Dialogues

our free and noble science, and in looking for the Sophist have we not entertained the philosopher unawares? Theaetetus What do you mean? Stranger Should we not say that the division according to classes, which neither makes the same other, nor makes other the same, is the business of the dialectical science? Theaetetus That is what we should say. Stranger Then, surely, he who can divide rightly is able to see clearly one form pervading a scattered multitude, and many different forms contained under one higher form; and again, one form knit together into a single whole and pervading many such wholes, and many forms, existing only in separation and isolation. This is the knowledge of classes which determines where they can have communion with one another and where not. Theaetetus Quite true. Stranger And the art of dialectic would be attributed by you only to the philosopher pure and true? Theaetetus Who but he can be worthy? Stranger In this region we shall always discover the philosopher, if we look for him; like the Sophist, he is not easily discovered, but for a different reason. Theaetetus For what reason? Stranger Because the Sophist runs away into the darkness of not-being, in which he has learned by habit to feel about, and cannot be discovered because of the darkness of the place. Is not that true? Theaetetus It seems to be so. Stranger And the philosopher, always holding converse through reason with the idea of being, is also dark from excess of light; for the souls of the many have no eye which can endure the vision of the divine. Theaetetus Yes; that seems to be quite as true as the other. Stranger Well, the philosopher may hereafter be more fully considered by us, if we are disposed; but the Sophist must clearly not be allowed to escape until we have had a good look at him. Theaetetus Very good. Stranger Since, then, we are agreed that some classes have a communion with one another, and others not, and some have communion with a few and others with many, and that there is no reason why some should not have universal communion with all, let us now pursue the enquiry, as the argument suggests, not in relation to all ideas, lest the multitude of them should confuse us, but let us select a few of those which are reckoned to be the principal ones, and consider their several natures and their capacity of communion with one another, in order that if we are not able to apprehend with perfect clearness the notions of being and not-being, we may at least not fall short in the consideration of them, so far as they come within the scope of the present enquiry, if peradventure we may be allowed to assert the reality of not-being, and yet escape unscathed. Theaetetus We must do so. Stranger The most important of all the genera are those which we were just now mentioning⁠—being and rest and motion. Theaetetus Yes, by far. Stranger And two of these are, as we affirm, incapable of communion with one another. Theaetetus Quite incapable. Stranger Whereas being surely has communion with both of them, for both of them are? Theaetetus Of course. Stranger That makes up three of them. Theaetetus To be sure. Stranger And each of them is other than the remaining two, but the same with itself. Theaetetus True. Stranger But then, what is the meaning of these two words, “same” and “other”? Are they two new kinds other than the three, and yet always of necessity intermingling with them, and are we to have five kinds instead of three; or when we speak of the same and other, are we unconsciously speaking of one of the three first kinds? Theaetetus Very likely we are. Stranger But, surely, motion and rest are neither the other nor the same. Theaetetus How is that? Stranger Whatever we attribute to motion and rest in common, cannot be either of them. Theaetetus Why not? Stranger Because motion would be at rest and rest in motion, for either of them, being predicated of both, will compel the other to change into the opposite of its own nature, because partaking of its opposite. Theaetetus Quite true. Stranger Yet they surely both partake of the same and of the other? Theaetetus Yes. Stranger Then we must not assert that motion, any more than rest, is either the same or the other. Theaetetus No; we must not. Stranger But are we to conceive that being and the same are identical? Theaetetus Possibly. Stranger But if they are identical, then again in saying that motion and rest have being, we should also be saying that they are the same. Theaetetus Which surely cannot be. Stranger Then being and the same cannot be one. Theaetetus Scarcely. Stranger Then we may suppose the same to be a fourth class, which is now to be added to the three others. Theaetetus Quite true. Stranger And shall we call the other a fifth class? Or should we consider being and other to be two names of the same class? Theaetetus Very likely. Stranger But you would agree, if I am not mistaken, that existences are relative as well as absolute? Theaetetus Certainly. Stranger And the other is always relative to other? Theaetetus True. Stranger But this would not be the case unless being and the other entirely differed; for, if the other, like being, were absolute as well as relative, then there would have been a kind of other which was not other than other. And now we find that what is other must of necessity be what it is in relation to some other. Theaetetus That is the true state of the case. Stranger Then we must admit the other as the fifth of our selected classes. Theaetetus Yes. Stranger And the fifth class pervades all classes, for they all differ from one another, not by reason of their own nature, but because they partake of the idea of the other. Theaetetus Quite true. Stranger Then let us now put the case with reference to each of the five. Theaetetus How? Stranger First there is motion, which we affirm to be absolutely “other” than rest: what else can we say? Theaetetus It is so. Stranger And therefore is not rest. Theaetetus Certainly not.