Dialogues

you say, attracts you, I will not forestall the work of time. Let me suppose, then, that things which are said to be made by nature are the work of divine art, and that things which are made by man out of these are works of human art. And so there are two kinds of making and production, the one human and the other divine. Theaetetus True. Stranger Then, now, subdivide each of the two sections which we have already. Theaetetus How do you mean? Stranger I mean to say that you should make a vertical division of production or invention, as you have already made a lateral one. Theaetetus I have done so. Stranger Then, now, there are in all four parts or segments⁠—two of them have reference to us and are human, and two of them have reference to the gods and are divine. Theaetetus True. Stranger And, again, in the division which was supposed to be made in the other way, one part in each subdivision is the making of the things themselves, but the two remaining parts may be called the making of likenesses; and so the productive art is again divided into two parts. Theaetetus Tell me the divisions once more. Stranger I suppose that we, and the other animals, and the elements out of which things are made⁠—fire, water, and the like⁠—are known by us to be each and all the creation and work of God. Theaetetus True. Stranger And there are images of them, which are not them, but which correspond to them; and these are also the creation of a wonderful skill. Theaetetus What are they? Stranger The appearances which spring up of themselves in sleep or by day, such as a shadow when darkness arises in a fire, or the reflection which is produced when the light in bright and smooth objects meets on their surface with an external light, and creates a perception the opposite of our ordinary sight. Theaetetus Yes; and the images as well as the creation are equally the work of a divine hand. Stranger And what shall we say of human art? Do we not make one house by the art of building, and another by the art of drawing, which is a sort of dream created by man for those who are awake? Theaetetus Quite true. Stranger And other products of human creation are also twofold and go in pairs; there is the thing, with which the art of making the thing is concerned, and the image, with which imitation is concerned. Theaetetus Now I begin to understand, and am ready to acknowledge that there are two kinds of production, and each of them twofold; in the lateral division there is both a divine and a human production; in the vertical there are realities and a creation of a kind of similitudes. Stranger And let us not forget that of the imitative class the one part was to have been likeness-making, and the other fantastic, if it could be shown that falsehood is a reality and belongs to the class of real being. Theaetetus Yes. Stranger And this appeared to be the case; and therefore now, without hesitation, we shall number the different kinds as two. Theaetetus True. Stranger Then, now, let us again divide the fantastic art. Theaetetus Where shall we make the division? Stranger There is one kind which is produced by an instrument, and another in which the creator of the appearance is himself the instrument. Theaetetus What do you mean? Stranger When anyone makes himself appear like another in his figure or his voice, imitation is the name for this part of the fantastic art. Theaetetus Yes. Stranger Let this, then, be named the art of mimicry, and this the province assigned to it; as for the other division, we are weary and will give that up, leaving to someone else the duty of making the class and giving it a suitable name. Theaetetus Let us do as you say⁠—assign a sphere to the one and leave the other. Stranger There is a further distinction, Theaetetus, which is worthy of our consideration, and for a reason which I will tell you. Theaetetus Let me hear. Stranger There are some who imitate, knowing what they imitate, and some who do not know. And what line of distinction can there possibly be greater than that which divides ignorance from knowledge? Theaetetus There can be no greater. Stranger Was not the sort of imitation of which we spoke just now the imitation of those who know? For he who would imitate you would surely know you and your figure? Theaetetus Naturally. Stranger And what would you say of the figure or form of justice or of virtue in general? Are we not well aware that many, having no knowledge of either, but only a sort of opinion, do their best to show that this opinion is really entertained by them, by expressing it, as far as they can, in word and deed? Theaetetus Yes, that is very common. Stranger And do they always fail in their attempt to be thought just, when they are not? Or is not the very opposite true? Theaetetus The very opposite. Stranger Such a one, then, should be described as an imitator⁠—to be distinguished from the other, as he who is ignorant is distinguished from him who knows? Theaetetus True. Stranger Can we find a suitable name for each of them? This is clearly not an easy task; for among the ancients there was some confusion of ideas, which prevented them from attempting to divide genera into species; wherefore there is no great abundance of names. Yet, for the sake of distinctness, I will make bold to call the imitation which coexists with opinion, the imitation of appearance⁠—that which coexists with science, a scientific or learned imitation. Theaetetus Granted. Stranger The former is our present concern, for the Sophist was classed with imitators indeed, but not among those who have knowledge. Theaetetus Very true. Stranger Let us, then, examine our imitator of appearance, and see whether he is sound, like a piece of iron, or whether there is still some crack in him. Theaetetus Let us examine him. Stranger Indeed there is a very considerable crack; for if you