truth was that Noriega could have taken them anytime he wanted.
The Deputy Chief of Mission, John Bushnell (the Ambassador was on home leave), solved that problem by inviting the three men to dinner at his quarters on Howard Air Force Base, Tuesday evening, December 19. After dinner, they were flown by helicopter to Quarry Heights, where they were briefed on the operation by General Thurman.
Just before midnight, a Panamanian judge was provided space in Thurman's headquarters, and there officially swore in Endara as president, and Ford and Calderon as vice presidents. After the ceremony, they were taken to a safe house on Fort Clayton, where they prepared the speeches they would deliver the morning after H-hour.
The United States immediately recognized the Endara government.
Meanwhile, we had several people tracking Noriega, and they had a fairly good handle on where he was about eighty percent of the time. That turned out not to he good enough.
On Tuesday the nineteenth, he had spent most of the day in the Colon area. Late that afternoon, his entourage left Colon and headed for Panama City — or so we thought. We later learned that somewhere between Colon and Panama City, the convoy had split in two, one part headed east to a rest camp near Torrijos-Tocumen International Airport, where Noriega had a rendezvous with a prostitute (arranged by his aide, Captain Gaitan — a true bad guy; he'd reportedly murdered three people). The other part proceeded on to the Comandancia, where a Noriega look-alike got out, was greeted by the honor guard, and proceeded inside.
Based on information our people provided, Wayne Downing and I both quickly realized that this man was not Noriega.
But where was the real one? We didn't know.
Back in the States, marshaling had been completed and troops were loading and launching from fourteen different bases. Since the plan called for radio silence, we conducted everything up until H-hour from a Master Execution Checklist. As long as a unit was on schedule, there was no need for reports; we broke radio silence only when something happened that might keep a unit from accomplishing its mission at the specified time.
So far, so good. Everything seemed to be on track — including command and control: I had overall control from my headquarters in Panama, while Downing provided an alternate command post in that country. He had complete communications and the ability to control the whole operation. Airborne over the Atlantic in an EC-130 was the Deputy Corps Commander, Major General Will Roosma, with a complete battle staff and all the communications necessary to control the operation. And back at Fort Bragg was another fully manned command center, also capable of controlling the operation.
A total of 253 fixed-wing aircraft and 80 helicopters were to be involved in D Day activities. On the next page is a listing by type and number.
Some of these aircraft, such as the thirty-five KC-10 and KC-135 tankers, would assume orbit positions outside the immediate operational area so as not to interfere with combat activities.
All those carrying troops or in troop support missions would assemble over the Gulf of Mexico, drop down below Cuba's radar coverage and proceed through the Yucatan Gap, and then on to Panama and their specific target areas. Just in case any were challenged by Castro's air force, twelve F- 15 fighters were aloft near Cuba and ready to respond.
All crews involved in the combat operation would wear night-vision goggles. All troop-carrying aircraft, including heavy equipment drop operations, would fly blached-out, and were to be AWADS- equipped (technology for all weather conditions). All crews flying special operations forces would be SOLL-11 qualified (able to make blacked-out landings in total darkness).
The first call from a commander came at about 6:00 P.M., an hour before the 82nd's scheduled takeoff time, from Major General Jim Johnson, Commander of the 82nd Airborne Division: A severe ice storm had hit Pope Air Force Base and it would be impossible to launch all his troops as scheduled. The twenty-eight C-141 heavy drop aircraft had been loaded and pre-positioned at Charleston. No problem as far as they were concerned. The problem was with the troop-carrying C-141s. There was not enough de-icing equipment to launch the twenty personnel birds at one time. At this point, he had only eight ready to launch, and it would be three to four hours before he could launch the rest of the force.
I was not surprised when he asked for a delay, but I denied it. 'Send those eight on, ' I told him, 'and send the rest as soon as the others can be de-iced.'
Of course, I knew there was no getting around a delay, which would mean that three key targets — Panama Viejo, Tinajitas, and Fort Cimarron — could not all be taken before daylight. Two of them, probably Tinajitas and Fort Cimarron, would have to be taken in the morning, which would likely mean more casualties. You have to adjust for the unforeseen in any complex operation.
Meanwhile, a thick fog had moved in at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, where the tanker aircraft had been assembled. Though it was so thick that a truck had to lead each plane to the end of the runway for takeoff, all the aircraft launched on time.
Delaying H-hour for the entire operation would have resulted in serious consequences, as I well knew. Commanders are trained and entrusted to wake these kinds of judgments, and to develop alternative plans.
Accordingly, I called Johnson back ten minutes after his call. 'Your first priority,' I told him, 'is to take Panama Viejo, and if possible Tinajitas, before daylight. Fort Cimarron,' which was farther from Panama City, 'can be taken later in the day. I'll take responsibility for containing Tinajitas and Fort Cimarron by keeping AC-130s nearby until you can conduct your air assaults.'
We knew in advance that the PDF had established a nest of sixteen heavy mortars near Tinajitas, which could range all of Panama City and Howard Air Force Base. For that reason, they had already been targeted for AC-130 strikes at H-hour, and afterward if required.
Those mortars had given us other concerns: Since the nineteen C-130s carrying Rangers to Rio Hato and Torrijos would have been in the air for seven hours, they'd be practically running on fumes when they made their drop. Because they were not air-refuelable, we had to have fuel for them in Panama; the plan was to land them at Howard — about forty miles from Rio Hato. But, because the PDF mortars might be firing on Howard, an alternative plan had to be developed. We therefore planned to land two C-5s ou the civilian runway at Torrijos- Tocumen, where they could serve as 'wet wing filling stations' for the C-130s, if nesessary. The C-5s were to land immediately after the Rangers had secured the field and cleared the runway of obstacles.
As it turned out, we had no problem using Howard, but still used the C-5s for refueling helicopters, particularly those supporting the 82nd's three air assaults.
As we got closer to H-hour, Downing and I monitored PDF command nets to determine if they had any inkling of our operation.
