30 Quiet in the SS sector Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 366–371.
31 “I couldn’t deal with it” Agte, Jochen Peiper, pp. 176– 179.
32 On Totenkopf’s front Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 460–466; Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 378–382.
33 Taken at all costs Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, p. 382.
34 Soviet attacks began Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 469–473; Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 372–374.
35 Fourth Panzer Army’s daily report “KTB 4. Panzerarmee, Chefnotizen fur 13.7.1943,” National Archives, T-313, roll 369.
36 Suggested an opportunity At least to Manstein. Manstein, Verlorene Siege, p. 501.
37 Dazed and mechanical Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, p. 226; Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, p. 210; cf. “Darstellung der Ereignisse XLVIII Panzer- Korps am 13.7.1943,” National Archives, T-314, roll 1170; and Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 384–388.
38 Nowhere near in any of its divisional sectors Lodieu, III. Pz. Korps, pp. 121–126; Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 474–480.
39 A revised plan Manstein, Verlorene Siege, pp. 500–501; Melvin, Manstein, p. 376; Frieser et al., Ostfront, pp. 141– 144.
40 Strained to its limits Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, p. 382.
41 It was Grossdeutschland’s turn Ibid., pp. 412–413; Spaeter, Grossdeutschland, pp. 131–132; Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, pp. 228–229; Bergstrom, Kursk: The Air Battle, pp. 99–100.
42 First Tank Army … had done its job Armstrong, Red Army Tank Commanders, p. 63.
43 “The stubborn defense of its current lines” Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 513–514.
44 Rhetoric of attack was challenged Ibid., pp. 486–487.
45 Breith was on his own Ibid., pp. 495–496; Lodieu, III. Pz. Korps, pp. 126–140; Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 409–411.
46 “Behaving splendidly” Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, p. 489.
47 Vatutin responded Ibid., pp. 503–504.
48 Withdrawal to a new defensive line Ibid., pp. 504–512.
49 Das Reich’s panzer grenadiers Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 398–405; Lodier, III. Pz. Korps, p. 139.
50 Further refined and reconceptualized Cf. the summaries in Frieser et al., Ostfront, p. 145, and Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 413, 417–418, with “Vorschlag fur Operation Roland am 16.7.1943, KTB Panzerarmeeoberkommando 4 an Heeresgruppe Sud,” National Archives, T-313, roll 382.
51 Stavka’s planned offensive David M. Glantz, From the Don to the Dnepr: Soviet Offensive Operations, December 1942-August 1943 (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1991), pp. 229–252.
52 Unlikely to encourage a narrow focus Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, p. 445, revising his earlier judgment in Decision in the Ukraine: German Panzer Operations on the Eastern Front, Summer 1943 (Winnipeg: J. J. Fedorowicz, 1996), pp. 55–56, 67.
53 Limited prospects for Manstein’s projected revision of Citadel Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 421–422.
54 Citadel’s file of might-have-beens Weidinger, Division Das Reich, pp. 213, 216.
55 Stalin and Stavka were anxious Zhukov, Reminiscences and Reflections, p. 194.
56 Southern Front attacked the Sixth Army Major Dr. Martin Francke, “Sixth Army Defends the Mius River Line,” in Kursk: The German View, pp. 306–324.
57 Finally recognized the obvious Frieser et al., Ostfront, pp. 191–193; Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, pp. 244–246.
58 Out of touch with reality Newton, Hitler’s Commander, pp. 256–262; Frieser et al., Ostfront, pp. 185–190; Bergstrom, Kursk: The Air Battle, pp. 90–95; Hardesty and Grinberg, Red Phoenix Rising, pp. 262– 267.
59 To change the Fuhrer’s mind Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, p. 238.
60 Position in the Mediterranean was steadily eroding Citino, The Wehrmacht Retreats, pp. 238–254, reconstructs and contextualizes admirably the quandary facing the German high command at this period. For a staff officer’s on-the-ground perspective of the situation in Italy, see Siegfried Westphal, Heer in Fesseln: Aus den Papieren des Stabschefs von Rommel, Kesselring und Rundstedt (Bonn: Athenaum Verlag, 1952), pp. 214–226.
61 Grew increasingly tenuous For details and background, see Josef Schroder, Italiens Kriegsaustritt 1943: Die deutschen Gegenmassnahmen im italienischen Raum: Fall “Alarich” und “Achse” (Gottingen: Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1969).
62 He summoned Kluge Frieser et al., Ostfront, pp. 219– 220.
63 No pressure was applied for close pursuit Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 458–459, 515.
64 Germany’s ultimate assets Manstein, Verlorene Siege, pp. 516–517.
65 Fighting Manstein’s war For the German perspective, cf. Frieser et al., Ostfront, pp. 193–200, and Melvin, Manstein, pp. 382–387. The Russian side is predictably well and exhaustively presented in Glantz, Don to the Dnepr, pp. 251–365.
66 “A blizzard of red arrows” Citino, The Wehrmacht Retreats, p. 232.
67 Zeitzler paid an unannounced visit Manstein, Verlorene Siege, pp. 518–519.
68 Hitler flew to Vinnitsa Ibid., pp. 522–529; Melvin, Manstein, pp. 387–388, 391–394.
69 Demanded a private meeting with the Fuhrer Manstein, Verlorene Siege, pp. 529–530.
70 No dictator can accept such a challenge Melvin, Manstein, pp. 394–395.
71 Close to throwing the Salerno landing into the sea Angus Konstam, Salerno 1943: The Allied Invasion of Italy (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Military, 2007), is an economical overview.
