Dialogues

answer, that even the scratcher would live pleasantly. Socrates And if pleasantly, then also happily? Callicles To be sure. Socrates But what if the itching is not confined to the head? Shall I pursue the question? And here, Callicles, I would have you consider how you would reply if consequences are pressed upon you, especially if in the last resort you are asked, whether the life of a catamite is not terrible, foul, miserable? Or would you venture to say, that they too are happy, if they only get enough of what they want? Callicles Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of introducing such topics into the argument? Socrates Well, my fine friend, but am I the introducer of these topics, or he who says without any qualification that all who feel pleasure in whatever manner are happy, and who admits of no distinction between good and bad pleasures? And I would still ask, whether you say that pleasure and good are the same, or whether there is some pleasure which is not a good? Callicles Well, then, for the sake of consistency, I will say that they are the same. Socrates You are breaking the original agreement, Callicles, and will no longer be a satisfactory companion in the search after truth, if you say what is contrary to your real opinion. Callicles Why, that is what you are doing too, Socrates. Socrates Then we are both doing wrong. Still, my dear friend, I would ask you to consider whether pleasure, from whatever source derived, is the good; for, if this be true, then the disagreeable consequences which have been darkly intimated must follow, and many others. Callicles That, Socrates, is only your opinion. Socrates And do you, Callicles, seriously maintain what you are saying? Callicles Indeed I do. Socrates Then, as you are in earnest, shall we proceed with the argument? Callicles By all means.125 Socrates Well, if you are willing to proceed, determine this question for me:⁠—There is something, I presume, which you would call knowledge? Callicles There is. Socrates And were you not saying just now, that some courage implied knowledge? Callicles I was. Socrates And you were speaking of courage and knowledge as two things different from one another? Callicles Certainly I was. Socrates And would you say that pleasure and knowledge are the same, or not the same? Callicles Not the same, O man of wisdom. Socrates And would you say that courage differed from pleasure? Callicles Certainly. Socrates Well, then, let us remember that Callicles, the Acharnian, says that pleasure and good are the same; but that knowledge and courage are not the same, either with one another, or with the good. Callicles And what does our friend Socrates, of Foxton, say⁠—does he assent to this, or not? Socrates He does not assent; neither will Callicles, when he sees himself truly. You will admit, I suppose, that good and evil fortune are opposed to each other? Callicles Yes. Socrates And if they are opposed to each other, then, like health and disease, they exclude one another; a man cannot have them both, or be without them both, at the same time? Callicles What do you mean? Socrates Take the case of any bodily affection:⁠—a man may have the complaint in his eyes which is called ophthalmia? Callicles To be sure. Socrates But he surely cannot have the same eyes well and sound at the same time? Callicles Certainly not. Socrates And when he has got rid of his ophthalmia, has he got rid of the health of his eyes too? Is the final result, that he gets rid of them both together? Callicles Certainly not. Socrates That would surely be marvellous and absurd? Callicles Very. Socrates I suppose that he is affected by them, and gets rid of them in turns? Callicles Yes. Socrates And he may have strength and weakness in the same way, by fits? Callicles Yes. Socrates Or swiftness and slowness? Callicles Certainly. Socrates And does he have and not have good and happiness, and their opposites, evil and misery, in a similar alternation?126 Callicles Certainly he has. Socrates If then there be anything which a man has and has not at the same time, clearly that cannot be good and evil⁠—do we agree? Please not to answer without consideration. Callicles I entirely agree. Socrates Go back now to our former admissions.⁠—Did you say that to hunger, I mean the mere state of hunger, was pleasant or painful? Callicles I said painful, but that to eat when you are hungry is pleasant. Socrates I know; but still the actual hunger is painful: am I not right? Callicles Yes. Socrates And thirst, too, is painful? Callicles Yes, very. Socrates Need I adduce any more instances, or would you agree that all wants or desires are painful? Callicles I agree, and therefore you need not adduce any more instances. Socrates Very good. And you would admit that to drink, when you are thirsty, is pleasant? Callicles Yes. Socrates And in the sentence which you have just uttered, the word “thirsty” implies pain? Callicles Yes. Socrates And the word “drinking” is expressive of pleasure, and of the satisfaction of the want? Callicles Yes. Socrates There is pleasure in drinking? Callicles Certainly. Socrates When you are thirsty? Socrates And in pain? Callicles Yes. Socrates Do you see the inference:⁠—that pleasure and pain are simultaneous, when you say that being thirsty, you drink? For are they not simultaneous, and do they not affect at the same time the same part, whether of the soul or the body?⁠—which of them is affected cannot be supposed to be of any consequence: Is not this true? Callicles It is. Socrates You said also, that no man could have good and evil fortune at the same time? Callicles Yes, I did. Socrates But you admitted, that when in pain a man might also have pleasure? Callicles Clearly. Socrates Then pleasure is not the same as good fortune, or pain the same as evil fortune, and therefore the good is not the same as the pleasant? Callicles I wish I knew, Socrates, what your quibbling means. Socrates You know, Callicles, but you affect not to know. Callicles Well, get on, and don’t keep fooling: then you will know what a wiseacre you are in your admonition of me. Socrates Does not a man cease from his thirst and from his pleasure in