Shadow Warriors: Inside the Special Forces

then made to lean against a wall. She eventually collapsed on the floor. When the lieutenant protested, the PDF interrogators shoved wads of paper into his mouth, put a gun to his head, and again kicked him several times in the groin. 'Your husband will never perform in bed again,' one of the interrogators told Bonnie.

After four hours of this, the PDF abruptly released them.

General Thurman learned of these incidents at 11:00 P.M., in Washington, where he'd gone for meetings. He immediately flew back to Panama.

About the same time, the liaison team in Panama got word to Stiner at Fort Bragg.

Meanwhile, Noriega had issued a communique that blamed the shooting incident on the four U.S. officers, alleging they had broken through a PDF checkpoint, shot at the Comandancia, and wounded three Panamanians — a soldier, a civilian, and a one-year-old girl.

The next morning, Sunday, December 17, Stiner got a secure phone call from Lieutenant General Kelley: 'General Thurman is recommending the implementation of the OPLAN,' Kelley told him. 'The Chairman, the SECDEF, and I are about to brief the President. Is there anything you want to pass on?'

'Yes, there is,' Stiner answered. 'What happened is unfortunate; there is nothing we can do to bring back Lieutenant Paz or relieve the pain and suffering of the Navy lieutenant and his wife. But what we can do is clean up this mess once and for all by implementing the full OPLAN, and that is my recommendation. We are prepared to do it right.'

Stiner continued:

'We need a decision on H-hour, and I'd like to have it established at 0100 hours. I have three reasons:

'First, that's when the tide is highest in Panama (it fluctuates some forty-three feet there). The SEALs have to swim to some of their targets in order to place their explosive charges. If we pick the wrong time, they'd have to walk across mudflats, thus compromising their operations, and greatly increasing the risk of not being able to accomplish these critical missions at H-hour.

'Second, we want to minimize possibilities for hostage situations. For that, we need a time when there is little chance that a wide-body civilian jet, and several hundred passengers, will be landing at Torrijos Tocumen International Airport. We have been watching the airport for a couple of months, and seldom does a large jet land after midnight.

'Third, we have three major targets that we cannot secure at H-hour. After it jumps at H+45, the 82nd Airborne Division needs four hours to make three battalion-size combat air assaults before daylight. With H-hour at 0100, we believe that most of the fighting will be over come daylight.'

Kelley promised to pass this on to the President and get back to Stiner after the meeting. He called back at 5:15 that afternoon: 'The President has made the decision to go,' he said. 'And you've got what you wanted. H-hour will be at 0100.

'The President also wants you to pass on to the commanders and troops his total trust and confidence in their ability to accomplish the mission, and that he'll be praying for them.'

Stiner immediately called his stateside commanders to give them the word. A couple of hours later, he assembled his staff at the XVIII Airborne Corps Headquarters to review the sequencing of operations that would follow on the President's decision.

Shortly, the official 'Execute Order' was published by Secretary Cheney. It established H-hour as 0100 hours, 20 December 1989.

That night, Brigadier General Ed Scholes, XVIII Airborne Corps Chief of Staff, left for Fort Clayton with a contingent of headquarters staff officers to establish a small command post to handle pre-H-hour details from that end.

At 0900, Monday, the eighteenth, the XVIII Airborne Corps called an emergency deployment readiness exercise (EDRE) to serve as a cover and no-notice order for executing Corps Plan 90-2. This initiated the 82nd Airborne's eighteen-hour planning-and-alert procedure, a normal routine which would cover deployment, though only key personnel knew this.

Later in the afternoon, Stiner, key members of his Corps staff, and an advance command element from the 82nd Airborne Division, led by Brigadier General Joe Kinzer, took off for HowardAir Force Base in two unmarked C- 20s. The entire contingent traveled once again in civilian clothes; they did not change into battle dress until Tuesday night.

Meanwhile, there'd been a major command change. Gary Luck was being promoted to Lieutenant General and would now command U.S. Army Special Forces Command; Major General Wayne Downing was taking over as commander of the JSOTF. Since General Downing's background was filled with Airborne, Ranger, and Special Operations assignments, including combat in Vietnam, there was no loss in command continuity. He had been completely read-in on the plan, and had participated in all the rehearsals.

By the time the Execute Order was published, a large part of the special operations forces had already clandestinely infiltrated into Panama; the rest were scheduled to be infiltrated before H-hour. At 0100 on Monday morning, General Downing left for Panama with a contingent of his forces.

The force he would command totaled approximately 4,400 and was composed of special operations, psychological operations, and civil affairs units from the Army, Air Force, and the Navy. The largest special operations component, and its principal assault force, was the 75th Ranger Regiment, dubbed Task Force Red.

CARL Stiner comments:

Gary Luck had done an outstanding job integrating the joint special operations activities into the overall plan, and now he would not have the opportunity to execute them. On that count, I had to feel sorry for him. On the other hand, his promotion was long overdue and he would do an equally outstanding job commanding the Army's Special Operations Command and go on to command the XVIII Airborne Corps in Operation DESERT STORM, less than a year away.

PRE-H-HOUR

Maintaining operational security had from the outset been crucial to the plan. Without it, we could forget about achieving surprise. And without surprise, there would certainly be greater casualties — on both sides. The troops stationed in Panama gave me the most concern in this regard. Some lived off-base, some had Panamanian girlfriends, some of the families had maids, and all our installations had Panamanian workers — a ready-made situation for a compromise.

One of my main reasons for going down to Panama early was to meet with the commanders there to determine how to best alert the troops for the operation without compromising security. And of course, I could control the pre-H-hour activities better there than I could back at Bragg.

There was no doubt; the troops in Panama were ready. All units were already in a high state of alert and could be assembled in two hours. They'd had intensified training; they'd eyeballed every target they would take down; and commanders had even prepared handy 'battle books,' which provided the complete tactical plan for each target. For the sake of security, however, units below battalion level had deliberately not been briefed. And now this would have to be done for real, and quickly.

After landing at Howard Air Force Base on Monday night, I went straight to Fort Clayton and assembled all my commanders down to battalion level to tell them the operation was a go, at 0100 hours, 20 December — twenty-eight hours away. We then decided to call the junior officers in for briefing at 8:00 P.M. the next day, and the troops sequestered and briefed at 9:00. This would allow four hours for detailed briefings at company level, issue of ammo, and preparation for movement to attach positions. Both Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations teams (equipped with portable lowdspeakers and precut scripts) had previously been assigned to all company-level combat units.

Meanwhile, General Thurman and I had one other major concern — the security of the rightfully elected government, Endara, Ford, and Calderon, in hiding since their heating in May. Although Green Berets stationed in Panama had been keeping an eye on them and had responsibility for a rescue mission (if needed), the