Dialogues

himself to learn what he already knows? Theaetetus It would be too absurd, Socrates. Socrates Shall we say then that he is going to read or number what he does not know, although we have admitted that he knows all letters and all numbers? Theaetetus That, again, would be an absurdity. Socrates Then shall we say that about names we care nothing?⁠—anyone may twist and turn the words “knowing” and “learning” in any way which he likes, but since we have determined that the possession of knowledge is not the having or using it, we do assert that a man cannot not possess that which he possesses; and, therefore, in no case can a man not know that which he knows, but he may get a false opinion about it; for he may have the knowledge, not of this particular thing, but of some other;⁠—when the various numbers and forms of knowledge are flying about in the aviary, and wishing to capture a certain sort of knowledge out of the general store, he takes the wrong one by mistake, that is to say, when he thought eleven to be twelve, he got hold of the ringdove which he had in his mind, when he wanted the pigeon. Theaetetus A very rational explanation. Socrates But when he catches the one which he wants, then he is not deceived, and has an opinion of what is, and thus false and true opinion may exist, and the difficulties which were previously raised disappear. I dare say that you agree with me, do you not? Theaetetus Yes. Socrates And so we are rid of the difficulty of a man’s not knowing what he knows, for we are not driven to the inference that he does not possess what he possesses, whether he be or be not deceived. And yet I fear that a greater difficulty is looking in at the window. Theaetetus What is it? Socrates How can the exchange of one knowledge for another ever become false opinion? Theaetetus What do you mean? Socrates In the first place, how can a man who has the knowledge of anything be ignorant of that which he knows, not by reason of ignorance, but by reason of his own knowledge? And, again, is it not an extreme absurdity that he should suppose another thing to be this, and this to be another thing;⁠—that, having knowledge present with him in his mind, he should still know nothing and be ignorant of all things?⁠—you might as well argue that ignorance may make a man know, and blindness make him see, as that knowledge can make him ignorant. Theaetetus Perhaps, Socrates, we may have been wrong in making only forms of knowledge our birds: whereas there ought to have been forms of ignorance as well, flying about together in the mind, and then he who sought to take one of them might sometimes catch a form of knowledge, and sometimes a form of ignorance; and thus he would have a false opinion from ignorance, but a true one from knowledge, about the same thing. Socrates I cannot help praising you, Theaetetus, and yet I must beg you to reconsider your words. Let us grant what you say⁠—then, according to you, he who takes ignorance will have a false opinion⁠—am I right? Theaetetus Yes. Socrates He will certainly not think that he has a false opinion? Theaetetus Of course not. Socrates He will think that his opinion is true, and he will fancy that he knows the things about which he has been deceived? Theaetetus Certainly. Socrates Then he will think that he has captured knowledge and not ignorance? Theaetetus Clearly. Socrates And thus, after going a long way round, we are once more face to face with our original difficulty. The hero of dialectic will retort upon us:⁠—“O my excellent friends, he will say, laughing, if a man knows the form of ignorance and the form of knowledge, can he think that one of them which he knows is the other which he knows? or, if he knows neither of them, can he think that the one which he knows not is another which he knows not? or, if he knows one and not the other, can he think the one which he knows to be the one which he does not know? or the one which he does not know to be the one which he knows? or will you tell me that there are other forms of knowledge which distinguish the right and wrong birds, and which the owner keeps in some other aviaries or graven on waxen blocks according to your foolish images, and which he may be said to know while he possesses them, even though he have them not at hand in his mind? And thus, in a perpetual circle, you will be compelled to go round and round, and you will make no progress.” What are we to say in reply, Theaetetus? Theaetetus Indeed, Socrates, I do not know what we are to say. Socrates Are not his reproaches just, and does not the argument truly show that we are wrong in seeking for false opinion until we know what knowledge is; that must be first ascertained; then, the nature of false opinion? Theaetetus I cannot but agree with you, Socrates, so far as we have yet gone. Socrates Then, once more, what shall we say that knowledge is?⁠—for we are not going to lose heart as yet. Theaetetus Certainly, I shall not lose heart, if you do not. Socrates What definition will be most consistent with our former views? Theaetetus I cannot think of any but our old one, Socrates. Socrates What was it? Theaetetus Knowledge was said by us to be true opinion; and true opinion is surely unerring, and the results which follow from it are all noble and good. Socrates He who led the way into the river, Theaetetus, said “The experiment will show”; and perhaps if we go forward in the search, we may stumble upon the thing which we are looking for; but if we stay where we are, nothing will come to light. Theaetetus Very true; let us go