Dialogues

suffering is confined to becoming, and that neither power is applicable to being. Theaetetus And is there not some truth in what they say? Stranger Yes; but our reply will be, that we want to ascertain from them more distinctly, whether they further admit that the soul knows, and that being or essence is known. Theaetetus There can be no doubt that they say so. Stranger And is knowing and being known doing or suffering, or both, or is the one doing and the other suffering, or has neither any share in either? Theaetetus Clearly, neither has any share in either; for if they say anything else, they will contradict themselves. Stranger I understand; but they will allow that if to know is active, then, of course, to be known is passive. And on this view being, in so far as it is known, is acted upon by knowledge, and is therefore in motion; for that which is in a state of rest cannot be acted upon, as we affirm. Theaetetus True. Stranger And, O heavens, can we ever be made to believe that motion and life and soul and mind are not present with perfect being? Can we imagine that being is devoid of life and mind, and exists in awful unmeaningness an everlasting fixture? Theaetetus That would be a dreadful thing to admit, Stranger. Stranger But shall we say that has mind and not life? Theaetetus How is that possible? Stranger Or shall we say that both inhere in perfect being, but that it has no soul which contains them? Theaetetus And in what other way can it contain them? Stranger Or that being has mind and life and soul, but although endowed with soul remains absolutely unmoved? Theaetetus All three suppositions appear to me to be irrational. Stranger Under being, then, we must include motion, and that which is moved. Theaetetus Certainly. Stranger Then, Theaetetus, our inference is, that if there is no motion, neither is there any mind anywhere, or about anything or belonging to anyone. Theaetetus Quite true. Stranger And yet this equally follows, if we grant that all things are in motion⁠—upon this view too mind has no existence. Theaetetus How so? Stranger Do you think that sameness of condition and mode and subject could ever exist without a principle of rest? Theaetetus Certainly not. Stranger Can you see how without them mind could exist, or come into existence anywhere? Theaetetus No. Stranger And surely contend we must in every possible way against him who would annihilate knowledge and reason and mind, and yet ventures to speak confidently about anything. Theaetetus Yes, with all our might. Stranger Then the philosopher, who has the truest reverence for these qualities, cannot possibly accept the notion of those who say that the whole is at rest, either as unity or in many forms: and he will be utterly deaf to those who assert universal motion. As children say entreatingly “Give us both,” so he will include both the moveable and immoveable in his definition of being and all. Theaetetus Most true. Stranger And now, do we seem to have gained a fair notion of being? Theaetetus Yes truly. Stranger Alas, Theaetetus, methinks that we are now only beginning to see the real difficulty of the enquiry into the nature of it. Theaetetus What do you mean? Stranger O my friend, do you not see that nothing can exceed our ignorance, and yet we fancy that we are saying something good? Theaetetus I certainly thought that we were; and I do not at all understand how we never found out our desperate case. Stranger Reflect: after having made these admissions, may we not be justly asked the same questions which we ourselves were asking of those who said that all was hot and cold? Theaetetus What were they? Will you recall them to my mind? Stranger To be sure I will, and I will remind you of them, by putting the same questions to you which I did to them, and then we shall get on. Theaetetus True. Stranger Would you not say that rest and motion are in the most entire opposition to one another? Theaetetus Of course. Stranger And yet you would say that both and either of them equally are? Theaetetus I should. Stranger And when you admit that both or either of them are, do you mean to say that both or either of them are in motion? Theaetetus Certainly not. Stranger Or do you wish to imply that they are both at rest, when you say that they are? Theaetetus Of course not. Stranger Then you conceive of being as some third and distinct nature, under which rest and motion are alike included; and, observing that they both participate in being, you declare that they are. Theaetetus Truly we seem to have an intimation that being is some third thing, when we say that rest and motion are. Stranger Then being is not the combination of rest and motion, but something different from them. Theaetetus So it would appear. Stranger Being, then, according to its own nature, is neither in motion nor at rest. Theaetetus That is very much the truth. Stranger Where, then, is a man to look for help who would have any clear or fixed notion of being in his mind? Theaetetus Where, indeed? Stranger I scarcely think that he can look anywhere; for that which is not in motion must be at rest, and again, that which is not at rest must be in motion; but being is placed outside of both these classes. Is this possible? Theaetetus Utterly impossible. Stranger Here, then, is another thing which we ought to bear in mind. Theaetetus What? Stranger When we were asked to what we were to assign the appellation of not-being, we were in the greatest difficulty:⁠—do you remember? Theaetetus To be sure. Stranger And are we not now in as great a difficulty about being? Theaetetus I should say, Stranger, that we are in one which is, if possible, even greater. Stranger Then let us acknowledge the difficulty; and as being and not-being are involved in the same perplexity, there is hope that when the one appears more or less distinctly, the other will equally appear; and if we are able to see neither, there may still be a chance of