Dialogues

there is a third principle over and above the other two⁠—three in all, and not two? For clearly you cannot say that one of the two principles is being, and yet attribute being equally to both of them; for, if you did, whichever of the two is identified with being, will comprehend the other; and so they will be one and not two.” Theaetetus Very true. Stranger But perhaps you mean to give the name of “being” to both of them together? Theaetetus Quite likely. Stranger “Then, friends,” we shall reply to them, “the answer is plainly that the two will still be resolved into one.” Theaetetus Most true. Stranger “Since, then, we are in a difficulty, please to tell us what you mean, when you speak of being; for there can be no doubt that you always from the first understood your own meaning, whereas we once thought that we understood you, but now we are in a great strait. Please to begin by explaining this matter to us, and let us no longer fancy that we understand you, when we entirely misunderstand you.” There will be no impropriety in our demanding an answer to this question, either of the dualists or of the pluralists? Theaetetus Certainly not. Stranger And what about the assertors of the oneness of the all⁠—must we not endeavour to ascertain from them what they mean by “being”? Theaetetus By all means. Stranger Then let them answer this question: One, you say, alone is? “Yes,” they will reply. Theaetetus True. Stranger And there is something which you call “being”? Theaetetus “Yes.” Stranger And is being the same as one, and do you apply two names to the same thing? Theaetetus What will be their answer, Stranger? Stranger It is clear, Theaetetus, that he who asserts the unity of being will find a difficulty in answering this or any other question. Theaetetus Why so? Stranger To admit of two names, and to affirm that there is nothing but unity, is surely ridiculous? Theaetetus Certainly. Stranger And equally irrational to admit that a name is anything? Theaetetus How so? Stranger To distinguish the name from the thing, implies duality. Theaetetus Yes. Stranger And yet he who identifies the name with the thing will be compelled to say that it is the name of nothing, or if he says that it is the name of something, even then the name will only be the name of a name, and of nothing else. Theaetetus True. Stranger And the one will turn out to be only one of one, and being absolute unity, will represent a mere name.329 Theaetetus Certainly. Stranger And would they say that the whole is other than the one that is, or the same with it? Theaetetus To be sure they would, and they actually say so. Stranger

If being is a whole, as Parmenides sings⁠—

“Every way like unto the fullness of a well-rounded sphere,
Evenly balanced from the centre on every side,
And must needs be neither greater nor less in any way,
Neither on this side nor on that⁠—”

then being has a centre and extremes, and, having these, must also have parts.

Theaetetus True. Stranger Yet that which has parts may have the attribute of unity in all the parts, and in this way being all and a whole, may be one? Theaetetus Certainly. Stranger But that of which this is the condition cannot be absolute unity? Theaetetus Why not? Stranger Because, according to right reason, that which is truly one must be affirmed to be absolutely indivisible. Theaetetus Certainly. Stranger But this indivisible, if made up of many parts, will contradict reason. Theaetetus I understand. Stranger Shall we say that being330 is one and a whole, because it has the attribute of unity? Or shall we say that being is not a whole at all? Theaetetus That is a hard alternative to offer. Stranger Most true; for being, having in a certain sense the attribute of one, is yet proved not to be the same as one, and the all is therefore more than one. Theaetetus Yes. Stranger And yet if being be not a whole, through having the attribute of unity, and there be such a thing as an absolute whole, being lacks something of its own nature? Theaetetus Certainly. Stranger Upon this view, again, being, having a defect of being, will become not-being? Theaetetus True. Stranger And, again, the all becomes more than one, for being and the whole will each have their separate nature. Theaetetus Yes. Stranger But if the whole does not exist at all, all the previous difficulties remain the same, and there will be the further difficulty, that besides having no being, being can never have come into being. Theaetetus Why so? Stranger Because that which comes into being always comes into being as a whole, so that he who does not give whole a place among beings, cannot speak either of essence or generation as existing. Theaetetus Yes, that certainly appears to be true. Stranger Again; how can that which is not a whole have any quantity? For that which is of a certain quantity must necessarily be the whole of that quantity. Theaetetus Exactly. Stranger And there will be innumerable other points, each of them causing infinite trouble to him who says that being is either one or two. Theaetetus The difficulties which are dawning upon us prove this; for one objection connects with another, and they are always involving what has preceded in a greater and worse perplexity. Stranger We are far from having exhausted the more exact thinkers who treat of being and not-being. But let us be content to leave them, and proceed to view those who speak less precisely; and we shall find as the result of all, that the nature of being is quite as difficult to comprehend as that of not-being. Theaetetus Then now we will go to the others. Stranger There appears to be a sort of war of Giants and Gods going on amongst them; they are fighting with one another about the nature of essence. Theaetetus How is that? Stranger Some of them are dragging down all things from heaven and from the unseen to earth, and they literally grasp in their hands rocks and oaks; of these they lay hold, and