make two parts, one having regard to the relativity of greatness and smallness to each other; and there is another, without which the existence of production would be impossible.
Young Socrates
What do you mean?
Stranger
Do you not think that it is only natural for the greater to be called greater with reference to the less alone, and the less less with reference to the greater alone?
Young Socrates
Yes.
Stranger
Well, but is there not also something exceeding and exceeded by the principle of the mean, both in speech and action, and is not this a reality, and the chief mark of difference between good and bad men?
Young Socrates
Plainly.
Stranger
Then we must suppose that the great and small exist and are discerned in both these ways, and not, as we were saying before, only relatively to one another, but there must also be another comparison of them with the mean or ideal standard; would you like to hear the reason why?
Young Socrates
Certainly.
Stranger
If we assume the greater to exist only in relation to the less, there will never be any comparison of either with the mean.
Young Socrates
True.
Stranger
And would not this doctrine be the ruin of all the arts and their creations; would not the art of the Statesman and the aforesaid art of weaving disappear? For all these arts are on the watch against excess and defect, not as unrealities, but as real evils, which occasion a difficulty in action; and the excellence or beauty of every work of art is due to this observance of measure.
Young Socrates
Certainly.
Stranger
But if the science of the Statesman disappears, the search for the royal science will be impossible.
Young Socrates
Very true.
Stranger
Well, then, as in the case of the Sophist we extorted the inference that not-being had an existence, because here was the point at which the argument eluded our grasp, so in this we must endeavour to show that the greater and less are not only to be measured with one another, but also have to do with the production of the mean; for if this is not admitted, neither a statesman nor any other man of action can be an undisputed master of his science.
Young Socrates
Yes, we must certainly do again what we did then.
Stranger
But this, Socrates, is a greater work than the other, of which we only too well remember the length. I think, however, that we may fairly assume something of this sort—
Young Socrates
What?
Stranger
That we shall some day require this notion of a mean with a view to the demonstration of absolute truth; meanwhile, the argument that the very existence of the arts must be held to depend on the possibility of measuring more or less, not only with one another, but also with a view to the attainment of the mean, seems to afford a grand support and satisfactory proof of the doctrine which we are maintaining; for if there are arts, there is a standard of measure, and if there is a standard of measure, there are arts; but if either is wanting, there is neither.
Young Socrates
True; and what is the next step?
Stranger
The next step clearly is to divide the art of measurement into two parts, as we have said already, and to place in the one part all the arts which measure number, length, depth, breadth, swiftness344 with their opposites; and to have another part in which they are measured with the mean, and the fit, and the opportune, and the due, and with all those words, in short, which denote a mean or standard removed from the extremes.
Young Socrates
Here are two vast divisions, embracing two very different spheres.
Stranger
There are many accomplished men, Socrates, who say, believing themselves to speak wisely, that the art of measurement is universal, and has to do with all things. And this means what we are now saying; for all things which come within the province of art do certainly in some sense partake of measure. But these persons, because they are not accustomed to distinguish classes according to real forms, jumble together two widely different things, relation to one another, and to a standard, under the idea that they are the same, and also fall into the converse error of dividing other things not according to their real parts. Whereas the right way is, if a man has first seen the unity of things, to go on with the enquiry and not desist until he has found all the differences contained in it which form distinct classes; nor again should he be able to rest contented with the manifold diversities which are seen in a multitude of things until he has comprehended all of them that have any affinity within the bounds of one similarity and embraced them within the reality of a single kind. But we have said enough on this head, and also of excess and defect; we have only to bear in mind that two divisions of the art of measurement have been discovered which are concerned with them, and not forget what they are.
Young Socrates
We will not forget.
Stranger
And now that this discussion is completed, let us go on to consider another question, which concerns not this argument only but the conduct of such arguments in general.
Young Socrates
What is this new question?
Stranger
Take the case of a child who is engaged in learning his letters: when he is asked what letters make up a word, should we say that the question is intended to improve his grammatical knowledge of that particular word, or of all words?
Young Socrates
Clearly, in order that he may have a better knowledge of all words.
Stranger
And is our enquiry about the Statesman intended only to improve our knowledge of politics, or our power of reasoning generally?
Young Socrates
Clearly, as in the former example, the purpose is general.
Stranger
Still less would any rational man seek to analyse the notion of weaving for its own sake.
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