Dialogues

steering our way in between them, without any great discredit. Theaetetus Very good. Stranger Let us enquire, then, how we come to predicate many names of the same thing. Theaetetus Give an example. Stranger I mean that we speak of man, for example, under many names⁠—that we attribute to him colours and forms and magnitudes and virtues and vices, in all of which instances and in ten thousand others we not only speak of him as a man, but also as good, and having numberless other attributes, and in the same way anything else which we originally supposed to be one is described by us as many, and under many names. Theaetetus That is true. Stranger And thus we provide a rich feast for tyros, whether young or old; for there is nothing easier than to argue that the one cannot be many, or the many one; and great is their delight in denying that a man is good; for man, they insist, is man and good is good. I dare say that you have met with persons who take an interest in such matters⁠—they are often elderly men, whose meagre sense is thrown into amazement by these discoveries of theirs, which they believe to be the height of wisdom. Theaetetus Certainly, I have. Stranger Then, not to exclude anyone who has ever speculated at all upon the nature of being, let us put our questions to them as well as to our former friends. Theaetetus What questions? Stranger Shall we refuse to attribute being to motion and rest, or anything to anything, and assume that they do not mingle, and are incapable of participating in one another? Or shall we gather all into one class of things communicable with one another? Or are some things communicable and others not?⁠—Which of these alternatives, Theaetetus, will they prefer? Theaetetus I have nothing to answer on their behalf. Suppose that you take all these hypotheses in turn, and see what are the consequences which follow from each of them. Stranger Very good, and first let us assume them to say that nothing is capable of participating in anything else in any respect; in that case rest and motion cannot participate in being at all. Theaetetus They cannot. Stranger But would either of them be if not participating in being? Theaetetus No. Stranger Then by this admission everything is instantly overturned, as well the doctrine of universal motion as of universal rest, and also the doctrine of those who distribute being into immutable and everlasting kinds; for all these add on a notion of being, some affirming that things “are” truly in motion, and others that they “are” truly at rest. Theaetetus Just so. Stranger Again, those who would at one time compound, and at another resolve all things, whether making them into one and out of one creating infinity, or dividing them into finite elements, and forming compounds out of these; whether they suppose the processes of creation to be successive or continuous, would be talking nonsense in all this if there were no admixture. Theaetetus True. Stranger Most ridiculous of all will the men themselves be who want to carry out the argument and yet forbid us to call anything, because participating in some affection from another, by the name of that other. Theaetetus Why so? Stranger Why, because they are compelled to use the words “to be,” “apart,” “from others,” “in itself,” and ten thousand more, which they cannot give up, but must make the connecting links of discourse; and therefore they do not require to be refuted by others, but their enemy, as the saying is, inhabits the same house with them; they are always carrying about with them an adversary, like the wonderful ventriloquist, Eurycles, who out of their own bellies audibly contradicts them. Theaetetus Precisely so; a very true and exact illustration. Stranger And now, if we suppose that all things have the power of communion with one another⁠—what will follow? Theaetetus Even I can solve that riddle. Stranger How? Theaetetus Why, because motion itself would be at rest, and rest again in motion, if they could be attributed to one another. Stranger But this is utterly impossible. Theaetetus Of course. Stranger Then only the third hypothesis remains. Theaetetus True. Stranger For, surely, either all things have communion with all; or nothing with any other thing; or some things communicate with some things and others not. Theaetetus Certainly. Stranger And two out of these three suppositions have been found to be impossible. Theaetetus Yes. Stranger Everyone then, who desires to answer truly, will adopt the third and remaining hypothesis of the communion of some with some. Theaetetus Quite true. Stranger This communion of some with some may be illustrated by the case of letters; for some letters do not fit each other, while others do. Theaetetus Of course. Stranger And the vowels, especially, are a sort of bond which pervades all the other letters, so that without a vowel one consonant cannot be joined to another. Theaetetus True. Stranger But does everyone know what letters will unite with what? Or is art required in order to do so?332 Theaetetus Art is required. Stranger What art? Theaetetus The art of grammar. Stranger And is not this also true of sounds high and low?⁠—Is not he who has the art to know what sounds mingle, a musician, and he who is ignorant, not a musician? Theaetetus Yes. Stranger And we shall find this to be generally true of art or the absence of art. Theaetetus Of course. Stranger And as classes are admitted by us in like manner to be some of them capable and others incapable of intermixture, must not he who would rightly show what kinds will unite and what will not, proceed by the help of science in the path of argument? And will he not ask if the connecting links are universal, and so capable of intermixture with all things; and again, in divisions, whether there are not other universal classes, which make them possible? Theaetetus To be sure he will require science, and, if I am not mistaken, the very greatest of all sciences. Stranger How are we to call it? By Zeus, have we not lighted unwittingly upon