Dialogues

or unjust in accordance with the standard which he receives from the king and legislator⁠—showing his own peculiar virtue only in this, that he is not perverted by gifts, or fears, or pity, or by any sort of favour or enmity, into deciding the suits of men with one another contrary to the appointment of the legislator? Young Socrates No; his office is such as you describe. Stranger Then the inference is that the power of the judge is not royal, but only the power of a guardian of the law which ministers to the royal power? Young Socrates True. Stranger The review of all these sciences shows that none of them is political or royal. For the truly royal ought not itself to act, but to rule over those who are able to act; the king ought to know what is and what is not a fitting opportunity for taking the initiative in matters of the greatest importance, whilst others should execute his orders. Young Socrates True. Stranger And, therefore, the arts which we have described, as they have no authority over themselves or one another, but are each of them concerned with some special action of their own, have, as they ought to have, special names corresponding to their several actions. Young Socrates I agree. Stranger And the science which is over them all, and has charge of the laws, and of all matters affecting the State, and truly weaves them all into one, if we would describe under a name characteristic of their common nature, most truly we may call politics. Young Socrates Exactly so. Stranger Then, now that we have discovered the various classes in a State,349 shall I analyse politics after the pattern which weaving supplied? Young Socrates I greatly wish that you would. Stranger Then I must describe the nature of the royal web, and show how the various threads are woven into one piece. Young Socrates Clearly. Stranger A task has to be accomplished, which, although difficult, appears to be necessary. Young Socrates Certainly the attempt must be made. Stranger To assume that one part of virtue differs in kind from another, is a position easily assailable by contentious disputants, who appeal to popular opinion. Young Socrates I do not understand. Stranger Let me put the matter in another way: I suppose that you would consider courage to be a part of virtue? Young Socrates Certainly I should. Stranger And you would think temperance to be different from courage; and likewise to be a part of virtue? Young Socrates True. Stranger I shall venture to put forward a strange theory about them. Young Socrates What is it? Stranger That they are two principles which thoroughly hate one another and are antagonistic throughout a great part of nature. Young Socrates How singular! Stranger Yes, very⁠—for all the parts of virtue are commonly said to be friendly to one another. Young Socrates Yes. Stranger Then let us carefully investigate whether this is universally true, or whether there are not parts of virtue which are at war with their kindred in some respect. Young Socrates Tell me how we shall consider that question. Stranger We must extend our enquiry to all those things which we consider beautiful and at the same time place in two opposite classes. Young Socrates Explain; what are they? Stranger Acuteness and quickness, whether in body or soul or in the movement of sound, and the imitations of them which painting and music supply, you must have praised yourself before now, or been present when others praised them. Young Socrates Certainly. Stranger And do you remember the terms in which they are praised? Young Socrates I do not. Stranger I wonder whether I can explain to you in words the thought which is passing in my mind. Young Socrates Why not? Stranger You fancy that this is all so easy: Well, let us consider these notions with reference to the opposite classes of action under which they fall. When we praise quickness and energy and acuteness, whether of mind or body or sound, we express our praise of the quality which we admire by one word, and that one word is manliness or courage. Young Socrates How? Stranger We speak of an action as energetic and brave, quick and manly, and vigorous too; and when we apply the name of which I speak as the common attribute of all these natures, we certainly praise them. Young Socrates True. Stranger And do we not often praise the quiet strain of action also? Young Socrates To be sure. Stranger And do we not then say the opposite of what we said of the other? Young Socrates How do you mean? Stranger We exclaim How calm! How temperate! in admiration of the slow and quiet working of the intellect, and of steadiness and gentleness in action, of smoothness and depth of voice, and of all rhythmical movement and of music in general, when these have a proper solemnity. Of all such actions we predicate not courage, but a name indicative of order. Young Socrates Very true. Stranger But when, on the other hand, either of these is out of place, the names of either are changed into terms of censure. Young Socrates How so? Stranger Too great sharpness or quickness or hardness is termed violence or madness; too great slowness or gentleness is called cowardice or sluggishness; and we may observe, that for the most part these qualities, and the temperance and manliness of the opposite characters, are arrayed as enemies on opposite sides, and do not mingle with one another in their respective actions; and if we pursue the enquiry, we shall find that men who have these different qualities of mind differ from one another. Young Socrates In what respect? Stranger In respect of all the qualities which I mentioned, and very likely of many others. According to their respective affinities to either class of actions they distribute praise and blame⁠—praise to the actions which are akin to their own, blame to those of the opposite party⁠—and out of this many quarrels and occasions of quarrel arise among them. Young Socrates True. Stranger The difference between the two classes is often a trivial concern; but in a state, and when affecting really important