Dialogues

forward and try. Socrates The trail soon comes to an end, for a whole profession is against us. Theaetetus How is that, and what profession do you mean? Socrates The profession of the great wise ones who are called orators and lawyers; for these persuade men by their art and make them think whatever they like, but they do not teach them. Do you imagine that there are any teachers in the world so clever as to be able to convince others of the truth about acts of robbery or violence, of which they were not eyewitnesses, while a little water is flowing in the clepsydra? Theaetetus Certainly not, they can only persuade them. Socrates And would you not say that persuading them is making them have an opinion? Theaetetus To be sure. Socrates When, therefore, judges are justly persuaded about matters which you can know only by seeing them, and not in any other way, and when thus judging of them from report they attain a true opinion about them, they judge without knowledge, and yet are rightly persuaded, if they have judged well. Theaetetus Certainly. Socrates And yet, O my friend, if true opinion in law courts320 and knowledge are the same, the perfect judge could not have judged rightly without knowledge; and therefore I must infer that they are not the same. Theaetetus That is a distinction, Socrates, which I have heard made by someone else, but I had forgotten it. He said that true opinion, combined with reason, was knowledge, but that the opinion which had no reason was out of the sphere of knowledge; and that things of which there is no rational account are not knowable⁠—such was the singular expression which he used⁠—and that things which have a reason or explanation are knowable. Socrates Excellent; but then, how did he distinguish between things which are and are not “knowable”? I wish that you would repeat to me what he said, and then I shall know whether you and I have heard the same tale. Theaetetus I do not know whether I can recall it; but if another person would tell me, I think that I could follow him. Socrates Let me give you, then, a dream in return for a dream:⁠—Methought that I too had a dream, and I heard in my dream that the primeval letters or elements out of which you and I and all other things are compounded, have no reason or explanation; you can only name them, but no predicate can be either affirmed or denied of them, for in the one case existence, in the other nonexistence is already implied, neither of which must be added, if you mean to speak of this or that thing by itself alone. It should not be called itself, or that, or each, or alone, or this, or the like; for these go about everywhere and are applied to all things, but are distinct from them; whereas, if the first elements could be described, and had a definition of their own, they would be spoken of apart from all else. But none of these primeval elements can be defined; they can only be named, for they have nothing but a name, and the things which are compounded of them, as they are complex, are expressed by a combination of names, for the combination of names is the essence of a definition. Thus, then, the elements or letters are only objects of perception, and cannot be defined or known; but the syllables or combinations of them are known and expressed, and are apprehended by true opinion. When, therefore, anyone forms the true opinion of anything without rational explanation, you may say that his mind is truly exercised, but has no knowledge; for he who cannot give and receive a reason for a thing, has no knowledge of that thing; but when he adds rational explanation, then, he is perfected in knowledge and may be all that I have been denying of him. Was that the form in which the dream appeared to you? Theaetetus Precisely. Socrates And you allow and maintain that true opinion, combined with definition or rational explanation, is knowledge? Theaetetus Exactly. Socrates Then may we assume, Theaetetus, that today, and in this casual manner, we have found a truth which in former times many wise men have grown old and have not found? Theaetetus At any rate, Socrates, I am satisfied with the present statement. Socrates Which is probably correct⁠—for how can there be knowledge apart from definition and true opinion? And yet there is one point in what has been said which does not quite satisfy me. Theaetetus What was it? Socrates What might seem to be the most ingenious notion of all:⁠—That the elements or letters are unknown, but the combination or syllables known. Theaetetus And was that wrong? Socrates We shall soon know; for we have as hostages the instances which the author of the argument himself used. Theaetetus What hostages? Socrates The letters, which are the clements; and the syllables, which are the combinations;⁠—he reasoned, did he not, from the letters of the alphabet? Theaetetus Yes; he did. Socrates Let us take them and put them to the test, or rather, test ourselves:⁠—What was the way in which we learned letters? and, first of all, are we right in saying that syllables have a definition, but that letters have no definition? Theaetetus I think so. Socrates I think so too; for, suppose that someone asks you to spell the first syllable of my name:⁠—Theaetetus, he says, what is SO? Theaetetus I should reply s and o. Socrates That is the definition which you would give of the syllable? Theaetetus I should. Socrates I wish that you would give me a similar definition of the s. Theaetetus But how can anyone, Socrates, tell the elements of an element? I can only reply, that s is a consonant, a mere noise, as of the tongue hissing; b, and most other letters, again, are neither vowel-sounds nor noises. Thus letters may be most truly said to be undefined; for even the most distinct