72 Gersdorff … had gone so far His version of the following events is in Rudolf-Christof Gersdorff, Soldat im Untergang (Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1977), pp. 134–136; cf. Hoffmann, German Resistance, p. 290.
73 “One-sided actionism” Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 170.
74 Is an oath one-sided? Robert B. Kane, Disobedience and Conspiracy in the German Army, 1918–1945 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 2002), analyzes and contextualizes this morally complex question.
75 They scorched the earth For Manstein’s definition and description, see Manstein, Verlorene Siege, pp. 539–540. Broader analyses include Bernd Wegner, “Die Aporie des Krieges,” in Frieser et al., Ostfront, pp. 256–269; and from a unit perspective, Christoph Rass, “Menschenmaterial”: Deutsche Soldaten an der Ostfront: Innenansichten einer Infanteriedivision, 1939–1945 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh, 2003), pp. 365–385.
76 “Field of rubble” Cited in Stephen G. Fritz, Ostkrieg: Hitler’s War of Extermination in the East (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011), p. 372.
77 “Burning our bread” Quoted in David M. Glantz and Jonathan House, When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), p. 172.
78 By the time Army Group South reached the Dnieper Frieser et al., Ostfront, pp. 360–367 and 301–308, discusses the situation of Army Groups South and Center.
1 First come statistics Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 530–546; Frieser et al., Ostfront, pp. 150–159; Zetterling and Frankson, Kursk 1943, pp. 111–131.
2 “Platoon technology” Dennis E. Showalter, “More than Nuts and Bolts: Technology and the German Army, 1870–1945,” Historian 65, no. 1 (2002): 139–142.
3 Signposts of the Red Army’s tactical progress Frieser et al., Ostfront, pp. 301–490, is the best analysis; Rolf Hinze, Crucible of Combat: Germany’s Defensive Battles in the Ukraine, 1943–1944, trans. and ed. Frederick P. Steinhardt (Solihull, UK: Helion & Co., 2009), is the most detailed account in English.
4 Russian accounts stress a system Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, pp. 196–201; Karl-Heinz Frieser, “Der Zusammenbruch im Osten,” in Frieser et al., Ostfront, pp. 493ff. passim. Useful as well are Gerd Niepold, Battle for White Russia: The Destruction of Army Group Centre June 1944, trans. Richard Simpkin (London: Brassey’s, 1987), and Walter S. Dunn Jr., Soviet Blitzkrieg: The Battle for White Russia, 1944 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000).
5 Three taproots Cf. David M. Glantz, The Military Strategy of the Soviet Union: A History (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1992).
6 Armored force in particular moved to an advanced stage Porter, Soviet Tank Units, is a useful introduction to a subject bidding fair to eclipse its German counterpart in specialized literature and on websites.
7 Altered the rifle units’ makeup David Glantz, “Soviet Use of ‘Substandard’ Manpower in the Red Army, 1941–1945,” in Scraping the Barrel: The Military Use of Substandard Manpower, 1860–1960, ed. Sanders Marble (New York: Fordham University Press, 2012), pp. 151–178.
8 “They know absolutely nothing” Quoted in Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944–1945 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), p. 124.
9 A culture of accommodation See particularly Martin van Creveld, The Culture of War (New York: Presidio Press/Ballantine Books, 2008).
10 “Quiver like a mouse” Cited in Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, p. 450.
11 Asked each man to give his age Lehmann, Leibstandarte, p. 230.
12 “A just and patriotic war” Reese, Why Stalin’s Soldiers Fought, pp. 176–200; Merridale, Ivan’s War, p. 282 passim.
13 Defending Western civilization David K. Yelton, Hitler’s Volkssturm: The Nazi Militia and the Fall of Germany, 1944–1945 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), and Robert S. Rush, “A Different Perspective: Cohesion, Morale, and Operational Effectiveness in the German Army, Fall 1944,” Armed Forces & Society 25, no. 3 (1999): 477–508, combine to depict a reality much more nuanced and far less exalted. The matrix of Nazi Germany’s endgame of “war to the knife” is exhaustively presented in Ralf Blank et al., Germany and the Second World War, vol. 9/1, German Wartime Society, 1939–1945: Politicization, Disintegration, and the Struggle for Survival, trans. Derry Cook-Radmore (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
ALSO BY DENNIS E. SHOWALTER
Hitler’s Panzers: The Lightning Attacks That Revolutionized Warfare
Railroads and Rifles: Soldiers, Technology, and the Unification of Germany
Patton and Rommel: Men of War in the Twentieth Century
The Wars of German Unification
Tannenberg: Clash of Empires
The Wars of Frederick the Great
German Military History Since 1648: A Critical Bibliography
Little Man, What Now?: Der Sturmer in the Weimar Republic
Soldiers’ Lives Through History: The Early Modern World (with William J. Astore)
Hindenburg: Icon of German Militarism (with William J. Astore)
Voices from the Third Reich: An Oral History (with Johannes Steinhoff and Peter Pechel)
DENNIS E. SHOWALTER has taught history at Colorado College since 1969 and is joint editor of the journal War in History. He was president of the Society for Military History from 1997 to 2001. In addition, Showalter has taught at the United States Air Force Academy, the United States Military Academy, and the Marine Corps University. He has written extensively on the wars of Frederick the Great, the German Wars of Unification, World War I, and World War II. Tannenberg: Clash of Empires won the American Historical Association’s Paul Birdsall Prize for best new book of 1992.
