summarizes the state of the SS; conditions were no better in the army formations.
76 Ideological racism and cultural arrogance Cf. Neitzel and Welzer, Soldaten, p. 317–343.
77 Delivered by phone Stadler, Offensive gegen Kursk, p. 103.
78 Solid prospects existed for a breakthrough Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, p. 209, speak of “cautious optimism.” Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, p. 353, stresses the shock effects of July 12 on Hoth and his staff.
79 Hoth’s final orders arrived “Durch FS um 20.45 Uhr.: An II-SS Pz.-Korps,” in Stadler, Offensivegegen Kursk, p. 103.
80 Corps intelligence summary “Feindlage 12.7.1943, Stand: 21.00 Uhr.,” in ibid., pp. 105–106.
81 Hausser responded to Hoth “Auftraege fur 13.7.43” (the “14” in the text is an obvious misprint), in ibid., p. 105; “KTB II. SS-Panzerkorps an SS Divisionen ‘LSAH,’ ‘DR,’ und ‘T’ … Auftraege fur 13.7.43,” National Archives, T-354, roll 605.
1 The Russians came to it Cf. Harrison, Russian Way of War, and the more comprehensive overview by Jacob Kipp, “The Tsarist and Soviet Operational Art, 1853–1991,” in Evolution of Operational Art, pp. 64–95.
2 Its rebirth was a two-year process “Rebirth” is the central theme of Glantz, Stumbling Colossus.
3 Preparations for Kutuzov Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, pp. 227–232; and Glantz, “Soviet Military Strategy,” Journal of Military History 60, no 1 (1996).
4 An inactive sector That description is relative. See Franz Kurowski, Deadlock Before Moscow: Army Group Center, 1942/1942, trans. Joseph G. Welsh (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 1992).
5 Locus of a serious plot Peter Hoffmann, “Trecksow and Army Group Center,” in The History of the German Resistance, 1933–1945, trans. Richard Barry (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977), pp. 264–289.
6 Confronted Operation Kutuzov For the final balance of forces, see Frieser et al., Ostfront, pp. 98–99.
7 Achieved almost complete surprise David M. Glantz, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 160–193.
8 Launch time was determined For a general operational overview, see John Erickson, The Road to Berlin: Continuing the History of Stalin’s War with Germany (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), p. 108. Major General Peter von der Groeben, “Ninth Army and Second Panzer Army,” in Kursk: The German View, pp. 108–112, gives a German staff officer’s perspective.
9 Airpower played a major role Bergstrom, Kursk: The Air Battle, pp. 82–84; Hardesty and Grinberg, Red Phoenix Rising, pp. 261– 265.
10 Had his ups and downs Geoffrey Jukes, “Bagramyan,” in Harold Shukman, ed., Stalin’s Generals, pp. 26–27.
11 Bryansk Front found the going tougher Lothar Rendulic, “Die Schlacht von Orel, Juli 1943: Wahl und Bildung des Schwerpunktes,” Osterreichische Militarische Zeitschrift 1 (1963): 130–138.
12 Owed a good part of their success Bergstrom, Kursk: The Air Battle, pp. 85–86.
13 A rapidity … Newton, calls suspicious Newton, Hitler’s Commander, pp. 253–255.
14 The 12th Panzer had spent a week The division’s records are summarized in Antonius John, Kursk ’43: Szenen einer Entscheidungsschlacht (Bonn: H&H Konzept Verlag, 1993), pp. 106–118.
15 “The threshold to battle hell” Ibid., pp. 117, 120. The 5th Panzer Grenadier Regiment was part of 12th Panzer Division.
16 In a strategic … cleft stick Simon Ball, The Bitter Sea: The Struggle for Mastery in the Mediterranean, 1935–1949 (London: HarperPress, 2010), and Douglas Porch, The Path to Victory: The Mediterranean Theater in World War II (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2004), are the best overviews from, respectively, a policy/strategy and a strategic/operational perspective. Citino, The Wehrmacht Retreats, brilliantly integrates the synergies of the Mediterranean theater and the Russian front.
17 Italy was a broken reed MacGregor Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies: Royal Armed Forces, Fascist Regime, and the War of 1940–1943 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), is an analytical overview. Gerhard Schreiber, “Das Ende des nordafrikanischen Feldzugs und der Krieg in Italien 1943 bis 1945,” in Frieser et al., Ostfront, pp. 1100–1114, summarizes the German perspective of the Axis endgame.
18 But where? Citino, The Wehrmacht Retreats, pp. 172–175, presents the options.
19 His reputation for optimism Albert Kesselring, Kesselring: A Soldier’s Record, trans. Lynton Hudson (New York: William Morrow, 1954), pp. 196–198; Schreiber, “Ende des nordafrikanischen Feldzugs,” in Frieser et al., Ostfront, p. 1113.
20 Hitler should have come forward Manstein, Verlorene Siege, p. 501.
21 “Under the sun-ray lamp” Stahlberg, Bounden Duty, p. 307.
22 Hitler’s presentation Manstein, Verlorene Siege, pp. 501– 503; Frieser et al., Ostfront, pp. 141–142.
23 Too late in the day Stahlberg, Bounden Duty, pp. 309– 310.
24 An increasing number of similar ones Dennis E. Showalter, “Conscience, Honor, and Expediency: The German Army’s Resistance to Hitler,” in Confront!: Resistance in Nazi Germany, ed. John J. Michalczyk (New York: Peter Lang, 2004), pp. 62–79.
25 To define his own place in history Melvin’s excellent biography may be complemented by Benoit Lemay, Erich von Manstein: Hitler’s Master Strategist (Havertown, PA: Casemate, 2010), and Marcel Stein, Field Marshal von Manstein: The Janus Head—A Portrait, ed. Gwyneth Fairbank, trans. Marcel Stein (Solihull, UK: Helion & Co., 2007).
26 Vatutin’s headquarters had been doing the same thing Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, p. 208; Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 426, 460–461.
27 Vatutin requested reinforcements Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 456–457.
28 Stated purpose of the meeting Ibid., pp. 457, 470–471.
29 Lack of specialized recovery vehicles Ibid., pp. 447–449. Gary A. Dickson, “Tank Repair and the Red Army in World War II,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 25 (2012): 381–392, is an overview of Red Army maintenance methods.
