Dialogues

epub:type="z3998:persona">Theaetetus Yes. Stranger And what is the quality of each of these two sentences? Theaetetus The one, as I imagine, is false, and the other true. Stranger The true says what is true about you? Theaetetus Yes. Stranger And the false says what is other than true? Theaetetus Yes. Stranger And therefore speaks of things which are not as if they were? Theaetetus True. Stranger And say that things are real of you which are not; for, as we were saying, in regard to each thing or person, there is much that is and much that is not. Theaetetus Quite true. Stranger The second of the two sentences which related to you was first of all an example of the shortest form consistent with our definition. Theaetetus Yes, this was implied in recent admission. Stranger And, in the second place, it related to a subject? Theaetetus Yes. Stranger Who must be you, and can be nobody else? Theaetetus Unquestionably. Stranger And it would be no sentence at all if there were no subject, for, as we proved, a sentence which has no subject is impossible. Theaetetus Quite true. Stranger When other, then, is asserted of you as the same, and not-being as being, such a combination of nouns and verbs is really and truly false discourse. Theaetetus Most true. Stranger And therefore thought, opinion, and imagination are now proved to exist in our minds both as true and false. Theaetetus How so? Stranger You will know better if you first gain a knowledge of what they are, and in what they severally differ from one another. Theaetetus Give me the knowledge which you would wish me to gain. Stranger Are not thought and speech the same, with this exception, that what is called thought is the unuttered conversation of the soul with herself? Theaetetus Quite true. Stranger But the stream of thought which flows through the lips and is audible is called speech? Theaetetus True. Stranger And we know that there exists in speech⁠ ⁠… Theaetetus What exists? Stranger Affirmation. Theaetetus Yes, we know it. Stranger When the affirmation or denial takes Place in silence and in the mind only, have you any other name by which to call it but opinion? Theaetetus There can be no other name. Stranger And when opinion is presented, not simply, but in some form of sense, would you not call it imagination? Theaetetus Certainly. Stranger And seeing that language is true and false, and that thought is the conversation of the soul with herself, and opinion is the end of thinking, and imagination or fantasy is the union of sense and opinion, the inference is that some of them, since they are akin to language, should have an element of falsehood as well as of truth? Theaetetus Certainly. Stranger Do you perceive, then, that false opinion and speech have been discovered sooner than we expected?⁠—For just now we seemed to be undertaking a task which would never be accomplished. Theaetetus I perceive. Stranger Then let us not be discouraged about the future; but now having made this discovery, let us go back to our previous classification. Theaetetus What classification? Stranger We divided image-making into two sorts; the one likeness-making, the other imaginative or fantastic. Theaetetus True. Stranger And we said that we were uncertain in which we should place the Sophist. Theaetetus We did say so. Stranger And our heads began to go round more and more when it was asserted that there is no such thing as an image or idol or appearance, because in no manner or time or place can there ever be such a thing as falsehood. Theaetetus True. Stranger And now, since there has been shown to be false speech and false opinion, there may be imitations of real existences, and out of this condition of the mind an art of deception may arise. Theaetetus Quite possible. Stranger And we have already admitted, in what preceded, that the Sophist was lurking in one of the divisions of the likeness-making art? Theaetetus Yes. Stranger Let us, then, renew the attempt, and in dividing any class, always take the part to the right, holding fast to that which holds the Sophist, until we have stripped him of all his common properties, and reached his difference or peculiar. Then we may exhibit him in his true nature, first to ourselves and then to kindred dialectical spirits. Theaetetus Very good. Stranger You may remember that all art was originally divided by us into creative and acquisitive. Theaetetus Yes. Stranger And the Sophist was flitting before us in the acquisitive class, in the subdivisions of hunting, contests, merchandize, and the like. Theaetetus Very true. Stranger But now that the imitative art has enclosed him, it is clear that we must begin by dividing the art of creation; for imitation is a kind of creation⁠—of images, however, as we affirm, and not of real things. Theaetetus Quite true. Stranger In the first place, there are two kinds of creation. Theaetetus What are they? Stranger One of them is human and the other divine. Theaetetus I do not follow. Stranger Every power, as you may remember our saying originally, which causes things to exist, not previously existing, was defined by us as creative. Theaetetus I remember. Stranger Looking, now, at the world and all the animals and plants, at things which grow upon the earth from seeds and roots, as well as at inanimate substances which are formed within the earth, fusile or non-fusile, shall we say that they come into existence⁠—not having existed previously⁠—by the creation of God, or shall we agree with vulgar opinion about them? Theaetetus What is it? Stranger The opinion that nature brings them into being from some spontaneous and unintelligent cause. Or shall we say that they are created by a divine reason and a knowledge which comes from God? Theaetetus I dare say that, owing to my youth, I may often waver in my view, but now when I look at you and see that you incline to refer them to God, I defer to your authority. Stranger Nobly said, Theaetetus, and if I thought that you were one of those who would hereafter change your mind, I would have gently argued with you, and forced you to assent; but as I perceive that you will come of yourself and without any argument of mine, to that belief which, as