And then we got a kick in the gut.

At 1830 I got a call from Bragg: Dan Rather had just announced on the CBS Evening News, 'U.S. military transport planes have left Fort Bragg, North Carolina, home of the Army's elite 82nd Airborne paratroopers. The Pentagon declines to say whether or not they are bound for Panama. It will say only that the Bragg-based XVIII Corps has been conducting what the Army calls an airborne readiness exercise.' And on the NBC Evening News, Ed Rabel reported, 'United States C-141 Starlifters flew into Panama this afternoon, one landing every ten minutes. At the same time these aircraft were arriving, security was tightened around the air base. U.S. soldiers could be seen in full combat gear on roads around the base.' At the end of his brief report, Rabel noted, 'No one here could confirm that these aircraft were part of a U. S. invasion group, but tensions on both sides are high this evening over the possibility of a U.S. strike.'

Washington had also received a report that a PDF soldier had overheard U.S. soldiers discussing H-hour, and had sent this information up the chain to Noriega; but I didn't believe it for a minute. All U. S. servicemen were locked up and preparing for the attack at the time when this was alleged to have happened.

However they got it — from reports in our media or otherwise — t he PDF apparently picked up word of the operation, now only three hours away. At 10:00 P.M., our listeners began hearing conversations among PDF commanders that indicated they knew something was up. One PDF commander told another: 'Tonight is the night, the ball game starts at one o'clock'; others called in their troops and ordered weapons to be issued. There were enough such indicators to convince me to recommend to Thurman that we should advance H-hour. My plan was to attach earlier with the troops already in Panama, to gain as much advantage as possible. The Rangers and the 82nd would just have to attach as scheduled.

I had first hoped to move H-hour ahead by thirty minutes, and Thurman approved that. But after checking again with Wayne Downing, who'd be running the three concurrent critical actions — rescue Kurt Muse, attack the Comandancia, and neutralize Patilla Airfield, Noriega's jet, and the presidential yacht — he and I realized that a thirty-minute advance might be pushing the envelope a bit. So we settled for fifteen minutes, which Thurman approved.

H-hour for all units in Panama was therefore set for 12:45 A.M.

TWENTY-SEVEN MINUTES TO GO

Now everything was on track. Most of the facilities that had to be protected had already been clandestinely secured. Special Forces reconnaissance teams had been covertly inserted in the vicinity of the major targets where they could report the latest information. Units were loaded and ready to move. Communications hot lines had long since been established to the major supporting commands — LANTCOM, SOCOM, the Air Mobility Command, and of course our parent headquarters, SOUTHCOM, only a short distance away in the tunnel at Quarry Heights, where General Thurman would remain the first night.

Though sporadic gunfire could be heard throughout Panama City, by then that was usually the case on any night.

As all troops well know, 'Shit happens.'

We didn't expect airliners at Torrijos-Tocumen after midnight. This night turned out to be an exception. At 12:40 A.M., a Brazilian wide-body landed, with more than three hundred people on board. At 0100 hours, when the Rangers dropped, these people would either be inside the terminal getting fleeced by the PDF and the customs agents or still unloading. Either way, we had problems.

I called Downing to tell him to prepare for a mass hostage situation at the airport.

'We'll be standing by,' he answered. 'But remember, we have four rifle companies in that battalion, and one has responsibility for securing the terminal and the control tower. They should be able to handle the situation.'

'Let's hope so,' I said.

With only minutes remaining, combat was fast approaching. The AC-130 gunships and Apaches were airborne and ready to start preparatory fires on key objectives. The four Sheridan tanks brought in on October- 15 were now approaching firing positions on Anton Hill. They'd engage the Comandancia with their main guns at precisely 0045 hours. Twenty-five Special Forces soldiers from Task Force Black were aboard three Blackhawk helicopters en route to secure the Pacora River bridge, which was critical in keeping Battalion 2000 out of the fight at the airport.

During the planning phase, we had ruled out destroying the bridge. It was the only way for people in much of eastern Panama to get to Panama City. That meant the bridge had to be secured and protected.

All units in Panama were 'locked and loaded' (rounds chambered and weapons cocleed) and moving to their assault objectives. Once again, men had to resort to a barbaric way of settling differences. Hopefully, the dying would last no longer than about four hours.

During the final minutes before H-hour, I learned from Thurman that the name of the operation had been changed to Operation JUST CAUSE. General Jim Lindsay of USSOCOM had called General Kelley: 'Do you want your grandchildren to ask you, 'What were things like back there in BLUE SPOON?' 'And Kelley had agreed: BLUE SPOON didn't sound like anything anybody would ever want to be proud of.

'I sure am glad Jim Lindsay made that call,' I told Thurman, 'because what we're about to spill blood over certainly is a just cause. ' '

XI

PANAMA: OPERATION JUST CAUSE

At precisely 0045 hours, two EF-111 aircraft jammed PDF tactical communications, special operations EC- 130s began to override Panamanian radio and TV stations and broadcast the U.S. message to the Panamanian people, and all units began engaging their targets.

Special Forces snipers, who had painstakingly worked their way into strategic ovcrwatch positions, also began systematically to eliminate PDF sentries with highly accurate sniping. The sniper teams were led by Sergeant Major Pat Hurley (later killed in the Gulf War in a nighttime helicopter crash during a raging sandstorm as he was returning from a behind-the-lines mission in Iraq).

At the Modelo Prison (part of the fifteen-building Comandancia compound), the assault was under way to rescue Kurt Muse. Six operators from Task Force Green (the Army special mission unit), supported by AH-6 Little Bird gunships and OH-6 lift ships, made the short jump from the pods of their helicopters down to the rooftop. During their approach to the prison, the gunships cleaned off four.50-caliber machine guns from the roof of a high- rise in the compound that housed one of Noriega's Dignity Battalions. An AC-130 gunship blasted the Comandancia with its 105mm howitzer. Green tracers from PDF guns were flying everywhere.

The operators entered from the roof and moved through the totally dark building down to the second floor, neutralized the guards as they went, blew the cell door, and were back on the roof ready to lift off with their 'precious cargo' (now outfitted with a flak vest and Kevlar helmet) — all within six minutes.

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