Die Kunst des klaren Denkens

Perspectives 1, 1988.

Wenn es darum geht, den anderen auszustechen, siehe: Malhotra, Deepak: »The desire to win: The effects of competitive arousal on motivation and behavior«, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 111 (2), Marz 2010, S. 139–146.

Wie viel wurden Sie fur 100 Euro bezahlen? Beispiel von Plous, Scott: The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making, McGraw-Hill, 1993, S. 248.

»Warren Buffett’s rule for open-outcry auctions: don’t go.« Charlie Munger on the Psychology of Human Misjudgment. Rede an der Harvard University, Juni 1995.

Der fundamentale Attributionsfehler

Der Stanford-Psychologe Lee Ross hat zum ersten Mal den fundamentalen Attributionsfehler beschrieben, siehe: Ross, L.: »The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: Distortions in the attribution process«, in: Berkowitz, L. (Hrsg.): Advances in experimental social psychology (vol. 10), Academic Press, 1977.

Das Experiment mit der Rede, siehe: Jones, E. E.; Harris, V. A.: »The attribution of attitudes«, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 3, 1967, S. 1–24.

Siehe auch: Plous, Scott: The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making, McGraw-Hill, 1993, S. 180 f.

Die falsche Kausalitat

Dubben, Hans-Hermann; Beck-Bornholdt, Hans-Peter: Der Hund, der Eier legt. Erkennen von Fehlinformation durch Querdenken, rororo, 2006, S. 175 ff.

Das schone Beispiel mit den Storchen, ebenda S. 181.

Bucher im Haushalt, siehe: National Endowment for the Arts: To Read or Not To Read: A Question of National Consequence, November 2007.

The Halo Effect

Das ultimative Buch fur den Halo Effect in der Wirtschaft, von hier auch das Cisco-Beispiel: Rosenzweig, P.: The Halo Effect: and the Eight Other Business Delusions That Deceive Managers, Free Press, 2007.

Thorndike, E. L.: »A constant error on psychological rating«, Journal of Applied Psychology IV, 1920, S. 25–29.

Nisbett, Richard E.; Wilson, Timothy D.: »The halo effect: Evidence for unconscious alteration of judgments«, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 35 (4), 1977, S. 250–256.

Die alternativen Pfade

Das Beispiel mit dem Russisch Roulette: Taleb, Nassim Nicholas: Fooled By Randomness, Random House, 2001, S. 23.

»It is hard to think of Alexander the Great or Julius Caesar as men who won only in the visible history, but who could have suffered defeat in others. If we have heard of them, it is simply because they took considerable risks, along with thousands of others, and happened to win. They were intelligent, courageous, noble (at times), had the highest possible obtainable culture in their day – but so did thousands of others who live in the musty footnotes of history.« (Taleb, Nassim Nicholas: Fooled by Randomness, Random House, 2001, S. 34)

»My argument is that I can find you a security somewhere among the 40,000 available that went up twice that amount every year without fail. Should we put the social security money into it?« (ebenda S. 146)

Die Prognoseillusion

Tetlock, Philip E.: How Accurate Are Your Pet Pundits? Project Syndicate/Institute for Human Sciences, 2006.

Koehler, Derek J.; Brenner, Lyle; Griffin, Dale: »The Calibration of Expert Judgment. Heuristics and biases beyond the laboratory «, in: Gilovich, Dale Griffin and Daniel Kahneman (Hrsg.): Heuristics and Biases. The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, Cambridge University Press, 2002, S. 686.

»The only function of economic forecasting is to make astrology look respectable.« (John Kenneth Galbraith,http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/busi ness/4960280.stm)

Der Prognose-Spruch von Tony Blair in: Buehler, Roger; Griffin, Dale; Ross, Michael: »Inside the planning fallacy: The causes and consequences of optimistic time predictions«, in: Gilovich, Thomas; Griffin, Dale; Kahneman, Daniel (Hrsg.): Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment, Cambridge University Press, 2002, S. 270.

»There have been as many plagues as wars in history, yet always plagues and wars take people equally by surprise.« (Albert Camus, The Plague)

»I don’t read economic forecasts. I don’t read the funny papers.« (Warren Buffett)

Harvard-Professor Theodore Levitt: »It’s easy to be a prophet. You make twenty-five predictions and the ones that come true are the ones you talk about.« (Bevelin, Peter: Seeking Wisdom. From Darwin to Munger, Post Scriptum, 2003, S. 145)

»There are 60,000 economists in the U.S., many of them employed full-time trying to forecast recessions and interest rates, and if they could do it successfully twice in a row, they‘d all be millionaires by now … as far as I know, most of them are still gainfully employed, which ought to tell us something.« (Lynch, Peter: One Up On Wall Street, Simon Schuster, 2000)

Und weil dieser Satz so knackig war, hier gleich noch ein Zitat aus dem gleichen Buch: »Thousands of experts study overbought indicators, oversold indicators, head-and-shoulder patterns, put-call ratios, the Fed’s policy on money supply, foreign investment, the movement of the constellations through the heavens, and the moss on oak trees, and they can’t predict markets with any useful consistency, any more than the gizzard squeezers could tell the Roman emperors when the Huns would attack.« (ebenda) Borsenanalysten sind besonders gut im Nachhinein-Prognostizieren: »The analysts and the brokers. They don‘t know anything. Why do they always downgrade stocks after the bad earnings come out? Where‘s the guy that downgrades them before the bad earnings come out? That‘s the smart guy. But I don‘t know any of them. They‘re rare, they‘re very rare. They‘re rarer than Jesse Jackson at a Klan meeting.« (Perkins, Marc: 2000 TheStreet.com)

The Conjunction Fallacy

Die Geschichte mit Klaus ist eine modifizierte Variante der sogenannten »Linda-Geschichte« bei Tversky und Kahneman: Tversky, Amos; Kahneman, Daniel: »Extension versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment«, Psychological Review 90 (4), Oktober 1983, S. 293–331 . Die Conjunction Fallacy wird deshalb auch »Linda-Problem« genannt.

Das Beispiel mit dem Olverbrauch ist ein bisschen modifiziert und vereinfacht. Das Originalbeispiel hier: Tversky, Amos; Kahneman, Daniel: »Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment«, Psychological Review 90 (4), Oktober 1983, S. 293–315.

Zu den beiden Arten des Denkens – intuitiv vs. rational bzw. System 1 vs. System 2, siehe: Kahneman, Daniel: »A perspective on judgement and choice«, American Psychologist 58, 2003, S. 697– 720.

Framing

Tversky, Amos; Kahneman, Daniel: »The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice«, Science, New Series, Vol. 211, 1981, S. 453–458.

Der Framing-Effekt in der Medizin, siehe: Dawes, Robyn M.: Everyday Irrationality: How Pseudo- Scientists, Lunatics, and the Rest of Us Systematically Fail to Think Rationally, Westview Press, 2001, S. 3 ff.

Shepherd, R. et al.: »The effects of information on sensory ratings and preferences: The importance of attitudes«, Food Quality and Preference 3 (3), 1991–1992, S. 147–155.

The Action Bias

Bar-Eli, Michael et al.: »Action Bias among Elite Soccer Goalkeepers: The Case of Penalty Kicks«, Journal of Economic Psychology 28 (5), 2007, S. 606–621.

Warren Buffett verweigert sich erfolgreich dem Action Bias: »We don’t get paid for activity, just for being right. As to how long we’ll wait, we’ll wait indefinitely.« (Buffett, Warren: Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting 1998)