Dialogues

either. If this be clearly established, then pleasure will lose the victory, for the good will cease to be identified with her:⁠—Am I not right? Protarchus Yes. Socrates And there will cease to be any need of distinguishing the kinds of pleasures, as I am inclined to think, but this will appear more clearly as we proceed. Protarchus Capital, Socrates; pray go on as you propose. Socrates But, let us first agree on some little points. Protarchus What are they? Socrates Is the good perfect or imperfect? Protarchus The most perfect, Socrates, of all things. Socrates And is the good sufficient? Protarchus Yes, certainly, and in a degree surpassing all other things. Socrates And no one can deny that all percipient beings desire and hunt after good, and are eager to catch and have the good about them, and care not for the attainment of anything which is not accompanied by good. Protarchus That is undeniable. Socrates Now let us part off the life of pleasure from the life of wisdom, and pass them in review. Protarchus How do you mean? Socrates Let there be no wisdom in the life of pleasure, nor any pleasure in the life of wisdom, for if either of them is the chief good, it cannot be supposed to want anything, but if either is shown to want anything, then it cannot really be the chief good. Protarchus Impossible. Socrates And will you help us to test these two lives? Protarchus Certainly. Socrates Then answer. Protarchus Ask. Socrates Would you choose, Protarchus, to live all your life long in the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures? Protarchus Certainly I should. Socrates Would you consider that there was still anything wanting to you if you had perfect pleasure? Protarchus Certainly not. Socrates Reflect; would you not want wisdom and intelligence and forethought, and similar qualities? would you not at any rate want sight? Protarchus Why should I? Having pleasure I should have all things. Socrates Living thus, you would always throughout your life enjoy the greatest pleasures? Protarchus I should. Socrates But if you had neither mind, nor memory, nor knowledge, nor true opinion, you would in the first place be utterly ignorant of whether you were pleased or not, because you would be entirely devoid of intelligence. Protarchus Certainly. Socrates And similarly, if you had no memory you would not recollect that you had ever been pleased, nor would the slightest recollection of the pleasure which you feel at any moment remain with you; and if you had no true opinion you would not think that you were pleased when you were; and if you had no power of calculation you would not be able to calculate on future pleasure, and your life would be the life, not of a man, but of an oyster or “pulmo marinus.” Could this be otherwise? Protarchus No. Socrates But is such a life eligible? Protarchus I cannot answer you, Socrates; the argument has taken away from me the power of speech. Socrates We must keep up our spirits;⁠—let us now take the life of mind and examine it in turn. Protarchus And what is this life of mind? Socrates I want to know whether any one of us would consent to live, having wisdom and mind and knowledge and memory of all things, but having no sense of pleasure or pain, and wholly unaffected by these and the like feelings? Protarchus Neither life, Socrates, appears eligible to me, nor is likely, as I should imagine, to be chosen by anyone else. Socrates What would you say, Protarchus, to both of these in one, or to one that was made out of the union of the two? Protarchus Out of the union, that is, of pleasure with mind and wisdom? Socrates Yes, that is the life which I mean. Protarchus There can be no difference of opinion; not some but all would surely choose this third rather than either of the other two, and in addition to them. Socrates But do you see the consequence? Protarchus To be sure I do. The consequence is, that two out of the three lives which have been proposed are neither sufficient nor eligible for man or for animal. Socrates Then now there can be no doubt that neither of them has the good, for the one which had would certainly have been sufficient and perfect and eligible for every living creature or thing that was able to live such a life; and if any of us had chosen any other, he would have chosen contrary to the nature of the truly eligible, and not of his own free will, but either through ignorance or from some unhappy necessity. Protarchus Certainly that seems to be true. Socrates And now have I not sufficiently shown that Philebus’ goddess is not to be regarded as identical with the good? Philebus Neither is your “mind” the good, Socrates, for that will be open to the same objections. Socrates Perhaps, Philebus, you may be right in saying so of my “mind”; but of the true, which is also the divine mind, far otherwise. However, I will not at present claim the first place for mind as against the mixed life; but we must come to some understanding about the second place. For you might affirm pleasure and I mind to be the cause of the mixed life; and in that case although neither of them would be the good, one of them might be imagined to be the cause of the good. And I might proceed further to argue in opposition to Philebus, that the element which makes this mixed life eligible and good, is more akin and more similar to mind than to pleasure. And if this is true, pleasure cannot be truly said to share either in the first or second place, and does not, if I may trust my own mind, attain even to the third. Protarchus Truly, Socrates, pleasure appears to me to have had a fall; in fighting for the palm, she has been smitten by the argument, and is laid low. I must say that mind would have fallen too, and may therefore be thought to show discretion in not putting forward a similar claim.