house’, according to the New York Tribune newspaper in 1868 (Cochran and Miller 1942, pp. 159). See also Cochran and Miller 1942, pp. 158-9; Benson 1978.
23
Garraty and Carnes 2000, p. 472. Open sales of votes by them were especially widespread in the 1860s and 1870s. The group of corrupt assemblymen from both parties, called ‘Black Horse Cavalry’ demanded $1,000 per vote on railroad bills and vigorous bidding drove prices up to $5,000 per vote. The group also introduced ‘strike bills’, which if passed would greatly hinder some wealthy interests or corporation, and would then demand payment to drop the bill. As a result, some companies created lobbying organisations that bought legislation, sparing themselves from blackmail. See Benson 1978, pp. 59-60 for details.
24
World Bank 1997, chapter 6, sums up the current debate on this from the IDPE’s point of view.
25
Weber 1968; see also Evans 1995, chapter 2, for further discussion of this view.
26
See Hughes 1994 and Hood 1995, 1998, for some critical appraisals of the NPM literature.
27
Rauch and Evans 2000, present statistical evidence to support this.
28
See Kindleberger 1984, pp. 160-1 (for England); pp. 168-9 (for France); Dorwart 1953, p. 192 (for Prussia).
29
Anderson and Anderson 1978.
30
Finer 1989.
31
Cochran and Miller 1941, pp. 156-60; Garraty and Carnes 2000, pp. 253-4; Finer 1989.
32
Garraty and Carnes 2000, p. 472; id., pp. 581-3.
33
Anderson and Anderson 1978.
34
Armstrong 1973.
35
Of course, this does not imply that nepotism was the reason for all such appointments.
36
Feuchtwanger 1970, p. 45.
37
Armstrong 1973, pp. 79-81. However, the term ‘aristocracy’, should be interpreted somewhat carefully in this context. Since the days of the Great Elector, Frederick William (1640-1688), it was customary in Prussia to ennoble commoners who had risen high in the royal service (Feuchtwanger, 1970, p. 45-6).
38
Garraty and Carnes 2000, pp. 254, 583 (for USA); Clark 1996, p. 55 (for Italy); Palacio 1988, p. 496 (for Spain); Baudhuin 1946, pp. 203-4 (for Belgium).
39
For further details, see Dorwart 1953; Feuchtwanger 1970; Gothelf, 2000.
40
On the characteristics of the modern ‘Weberian’ bureaucracy in the context of . today’s developing countries, see Rauch and Evans 2000; Anderson and Anderson 1978; see also Blackbourn 1997, pp. 76-7, 82- 4.
41
Hobsbawm 1999, p. 209.
42
Benson 1978, pp. 81, 85.
43
See Upham 2000 and Ohnesorge 2000 for a critic of the ‘rule of law’ rhetoric.
