Hitler. 1936-1945: Nemesis

315. Weinberg II, 426–9.

316. TBJG, I/6, 91 (15 September 1938); Groscurth, 118.

317. Schmidt, 401; Keith Feiling, The Life of Neville Chamberlain, London, 1946, 364.

318. He confessed to ‘some slight sinking when I found myself flying over London and looking down thousands of feet at the houses below’, but he was soon enjoying ‘the marvellous spectacle of ranges of glittering white cumulus clouds stretching away to the horizon below me’, before experiencing ‘more nervous moments when we circled down over the aerodrome’ in Munich after passing through some turbulence when ‘the aeroplane rocked and bumped like a ship in a sea’. (Birmingham University Library, Chamberlain Collection, NC 18/1/1069, letter of Neville Chamberlain to his sister Ida, 19 September 1938.)

319. Birmingham University Library, Chamberlain Collection, NC 18/1/1069, letter of Neville Chamberlain to his sister Ida, 19 September 1938.

320. Schmidt, 401–7; DGFP, D, II, 787–98, No.487; DBFP, Ser.3, II, 342–51, No.896. According to Chamberlain’s notes of the meeting (DBFP, Ser.3, II, 338–41, No.895, here 340), his reply to Hitler had been: ‘If the Fuhrer is determined to settle this matter by force without even waiting for a discussion between ourselves to take place, what did he let me come here for? I have wasted my time.’

321. Schmidt, 406, blames it on Ribbentrop. As Weinberg II points out, however, 433 and n.235, it appears that Ribbentrop was acting on Hitler’s orders. See DGFP, D, II, 830–31, no.532.

322. Weinberg II, 433.

323. Weizsacker, Erinnerungen, 184.

324. Weizsacker-Papiere, 143.

325. TBJG, I/6, 94 (17 September 1938); Below, 123. Keitel, 189, claimed that Hitler was not satisfied at the outcome. This assertion is left unsupported, and contradicts the impressions of Weizsacker and Below.

326. Below, 123. Keitel’s own account — since he had been present at the Berghof, but not at the actual talks — must have drawn upon Hitler’s own description and diminished the role played by Chamberlain. Hitler, reported Keitel, had threatened the cancellation of the naval pact, at which Chamberlain had ‘collapsed’ (zusammengesackt). The Fuhrer had added that he was ready for anything, and had twenty years’ advantage over the British Prime Minister. To spare Chamberlain the long journey to Berchtesgaden, he agreed to meet him in Godesberg. He was prepared to travel to London but would be exposed there to insults of the Jews. ‘There is a determination to march,’ Keitel concluded. (Groscurth, 120 and n.102–3.)

327. Weinberg II, 438.

328. Birmingham University Library, Chamberlain Collection, NC 18/1/1069, letter of Neville Chamberlain to his sister Ida, 19 September 1938.

329. Weinberg II, 437–44.

330. TBJG, I/6, 94 (17 September 1938).

331. TBJG, I/6, 99 (19 September 1938).

332. TBJG, I/6, 101 (20 September 1938).

333. TBJG, I/6, 98 (18 September 1938).

334. Groscurth, 120 and n.104; Weinberg II, 434.

335. See Goebbels’s report on Hitler’s thinking in TBJG, I/6, 113 (26 September 1938).

336. TBJG, I/6, 101 (20 September 1938), 103 (21 September 1938), 105 (22 September 1938).

337. TBJG, I/6, 103 (21 September 1938).

338. Schmidt, 407.

339. Shirer, 113. For references to Hitler as the ‘carpet-biter’ in the middle of the war, see Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 187.

340. Schmidt, 407–9.

341. Schmidt, 409–11.

342. Schmidt, 412.

343. TBJG, I/6, 105 (22 September 1938).

344. Schmidt, 412.

345. Schmidt, 413–14.

346. TBJG, I/6, 113 (26 September 1938).

347. See Weizsacker, Erinnerungen, 184; Weizsacker- Papiere, 143.

348. Below’s recollection differed somewhat. According to his later account, Hitler did not believe that the Czechs would fall into line with British and German demands. Therefore, he would continue with Plan Green, aimed at the occupation of the whole of Czechoslovakia. Hitler had told his military leaders that this would be his favourite solution. The talks with Chamberlain had confirmed his impression that Britain and France would not intervene militarily. (Below, 126.)

349. Weinberg II, 449.

350. Schmidt, 415; Henderson, 159; DBFP, Ser.3, II, 554–7 (quotation, 555), No.1118, where Kirkpatrick’s note reads: ‘If France and England decided to strike, let them strike. He did not care a farthing.’

351. Domarus, 933, has 20,000; Shirer, 116, has 15,000.

352. Shirer, 116.

353. TBJG, I/6, 116 (27 September 1938).

354. Domarus, 928.

355. Domarus, 930–32.

356. Domarus, 932 (and see also 927).

357. Domarus, 932.

358. Domarus, 932–3; Shirer, 116–17.

359. Henderson, 160; Schmidt, 416–17.

360. Henderson, 160; Schmidt, 417.

361. Schmidt, 416.

362. Henderson, 160–61; Groscurth, 125–6, n.130–31 (for Weizsacker’s authorship); Schmidt, 417; Weinberg, II, 451 and n.294 for the timing of the decision to write to Chamberlain being taken before the military demonstration that afternoon; DGFP, D, II, 966–8, No.635; DBFP, Ser.3, II, 576–8, No.1144.

363. Henderson, 161.

364. Below, 127.

365. Shirer, 117; and see Wiedemann, 175–6.

366. TBJG, I/6, 119 (29 September 1938).

367. Below, 127.

368. Schmidt, 417; Shirer, 117. See also Weizsacker-Papiere, 145; Engel, 39–40; Ruth Andreas-Friedrich, Schauplatz Berlin. Ein deutscbes Tagebuch, Munich, 1962, 5–6; and Marlis Steinert, Hitlers Krieg und die Deutschen. Stimmung und Haltung der deutscben Bevolkerung im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Dusseldorf/Vienna, 1970, 77–9.

369. Weizsacker-Papiere, 170.

370. Groscurth, 125 (27 September 1938) and n.127.

371. Himmler, as Weizsacker subsequently implied, also favoured war. (See Weizsacker, Erinnerungen 191.) The growth of his SS empire was predicated upon German expansion. But his involvement in foreign-policy deliberations was minimal.

372. Groscurth, 128 (28 September 1938).

373. Kube, 273–5.

374. Neville Chamberlain, The Struggle for Peace, London, 1939, 275; Groscurth,