125 n.129.
375. Chamberlain, 299; Schmidt, 420.
376. Henderson, 162–3.
377. DBFP, Ser.3, II, 587, no.1159; Feiling, 372–3.
378. Henderson, 162.
379. Weizsacker, Erinnerungen, 186–7.
380. Henderson, 162–3.
381. Schmidt, 418.
382. Henderson, 163; TBJG, I/6, 119 (29 September 1938).
383. Andre Francois-Poncet, Als Botschafter im Dritten Reich. Die Erinnerungen des franzosischen Botschafters in Berlin September 1931 bis Oktober 1938, Mainz/Berlin, 1980, 378; Schmidt, 418–19.
384. Schmidt, 420; Henderson, 164.
385. Schmidt, 420.
386. Henderson, 164.
387. TBJG, I/6, 119 (29 September 1938).
388. Henderson, 164–6; DBFP, 3rd Ser., II. 597, No.1180; Weinberg II, 453–6 for the diplomatic background to Mussolini’s decision. Goebbels [TBJG, I/6, 119 (29 September 1938)] mistakenly remarks that the idea for the Four-Power Conference was Hitler’s.
389. Chips, 171; see also Harold Nicolson, Diaries and Letters, 1930–1964, New York, 1980, 138; Jones, 410–11; Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 109; Richard Lamb, The Ghosts of Peace, 1935–1945, Salisbury, 1987, 86. Chamberlain himself commented a few days later: ‘That the news of the deliverance should come to me in the very act of closing my speech in the House was a piece of drama that no work of fiction saw surpassed’ (University of Birmingham Library, Chamberlain Papers, NC 18/1/1070, letter of Neville Chamberlain to his sister, Hilda, 2 October 1938). The Labour and Liberal leaders were warm in their approval of Chamberlain’s decision to go to Munich, though they were aware that any settlement would mean the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany. Conservative critics, including Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden were silent. Only one Member of Parliament — a Communist — protested. (Roy Douglas, ‘Chamberlain and Appeasement’, in Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Lothar Kettenacker (eds.), The Fascist Challenge and the Policy of Appeasement, London, 1983, 79–88, here 86–7.)
390. TBJG, I/6, 120 (29 September 1938).
391. Schmidt, 421. See Celovsky, ch.10, especially 460ff., for a detailed account of the course of the conference and its results; also Keith Eubank, Munich, Norman, Oklahoma, 1963, 207– 22.
392. University of Birmingham Library, Chamberlain Papers, NC 18/1/1070, letter of Neville Chamberlain to his sister, Hilda, 2 October 1938.
393. Description of the conference proceedings from Schmidt, 421–4. See also DBFP, 3rd Ser., 11, 630–5, No.1227; Henderson, 166–8. For the authorship of the proposal attributed to Mussolini, see Schmidt, 423, Weinberg II, 457; Kube, 273; and Blasius, Fur Deutschland, 68.
394. Henderson, 166.
395. Schmidt, 421.
396. Schmidt, 424.
397. Henderson, 167.
398. TBJG, I/6, 122 (30 September 1938).
399. TBJG, I/6, 122 (1 October 1938).
400. Groscurth, 128 (29 September 1938) and n.142; Weizsacker, Erinnerungen, 187–8; Schmidt, 425–6.
401. Schmidt, 425–6; see Below, 129 (a distorted account). Kube, 276 n.86; Michalka, Ribbentrop, 240 n.2; Josef Henke, England, 187–204, for Hitler’s negative reactions to Munich.
402. University of Birmingham Library, Chamberlain Papers, NC 18/1/1070, letter of Neville Chamberlain to his sister, Hilda, 2 October 1938.
403. Schmidt, 425; DBFP, 3rd Ser., 11, 635–50, No.1228.
404. See Henderson, 174–5.
405. IMG, xxvi.343, Doc.798-PS.
406. Kube, 275–8, 299ff.
407. Henke, England, 188.
408. According to Below, Hitler’s Wehrmacht adjutant Major Engel reported at the time that he had found Halder slumped across his desk when the announcement of the Munich Conference was made. Below was incredulous, since he was aware that Halder had been against mobilization, and only, he said, understood following the post-war revelations about his connections with a plot to depose Hitler how the Munich Agreement had pulled the rug from under his feet (Below, 130). For Halder’s connections with the emergent opposition to Hitler, and for his behaviour during the Sudeten crisis, see Hoffmann, 109–29; Christian Hartmann, Halder. Generalstabschef Hitlers 1938–1942, Paderborn etc., 1991, 99–116; and also Gerd R. Ueberschar, Generaloberst Franz Halder. Generalstabschef, Gegner und Gefangener Hitlers, Gottingen, 1991, 33–4. On Munich and the failure of the coup plans, see Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende, 326; Klemperer, 109–10; and Hoffmann, 128–9. For the internal divisions of those opposed to war, and the coup plans, see Muller, in Koch, Aspects, 163–72.
409. University of Birmingham Library, Chamberlain Papers, NC 18/1/1070, letter of Neville Chamberlain to his sister, Hilda, 2 October 1938, where the euphoric scenes in the streets as he was driven from the aerodrome at Heston to Buckingham Palace, then in Downing Street, are described. See also The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938–1945, ed. David Dilks, London, 1971, 111; Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War. Vol.1: The Gathering Storm, London etc., 1948, 286. For Chamberlain’s immediate regret at having used such a phrase while swept away by emotion on his return, see Nicolson, 140; Halifax, 198–9.
410. Manchester Guardian, 1 October 1938.
411. Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende, 326; Muller, in Koch, Aspects, 171. See also Ritter, 204; Ulrich von Hassell, Die Hassell- Tagebucher 1938–1944. Aufzeichnungen vom Andern Deutschland, ed. Friedrich Freiherr Hiller von Gaertringen, Berlin, 1988, 54–7.
412. Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 138; Auerbach in Knipping and Muller, 284–6; Steinert, 79; Below, 129.
413. Treue, ‘Rede Hitlers vor der deutschen Presse’, 182.
