84
Bhagwati 1985, p. 22, n. 10.
85
Kindleberger 1990a, pp. 136-7.
86
I would like to thank Irfan ul Haque for raising this point.
87
Lipsey 2000, pp. 726-7.
88
Bairoch 1993, pp. 51-2.
89
Bairoch 1993, pp.52-3. According to Bairoch, the third fastest-growing 20-year period was that of 1850-70 (1.8 per cent). However, the record for this period is more difficult to assess than those of the other two periods. First of all, 1850-61 was a period of relatively (but relatively) low protectionism, while 1862-70 witnessed a marked increase in protection. Moreover, this period contains the periods of the Civil War (1861-5) and the postwar reconstruction, and thus cannot be treated in the same way as other periods.
90
See O’Rourke 2000. The 10 countries are: Austria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, the UK and the USA.
91
The role of tariffs in the development of cotton textile has generated a heated debate. Taussig was the first to argue that ‘[p]robably as early as 1824, and almost certainly by 1832, the industry had reached a firm position, in which it was able to meet foreign competition on equal terms’ (1892, p. 136). Bils disputed this and concluded his study with the statement that ‘[t]he removal of tariff … would have reduced value added in textiles by, at a minimum, three quarters. The implication is that about half of the industrial sector of New England would have been bankrupted’ (1984, p. 1,045). Irwin and Temin 2000 sided with Taussig on the ground that the American cotton textile producers would have survived the abolition of tariff because they specialised in different products from those of the British producers. However, the difference between them and Bils is actually not as striking as it first seems. Irwin and Temin do not disagree with Bils’s view that the American producers could not compete with the British producers in high-value-added segments of the market. They merely make the point that most American producers were not actually in those segments.
92
Engerman and Sokoloff 2000, p. 400; Lipsey 2000, p. 726. This is presumably why on the eve of the Civil War the New England woollen textile industry was in general quite content with the moderate protection accorded by the 1857 Tariff Act, inasmuch as the tariff on raw materials remained low. In contrast, states like Pennsylvania, New Jersey, parts of Maryland, and West Virginia (with its mining interests), where the new generation of heavy industries were growing around the iron-coal axis, were very strongly protectionist (see Luthin 1944, pp. 615- 20).
93
Kozul-Wright 1995, pp. 100-2, esp. p. 101, n. 37.
94
Shapiro and Taylor 1990, p. 866; Owen 1966, chapter 9; Mowery and Rosenberg 1993.
95
Owen 1966, pp. 149-50.
96
Mowery and Rosenberg 1993, table 2.3.
97
Shapiro and Taylor sum this up nicely: ‘Boeing would not be Boeing, nor would IBM be IBM, in either military or commercial endeavours without Pentagon contracts and civilian research support’ (1990, p. 866).
98
See http://www.phrma.orglpublications.
99
Spiegel 1971, p. 364.
100
Conkin 1980, p. 188. The best example of such extreme protectionist was Willard Philips, who, together with Calvin Colton, was one of the most famous campaigners for infant industry protection in the early nineteenth century. Philips published one of the two or three earliest American economics textbooks, A Manual of Political Economy (Conkin 1980, p. 178).
101
See above; see also Kaplan 1931, on Carey’s life and work.
102
Letter to Weydemeyer, 5 March 1852, in K Marx and F Engels, Letters to Americans, 1848-95: A Selection
