Dialogues

being, and therefore he will not continue fighting in this direction, but he will probably say that some ideas partake of not-being, and some not, and that language and opinion are of the non-partaking class; and he will still fight to the death against the existence of the image-making and fantastic art, in which we have placed him, because, as he will say, opinion and language do not partake of not-being, and unless this participation exists, there can be no such thing as falsehood. And, with the view of meeting this evasion, we must begin by enquiring into the nature of language, opinion, and imagination, in order that when we find them we may find also that they have communion with not-being, and, having made out the connection of them, may thus prove that falsehood exists; and therein we will imprison the Sophist, if he deserves it, or, if not, we will let him go again and look for him in another class. Theaetetus Certainly, Stranger, there appears to be truth in what was said about the Sophist at first, that he was of a class not easily caught, for he seems to have abundance of defences, which he throws up, and which must every one of them be stormed before we can reach the man himself. And even now, we have with difficulty got through his first defence, which is the not-being of not-being, and lo! here is another; for we have still to show that falsehood exists in the sphere of language and opinion, and there will be another and another line of defence without end. Stranger Anyone, Theaetetus, who is able to advance even a little ought to be of good cheer, for what would he who is dispirited at a little progress do, if he were making none at all, or even undergoing a repulse? Such a faint heart, as the proverb says, will never take a city: but now that we have succeeded thus far, the citadel is ours, and what remains is easier. Theaetetus Very true. Stranger Then, as I was saying, let us first of all obtain a conception of language and opinion, in order that we may have clearer grounds for determining, whether not-being has any concern with them, or whether they are both always true, and neither of them ever false. Theaetetus True. Stranger Then, now, let us speak of names, as before we were speaking of ideas and letters; for that is the direction in which the answer may be expected. Theaetetus And what is the question at issue about names? Stranger The question at issue is whether all names may be connected with one another, or none, or only some of them. Theaetetus Clearly the last is true. Stranger I understand you to say that words which have a meaning when in sequence may be connected, but that words which have no meaning when in sequence cannot be connected? Theaetetus What are you saying? Stranger What I thought that you intended when you gave your assent; for there are two sorts of intimation of being which are given by the voice. Theaetetus What are they? Stranger One of them is called nouns, and the other verbs. Theaetetus Describe them. Stranger That which denotes action we call a verb. Theaetetus True. Stranger And the other, which is an articulate mark set on those who do the actions, we call a noun. Theaetetus Quite true. Stranger A succession of nouns only is not a sentence, any more than of verbs without nouns. Theaetetus I do not understand you. Stranger I see that when you gave your assent you had something else in your mind. But what I intended to say was, that a mere succession of nouns or of verbs is not discourse. Theaetetus What do you mean? Stranger I mean that words like “walks,” “runs,” “sleeps,” or any other words which denote action, however many of them you string together, do not make discourse. Theaetetus How can they? Stranger Or, again, when you say “lion,” “stag,” “horse,” or any other words which denote agents⁠—neither in this way of stringing words together do you attain to discourse; for there is no expression of action or inaction, or of the existence of existence or nonexistence indicated by the sounds, until verbs are mingled with nouns; then the words fit, and the smallest combination of them forms language, and is the simplest and least form of discourse. Theaetetus Again I ask, What do you mean? Stranger When anyone says “A man learns,” should you not call this the simplest and least of sentences? Theaetetus Yes. Stranger Yes, for he now arrives at the point of giving an intimation about something which is, or is becoming, or has become, or will be. And he not only names, but he does something, by connecting verbs with nouns; and therefore we say that he discourses, and to this connection of words we give the name of discourse. Theaetetus True. Stranger And as there are some things which fit one another, and other things which do not fit, so there are some vocal signs which do, and others which do not, combine and form discourse. Theaetetus Quite true. Stranger There is another small matter. Theaetetus What is it? Stranger A sentence must and cannot help having a subject. Theaetetus True. Stranger And must be of a certain quality. Theaetetus Certainly. Stranger And now let us mind what we are about. Theaetetus We must do so. Stranger I will repeat a sentence to you in which a thing and an action are combined, by the help of a noun and a verb; and you shall tell me of whom the sentence speaks. Theaetetus I will, to the best of my power. Stranger “Theaetetus sits”⁠—not a very long sentence. Theaetetus Not very. Stranger Of whom does the sentence speak, and who is the subject? that is what you have to tell. Theaetetus Of me; I am the subject. Stranger Or this sentence, again⁠— Theaetetus What sentence? Stranger “Theaetetus, with whom I am now speaking, is flying.” Theaetetus That also is a sentence which will be admitted by everyone to speak of me, and to apply to me. Stranger We agreed that every sentence must necessarily have a certain quality.