he is not to be envied if he killed him justly.
Polus
At any rate you will allow that he who is unjustly put to death is wretched, and to be pitied?
Socrates
Not so much, Polus, as he who kills him, and not so much as he who is justly killed.
Polus
How can that be, Socrates?
Socrates
That may very well be, inasmuch as doing injustice is the greatest of evils.
Polus
But is it the greatest? Is not suffering injustice a greater evil?
Socrates
Certainly not.
Polus
Then would you rather suffer than do injustice?
Socrates
I should not like either, but if I must choose between them, I would rather suffer than do.
Polus
Then you would not wish to be a tyrant?
Socrates
Not if you mean by tyranny what I mean.
Polus
I mean, as I said before, the power of doing whatever seems good to you in a state, killing, banishing, doing in all things as you like.
Socrates
Well then, illustrious friend, when I have said my say, do you reply to me. Suppose that I go into a crowded Agora, and take a dagger under my arm. Polus, I say to you, I have just acquired rare power, and become a tyrant; for if I think that any of these men whom you see ought to be put to death, the man whom I have a mind to kill is as good as dead; and if I am disposed to break his head or tear his garment, he will have his head broken or his garment torn in an instant. Such is my great power in this city. And if you do not believe me, and I show you the dagger, you would probably reply: Socrates, in that sort of way anyone may have great power—he may burn any house which he pleases, and the docks and triremes of the Athenians, and all their other vessels, whether public or private—but can you believe that this mere doing as you think best is great power?
Polus
Certainly not such doing as this.
Socrates
But can you tell me why you disapprove of such a power?
Polus
I can.
Socrates
Why then?
Polus
Why, because he who did as you say would be certain to be punished.
Socrates
And punishment is an evil?
Polus
Certainly.
Socrates
And you would admit once more, my good sir, that great power is a benefit to a man if his actions turn out to his advantage, and that this is the meaning of great power; and if not, then his power is an evil and is no power. But let us look at the matter in another way:—do we not acknowledge that the things of which we were speaking, the infliction of death, and exile, and the deprivation of property are sometimes a good and sometimes not a good?
Polus
Certainly.
Socrates
About that you and I may be supposed to agree?
Polus
Yes.
Socrates
Tell me, then, when do you say that they are good and when that they are evil—what principle do you lay down?
Polus
I would rather, Socrates, that you should answer as well as ask that question.
Socrates
Well, Polus, since you would rather have the answer from me, I say that they are good when they are just, and evil when they are unjust.
Polus
You are hard of refutation, Socrates, but might not a child refute that statement?
Socrates
Then I shall be very grateful to the child, and equally grateful to you if you will refute me and deliver me from my foolishness. And I hope that refute me you will, and not weary of doing good to a friend.
Polus
Yes, Socrates, and I need not go far or appeal to antiquity; events which happened only a few days ago are enough to refute you, and to prove that many men who do wrong are happy.
Socrates
What events?
Polus
You see, I presume, that Archelaus the son of Perdiccas is now the ruler of Macedonia?
Socrates
At any rate I hear that he is.
Polus
And do you think that he is happy or miserable?
Socrates
I cannot say, Polus, for I have never had any acquaintance with him.
Polus
And cannot you tell at once, and without having an acquaintance with him, whether a man is happy?
Socrates
Most certainly not.
Polus
Then clearly, Socrates, you would say that you did not even know whether the great king was a happy man?
Socrates
And I should speak the truth; for I do not know how he stands in the matter of education and justice.
Polus
What! and does all happiness consist in this?
Socrates
Yes, indeed, Polus, that is my doctrine; the men and women who are gentle and good are also happy, as I maintain, and the unjust and evil are miserable.
Polus
Then, according to your doctrine, the said Archelaus is miserable?
Socrates
Yes, my friend, if he is wicked.
Polus
That he is wicked I cannot deny; for he had no title at all to the throne which he now occupies, he being only the son of a woman who was the slave of Alcetas the brother of Perdiccas; he himself therefore in strict right was the slave of Alcetas; and if he had meant to do rightly he would have remained his slave, and then, according to your doctrine, he would have been happy. But now he is unspeakably miserable, for he has been guilty of the greatest crimes: in the first place he invited his uncle and master, Alcetas, to come to him, under the pretence that he would restore to him the throne which Perdiccas has usurped, and after entertaining him and his son Alexander, who was his own cousin, and nearly of an age with him, and making them drunk, he threw them into a wagon and carried them off by night, and slew them, and got both of them out of the way; and when he had done all this wickedness he never discovered that he was the most miserable of all men, and was very far from repenting: shall I tell you how he showed his remorse? he had
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