which they give, or of their use, or of both? Polus Yes, I should. Socrates And you would call sounds and music beautiful for the same reason? Polus I should. Socrates Laws and institutions also have no beauty in them except in so far as they are useful or pleasant or both? Polus I think not. Socrates And may not the same be said of the beauty of knowledge? Polus To be sure, Socrates; and I very much approve of your measuring beauty by the standard of pleasure and utility. Socrates And deformity or disgrace may be equally measured by the opposite standard of pain and evil? Polus Certainly. Socrates Then when of two beautiful things one exceeds in beauty, the measure of the excess is to be taken in one or both of these; that is to say, in pleasure or utility or both? Polus Very true. Socrates And of two deformed things, that which exceeds in deformity or disgrace, exceeds either in pain or evil⁠—must it not be so? Polus Yes. Socrates But then again, what was the observation which you just now made, about doing and suffering wrong? Did you not say, that suffering wrong was more evil, and doing wrong more disgraceful? Polus I did. Socrates Then, if doing wrong is more disgraceful than suffering, the more disgraceful must be more painful and must exceed in pain or in evil or both: does not that also follow? Polus Of course. Socrates First, then, let us consider whether the doing of injustice exceeds the suffering in the consequent pain: Do the injurers suffer more than the injured? Polus No, Socrates; certainly not. Socrates Then they do not exceed in pain? Polus No. Socrates But if not in pain, then not in both? Polus Certainly not. Socrates Then they can only exceed in the other? Polus Yes. Socrates That is to say, in evil? Polus True. Socrates Then doing injustice will have an excess of evil, and will therefore be a greater evil than suffering injustice? Polus Clearly. Socrates But have not you and the world already agreed that to do injustice is more disgraceful than to suffer? Polus Yes. Socrates And that is now discovered to be more evil? Polus True. Socrates And would you prefer a greater evil or a greater dishonour to a less one? Answer, Polus, and fear not; for you will come to no harm if you nobly resign yourself into the healing hand of the argument as to a physician without shrinking, and either say “Yes” or “No” to me. Polus I should say “No.” Socrates Would any other man prefer a greater to a less evil? Polus No, not according to this way of putting the case, Socrates. Socrates Then I said truly, Polus, that neither you, nor I, nor any man, would rather do than suffer injustice; for to do injustice is the greater evil of the two. Polus That is