25. Teller to Mayer, n.d. (Aug. 1948), box 3, Mayer papers.
26. Bradbury to Sproul, July 29, 1948, Underhill papers, LANL. “It is clear that I must not mix in politics again—wherever I am—not, for some time to come,” Teller vowed upon his return to the lab. Teller to Mayer, n.d. (Dec. 1948–Jan. 1949), box 3, Mayer papers.
27. Fitzpatrick (1998), 140.
28. However, Teller’s return to Los Alamos signaled no change in his point of view, as indicated by a letter to Mayer: “It is very dangerous not to believe in anything. It is very dangerous not to be clear about one’s beliefs. It is very dangerous to believe in anything half-heartedly, to try to believe in something that one knows (in some other way) not to be quite true.”
29. “Even my lethargy is counted here as praiseworthy industry.” Teller to Mayer, Jan. 20, 1949, box 3, Mayer papers.
30. In a 1974 interview for an authorized biography, Teller claimed that he “had no intention of working on the super” when he returned to Los Alamos in 1948. But Teller’s efforts at the lab indicate otherwise. Blumberg and Owens (1976), 201.
31. Teller to Mayer, n.d. [Jan. 1949], box 3, Mayer papers.
32. Bacher to commissioners, May 26, 1947, series 17, AEC/NARA.
33. The CIA predicted that the maximum number of weapons in the Soviet’s nuclear stockpile by 1955 would be twenty to fifty. Hillenkoetter to Hickenlooper, July 1, 1948, file CD11–1–2, series 199, OSD/NARA. In Jan. 1949, the agency raised this figure. Hillenkoetter to Hickenlooper, Dec. 18, 1948, no. CXXIX, JCAE.
34. Rhodes (1995), 363.
35. Strauss showed a personal interest in the long-range detection program. Minutes, AEC-MLC meeting, Nov. 24, 1948, no. 71764, CIC/DOE; Strauss, 200–207; Pfau (1984), 95–97; Ziegler and Jacobson (1995), 176–78.
36. Oppenheimer and the committee believed that the Russians might evade detection of their first bomb by testing it underground. Zielger and Jacobson (1995), 135.
37. Finney to McCormack, Aug. 2, 1949, no. 28483, CIC/DOE.
38. McMahon to Secretary of Defense, Aug. 9, 1949, no. XLVII, JCAE.
39. Pike to McMahon, Aug. 31, 1949, no. 1196, JCAE.
40. More than three weeks after the Russians’ first nuclear test, a CIA estimate pegged mid-1950 as “the earliest possible date” for a Soviet bomb. Michael Warner, ed., The CIA Under Harry Truman (CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1994), 319–20; Doyle Northrup and Donald Rock, “The Detection of Joe 1,” Studies in Intelligence 10 (fall 1966), 23–33, box 14, CIA/NARA; Ziegler and Jacobson (1995), 199–224.
41. The Soviets exploded their bomb on Aug. 29, 1949, over the steppes of Kazakhstan, in a test code-named First Lightning. Joe-1 was a virtual copy of the Fat Man device, based upon blueprints stolen by Russian spies. Holloway (1994), 213–19.
42. Ziegler and Jacobson (1995), 208; Gordon Arneson, “The H-bomb Decision,” Foreign Service Journal, May 1969, 28. As late as 1953, Truman questioned whether the Russians had actually exploded an atomic bomb in 1949. Robert Oppenheimer, The Open Mind (Simon and Schuster, 1955), 70.
43. ITMOJRO, 910; Zachary (1997), 349.
44. Truman decided to wait another four days to make the news of Joe-1 public, and then pointedly announced only that there had been “an atomic explosion” in Russia, refusing to concede that it was, in fact, a bomb.
45. ITMOJRO, 75.
46. Childs (1968), 413; Teller and Brown (1962), 33.
47. Lilienthal (1964), 570.
48. Lilienthal to Oppenheimer, Sept. 23, 1949, box 46, JRO.
49. “[Teller] said that these talks would be just a courtesy inasmuch as he has made up his mind to leave Chicago and come to us.” May 25, 1949, memos, Sproul papers.
50. Peter Galison and Barton Bernstein, “In any light: Scientists and the decision to build the Superbomb, 1942–1954,” Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, 19, no. 2 (1989), 283; Teller to von Neumann, Aug. 23, 1949, AEC/NARA.
51. Teller to Mayer, n.d., box 3, Mayer papers.
52. Childs (1968), 405.
53. Teller (2001), 282.
54. Oct. 7, 1949, diary, box 3, Alvarez papers, SBFRC.
55. Minutes, Sept. 23, 1949, no. CXXIII, and “Reaction to Russian Atomic Development,” Sept. 28, 1949, no. LXXXVI, and “Questions for Meeting,” Sept. 23, 1949, no. LIII, JCAE.
56. Nichols, 272–73; Donnelly to Schlatter and Kennedy, Oct. 3, 1949, file 471.6, entry 197, USAF/NARA.
57. Bergman to Borden, Oct. 19, 1949, no. LXVIII, JCAE.
58. Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 373; Pfau (1984), 113.
59. Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 374; Strauss (1962), 217.
60. While Alvarez remained pessimistic about the future of radiological warfare—“Program approved but probably nothing will happen”—he was cheered that the RW panel’s recommendation for expanded neutron production “tie[d] in well with our program.”
61. Borden to files, Oct. 10, 1949, no. LXVI, JCAE; Oct. 10, 1949, diary, box 3, Alvarez papers.
62. In his diary, Alvarez described Lilienthal’s response as “lukewarm.” Borden to files, July 5, 1951, no. 2365, JCAE.
63. Alvarez (1987), 171.
64. Nichols (1987), 273–74; ITMOJRO, 682.
65. Minutes, Oct. 14, 1949, no. LXIV, JCAE.
66. Strauss to Lilienthal, Oct. 17, 1949, no. LXIII, JCAE.
67. Oppenheimer to Conant, Oct. 21, 1949, Oppenheimer file, entry 60, box 11, AEC/NARA.
68. Lilienthal (1964), 577, 582.
69. Lilienthal to Oppenheimer, Oct. 11, 1949, box 46, JRO.
70. A Joint Committee staffer warned Borden of the “peculiar situation” at the Rad Lab—namely, Lawrence’s propensity for empire building. Borden to files, Oct. 20, 1949, no. LXVII, and Brobeck to Borden, Oct. 20, 1949, no. 1266, JCAE.
71. Teller believed that Bethe had agreed to go to Los Alamos. “The Development of Atomic Weapons,” Jan. 30, 1950, no. 1447, JCAE; ITMOJRO, 715.
72. Blumberg and Owens (1976), 210.
73. Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 380.
74. Oct. 24, 1949, diary, Alvarez papers; H-bomb Chronology, 29–30, JCAE.
75. “I would have to hear some good arguments before I could take on sufficient courage to recommend not going toward such a program,” Seaborg wrote. Seaborg to Oppenheimer, Oct. 14, 1949, AEC/NARA.
76. Another visitor was Oppie’s former Berkeley colleague, Kenneth Pitzer. Pitzer was surprised to learn of Conant’s opposition and disturbed that Oppenheimer seemed to share Conant’s view. Pitzer interview (1997).
77. LeBaron: “Robert LeBaron—Man of Many Talents,” n.d., folder 4, box 1, Robert LeBaron papers, Hoover Institution Library, Stanford
