Dialogues

epub:type="z3998:persona">Stranger And yet is, because partaking of being. Theaetetus True. Stranger Again, motion is other than the same? Theaetetus Just so. Stranger And is therefore not the same. Theaetetus It is not. Stranger Yet, surely, motion is the same, because all things partake of the same. Theaetetus Very true. Stranger Then we must admit, and not object to say, that motion is the same and is not the same, for we do not apply the terms “same” and “not the same,” in the same sense; but we call it the “same,” in relation to itself, because partaking of the same; and not the same, because having communion with the other, it is thereby severed from the same, and has become not that but other, and is therefore rightly spoken of as “not the same.” Theaetetus To be sure. Stranger And if absolute motion in any point of view partook of rest, there would be no absurdity in calling motion stationary. Theaetetus Quite right⁠—that is, on the supposition that some classes mingle with one another, and others not. Stranger That such a communion of kinds is according to nature, we had already proved333 before we arrived at this part of our discussion. Theaetetus Certainly. Stranger Let us proceed, then. May we not say that motion is other than the other, having been also proved by us to be other than the same and other than rest? Theaetetus That is certain. Stranger Then, according to this view, motion is other and also not other? Theaetetus True. Stranger What is the next step? Shall we say that motion is other than the three and not other than the fourth⁠—for we agreed that there are five classes about and in the sphere of which we proposed to make enquiry? Theaetetus Surely we cannot admit that the number is less than it appeared to be just now. Stranger Then we may without fear contend that motion is other than being? Theaetetus Without the least fear. Stranger The plain result is that motion, since it partakes of being, really is and also is not? Theaetetus Nothing can be plainer. Stranger Then not-being necessarily exists in the case of motion and of every class; for the nature of the other entering into them all, makes each of them other than being, and so nonexistent; and therefore of all of them, in like manner, we may truly say that they are not; and again, inasmuch as they partake of being, that they are and are existent. Theaetetus So we may assume. Stranger Every class, then, has plurality of being and infinity of not-being. Theaetetus So we must infer. Stranger And being itself may be said to be other than the other kinds. Theaetetus Certainly. Stranger Then we may infer that being is not, in respect of as many other things as there are; for not-being these it is itself one, and is not the other things, which are infinite in number. Theaetetus That is not far from the truth. Stranger And we must not quarrel with this result, since it is of the nature of classes to have communion with one another; and if anyone denies our present statement [viz., that being is not, etc.], let him first argue with our former conclusion [i.e., respecting the communion of ideas], and then he may proceed to argue with what follows. Theaetetus Nothing can be fairer. Stranger Let me ask you to consider a further question. Theaetetus What question? Stranger When we speak of not-being, we speak, I suppose, not of something opposed to being, but only different. Theaetetus What do you mean? Stranger When we speak of something as not great, does the expression seem to you to imply what is little any more than what is equal? Theaetetus Certainly not. Stranger The negative particles, ou and me, when prefixed to words, do not imply opposition, but only difference from the words, or more correctly from the things represented by the words, which follow them. Theaetetus Quite true. Stranger There is another point to be considered, if you do not object. Theaetetus What is it? Stranger The nature of the other appears to me to be divided into fractions like knowledge. Theaetetus How so? Stranger Knowledge, like the other, is one; and yet the various parts of knowledge have each of them their own particular name, and hence there are many arts and kinds of knowledge. Theaetetus Quite true. Stranger And is not the case the same with the parts of the other, which is also one? Theaetetus Very likely; but will you tell me how? Stranger There is some part of the other which is opposed to the beautiful? Theaetetus There is. Stranger Shall we say that this has or has not a name? Theaetetus It has; for whatever we call not-beautiful is other than the beautiful, not than something else. Stranger And now tell me another thing. Theaetetus What? Stranger Is the not-beautiful anything but this⁠—an existence parted off from a certain kind of existence, and again from another point of view opposed to an existing something? Theaetetus True. Stranger Then the not-beautiful turns out to be the opposition of being to being? Theaetetus Very true. Stranger But upon this view, is the beautiful a more real and the not-beautiful a less real existence? Theaetetus Not at all. Stranger And the not-great may be said to exist, equally with the great? Theaetetus Yes. Stranger And, in the same way, the just must be placed in the same category with the not-just⁠—the one cannot be said to have any more existence than the other. Theaetetus True. Stranger The same may be said of other things; seeing that the nature of the other has a real existence, the parts of this nature must equally be supposed to exist. Theaetetus Of course. Stranger Then, as would appear, the opposition of a part of the other, and of a part of being, to one another, is, if I may venture to say so, as truly essence as being itself, and implies not the opposite of being, but only what is other than being. Theaetetus Beyond question. Stranger What then shall we call it? Theaetetus Clearly, not-being; and this is the very nature for which the Sophist compelled us to search. Stranger And has not this, as you were saying, as real an existence as any other class? May