Dialogues

of them, which are the seven vowels, have a sound only, but no definition at all. Socrates Then, I suppose, my friend, that we have been so far right in our idea about knowledge? Theaetetus Yes; I think that we have. Socrates Well, but have we been right in maintaining that the syllables can be known, but not the letters? Theaetetus I think so. Socrates And do we mean by a syllable two letters, or if there are more, all of them, or a single idea which arises out of the combination of them? Theaetetus I should say that we mean all the letters. Socrates Take the case of the two letters s and o, which form the first syllable of my own name; must not he who knows the syllable, know both of them? Theaetetus Certainly. Socrates He knows, that is, the s and o? Theaetetus Yes. Socrates But can he be ignorant of either singly and yet know both together? Theaetetus Such a supposition, Socrates, is monstrous and unmeaning. Socrates But if he cannot know both without knowing each, then if he is ever to know the syllable, he must know the letters first; and thus the fine theory has again taken wings and departed. Theaetetus Yes, with wonderful celerity. Socrates Yes, we did not keep watch properly. Perhaps we ought to have maintained that a syllable is not the letters, but rather one single idea framed out of them, having a separate form distinct from them. Theaetetus Very true; and a more likely notion than the other. Socrates Take care; let us not be cowards and betray a great and imposing theory. Theaetetus No, indeed. Socrates Let us assume then, as we now say, that the syllable is a simple form arising out of the several combinations of harmonious elements⁠—of letters or of any other elements. Theaetetus Very good. Socrates And it must have no parts. Theaetetus Why? Socrates Because that which has parts must be a whole of all the parts. Or would you say that a whole, although formed out of the parts, is a single notion different from all the parts? Theaetetus I should. Socrates And would you say that all and the whole are the same, or different? Theaetetus I am not certain; but, as you like me to answer at once, I shall hazard the reply, that they are different. Socrates I approve of your readiness, Theaetetus, but I must take time to think whether I equally approve of your answer. Theaetetus Yes; the answer is the point. Socrates According to this new view, the whole is supposed to differ from all? Theaetetus Yes. Socrates Well, but is there any difference between all (in the plural) and the all (in the singular)? Take the case of number:⁠—When we say one, two, three, four, five, six; or when we say twice three, or three times two, or four and two, or three and two and one, are we speaking of the same or of different numbers? Theaetetus Of the same. Socrates That is of six? Theaetetus Yes. Socrates And in each form of expression we spoke of all the six? Theaetetus True. Socrates Again, in speaking of all (in the plural) is there not one thing which we express?321 Theaetetus Of course there is. Socrates And that is six? Theaetetus Yes. Socrates Then in predicating the word “all” of things measured by number, we predicate at the same time a singular and a plural? Theaetetus Clearly we do. Socrates Again, the number of the acre and the acre are the same; are they not? Theaetetus Yes. Socrates And the number of the stadium in like manner is the stadium? Theaetetus Yes. Socrates And the army is the number of the army; and in all similar cases, the entire number of anything is the entire thing? Theaetetus True. Socrates And the number of each is the parts of each? Theaetetus Exactly. Socrates Then as many things as have parts are made up of parts? Theaetetus Clearly. Socrates But all the parts are admitted to be the all, if the entire number is the all? Theaetetus True. Socrates Then the whole is not made up of parts, for it would be the all, if consisting of all the parts? Theaetetus That is the inference. Socrates But is a part a part of anything but the whole? Theaetetus Yes, of the all. Socrates You make a valiant defence, Theaetetus. And yet is not the all that of which nothing is wanting? Theaetetus Certainly. Socrates And is not a whole likewise that from which nothing is absent? but that from which anything is absent is neither a whole nor all;⁠—if wanting in anything, both equally lose their entirety of nature. Theaetetus I now think that there is no difference between a whole and all. Socrates But were we not saying that when a thing has parts, all the parts will be a whole and all? Theaetetus Certainly. Socrates Then, as I was saying before, must not the alternative be that either the syllable is not the letters, and then the letters are not parts of the syllable, or that the syllable will be the same with the letters, and will therefore be equally known with them? Theaetetus You are right. Socrates And, in order to avoid this, we suppose it to be different from them? Theaetetus Yes. Socrates But if letters are not parts of syllables, can you tell me of any other parts of syllables, which are not letters? Theaetetus No, indeed, Socrates; for if I admit the existence of parts in a syllable, it would be ridiculous in me to give up letters and seek for other parts. Socrates Quite true, Theaetetus, and therefore, according to our present view, a syllable must surely be some indivisible form? Theaetetus True. Socrates But do you remember, my friend, that only a little while ago we admitted and approved the statement, that of the first elements out of which all other things are compounded there could be no definition, because each of them when taken by itself is uncompounded; nor can one rightly attribute to them the words “being” or “this,” because they are alien and inappropriate words, and for this reason the letters or elements were indefinable and unknown? Theaetetus I remember. Socrates And is not this also the reason why they are simple