Dialogues

drinking at the same time? Callicles I do not understand what you are saying. Gorgias Nay, Callicles, answer, if only for our sakes;⁠—we should like to hear the argument out. Callicles Yes, Gorgias, but I must complain of the habitual trifling of Socrates; he is always arguing about little and unworthy questions. Gorgias What matter? Your reputation, Callicles, is not at stake. Let Socrates argue in his own fashion. Callicles Well, then, Socrates, you shall ask these little peddling questions, since Gorgias wishes to have them. Socrates I envy you, Callicles, for having been initiated into the great mysteries before you were initiated into the lesser. I thought that this was not allowable. But to return to our argument:⁠—Does not a man cease from thirsting and from the pleasure of drinking at the same moment? Callicles True. Socrates And if he is hungry, or has any other desire, does he not cease from the desire and the pleasure at the same moment? Callicles Very true. Socrates Then he ceases from pain and pleasure at the same moment? Callicles Yes. Socrates But he does not cease from good and evil at the same moment, as you have admitted: do you still adhere to what you said? Callicles Yes, I do; but what is the inference? Socrates Why, my friend, the inference is that the good is not the same as the pleasant, or the evil the same as the painful; there is a cessation of pleasure and pain at the same moment; but not of good and evil, for they are different. How then can pleasure be the same as good, or pain as evil? And I would have you look at the matter in another light, which could hardly, I think, have been considered by you when you identified them: Are not the good good because they have good present with them, as the beautiful are those who have beauty present with them? Callicles Yes. Socrates And do you call the fools and cowards good men? For you were saying just now that the courageous and the wise are the good⁠—would you not say so? Callicles Certainly. Socrates And did you never see a foolish child rejoicing? Callicles Yes, I have. Socrates And a foolish man too? Callicles Yes, certainly; but what is your drift? Socrates Nothing particular, if you will only answer. Callicles Yes, I have. Socrates And did you ever see a sensible man rejoicing or sorrowing? Callicles Yes. Socrates Which rejoice and sorrow most⁠—the wise or the foolish? Callicles They are much upon a par, I think, in that respect. Socrates Enough: And did you ever see a coward in battle? Callicles To be sure. Socrates And which rejoiced most at the departure of the enemy, the coward or the brave? Callicles I should say “most” of both; or at any rate, they rejoiced about equally. Socrates No matter; then the cowards, and not only the brave, rejoice? Callicles Greatly. Socrates And the foolish; so it would seem? Callicles Yes. Socrates And are only the cowards pained at the approach of their enemies, or are the brave also pained? Callicles Both are pained. Socrates And are they equally pained? Callicles I should imagine that the cowards are more pained. Socrates And are they not better pleased at the enemy’s departure? Callicles I dare say. Socrates Then are the foolish and the wise and the cowards and the brave all pleased and pained, as you were saying, in nearly equal degree; but are the cowards more pleased and pained than the brave? Callicles Yes. Socrates But surely the wise and brave are the good, and the foolish and the cowardly are the bad? Callicles Yes. Socrates Then the good and the bad are pleased and pained in a nearly equal degree? Callicles Yes. Socrates Then are the good and bad good and bad in a nearly equal degree, or have the bad the advantage both in good and evil? (i.e. in having more pleasure and more pain.) Callicles I really do not know what you mean. Socrates Why, do you not remember saying that the good were good because good was present with them, and the evil because evil; and that pleasures were goods and pains evils? Callicles Yes, I remember. Socrates And are not these pleasures or goods present to those who rejoice⁠—if they do rejoice? Callicles Certainly. Socrates Then those who rejoice are good when goods are present with them? Callicles Yes. Socrates And those who are in pain have evil or sorrow present with them? Callicles Yes. Socrates And would you still say that the evil are evil by reason of the presence of evil? Callicles I should. Socrates Then those who rejoice are good, and those who are in pain evil? Callicles Yes. Socrates The degrees of good and evil vary with the degrees of pleasure and of pain? Callicles Yes. Socrates Have the wise man and the fool, the brave and the coward, joy and pain in nearly equal degrees? or would you say that the coward has more? Callicles I should say that he has. Socrates Help me then to draw out the conclusion which follows from our admissions; for it is good to repeat and review what is good twice and thrice over, as they say. Both the wise man and the brave man we allow to be good? Callicles Yes. Socrates And the foolish man and the coward to be evil? Callicles Certainly. Socrates And he who has joy is good? Callicles Yes. Socrates And he who is in pain is evil? Callicles Certainly. Socrates The good and evil both have joy and pain, but, perhaps, the evil has more of them? Callicles Yes. Socrates Then must we not infer, that the bad man is as good and bad as the good, or, perhaps, even better?⁠—is not this a further inference which follows equally with the preceding from the assertion that the good and the pleasant are the same:⁠—can this be denied, Callicles? Callicles I have been listening and making admissions to you, Socrates; and I remark that if a person grants you anything in play, you, like a child, want to keep hold and will not give it back. But do you really suppose that I or any other human being denies that some pleasures are good and others bad? Socrates Alas, Callicles, how unfair you are! you certainly treat me as if I were