78. Oppenheimer was gradually severing his ties with Berkeley. In early Nov., he informed Birge that, for the first time since the war, he would not be back on campus in the summer to teach Physics 221A. Interview with Robert Oppenheimer, n.d., box 2, Childs papers.
79. Oppenheimer to Birge, Nov. 9, 1949, box 20, JRO.
80. Serber interview (1992).
81. “I had no idea that people like Conant and Oppenheimer would harbor such ideas. At Berkeley they would have been unthinkable.” Serber (1998), 169.
82. Hamilton to files, Nov. 8, 1949, no. LXXVI, JCAE.
83. Oct. 18, 1949, diary, box 3, Alvarez papers.
84. Tomei to Conant, Oct. 18, 1949, box 27, JRO.
85. Kennan report: U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: (FRUS), 1950 (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), vol. 1, 22 fn. Kennan later wrote a draft press statement for Truman to announce that he had decided against proceeding with the Super as “not in the national interest.” Untitled draft, Nov. 18, 1949, box 43, JRO.
86. Although Oppenheimer was later unable to remember whether he acquainted the committee with Seaborg’s waffling letter—a point that would assume some importance in his 1954 security hearing—Smyth recalled following the text over the chairman’s shoulder while Oppie read aloud.
87. Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 379–81.
88. The previous spring, Conant had threatened to quit the committee. Conant to Oppenheimer, Mar. 7, 1949, box 27, JRO.
89. JRO to DuBridge, Oct. 8, 1949, box 33, JRO.
90. Lilienthal (1964), 581.
91. John Manley, “A Fateful Decision,” unpublished manuscript, Manley papers, LANL.
92. ITMOJRO, 395.
93. Lilienthal (1964), 582.
94. Roger Anders, ed., Forging the Atomic Shield: Excerpts from the Office Diary of Gordon E. Dean (University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 59.
95. Davis (1968), 314.
96. Rabi agreed that what he and Fermi proposed—in effect, a verifiable thermonuclear test ban—should have been more clearly spelled out. “It should have been many pages.” Rabi interview (1984).
97. Stern (1969), 145–46.
98. Rabi interview (1984). Oppenheimer decided to sign the majority report because he thought that the letter by Rabi and Fermi, in proposing a diplomatic initiative to Russia, presumed too much upon the State Department’s prerogatives. “Development of Atomic Super Weapons,” Jan. 30, 1950, no. 1447, JCAE.
99. Manley diary, Oct. 31, 1949, Manley papers, LANL.
100. Oppenheimer to Bohr, Nov. 2, 1949, box 21, JRO.
101. Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 385–86; Michelmore (1969), 173.
12: A Desperate Urgency Here
1. Manley diary, Manley papers, LANL; Lilienthal (1964), 584–85.
2. McMahon to Truman, Nov. 1, 1949, no. LXXII, JCAE.
3. Lilienthal (1964), 584.
4. Manley diary, Manley papers, LANL.
5. Arneson (1969), 29; Acheson (1969), 346.
6. Teller to Mayer, n.d. [Nov. 1949], box 3, Mayer papers.
7. ITMOJRO, 91.
8. Manley, “Recollections and Memories,” 5; Manley diary, 13–14; and “A Fateful Decision,” 5, Manley papers, LANL. Los Alamos colleague Stanislaw Ulam bet that Teller would not be quiet for long. Ulam to von Neumann, Nov. 15, 1949, box 2229, von Neumann collection, AEC/NARA.
9. Pfau (1984), 116.
10. Serber interview (1992).
11. Alvarez to Teller, Nov. 10, 1949, Teller folder, box 3, Alvarez papers, SBFRC.
12. Lilienthal (1964), 591.
13. Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 386–87.
14. Manley diary, 13, Manley papers, LANL.
15. Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 391.
16. Bradbury to Oppenheimer, Oct. 27, 1949, and Oct. 31, 1949, Bradbury folder, box 22, JRO. Teller to Alvarez, Teller folder, box 3, Alvarez papers. Teller accused Manley of trying to prevent him from meeting with McMahon. “Recollections and Memories,” and Manley diary, 6–8, Manley papers, LANL archives; Teller and Brown (1962), 44.
17. Although Bethe explained that he had changed his mind after talking with two physicist friends—Victor Weisskopf and George Placzek—Teller blamed Oppenheimer. Rhodes (1995), 393; Bethe interview (1996).
18. “November was as early as I heard a name mentioned, and then only informally and under seal,” Strauss later told the Joint Committee. But other evidence suggests that Strauss learned about Fuchs earlier. Minutes, Mar. 10, 1950, no. CXXXVIII, JCAE. Strauss knowledge of spying: Pfau (1984), 114–15; Williams (1987), 115–16.
19. The bureau became suspicious of Fuchs in Aug. 1949, when it learned that the Soviets were in possession of a top-secret Manhattan Project document on gaseous diffusion, written by Fuchs. On Oct. 21, 1949, Hoover formally informed the AEC that Fuchs was the subject of its investigation. Dean had been advised in Sept. that the German-born physicist was a suspect. Minutes, Mar. 10, 1950, no. CXXXVIII, and Hoover to McMahon, Apr. 21, 1950, no. CXL, JCAE.
20. “Bureau Source 5” was probably the Venona decrypts. See chap. 5. Robert Lamphere, Oct. 22, 1997, personal communication.
21. Robert Bacher recalled that before he went to England in Sept., AEC security officials instructed him to ask John Cockcroft whether the British had any reservations about Klaus Fuchs. Transcript of Bacher interview, Caltech archives.
22. Groves to Strauss, Nov. 4, 1949, Strauss folder, Groves/NARA.
23. Strauss to Nichols, Dec. 3, 1949, Harrison-Bundy file, MED/NARA.
24. The committee’s first meeting dissolved almost immediately into rancor when Johnson brusquely declared that the military services were unanimous on proceeding with the Super as the “minimum” next step. Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 398–99, 643 fn; Acheson (1969), 348.
25. Teller to Mayer, n.d. [Dec. 1949–Jan. 1950], box 3, Mayer papers.
26. Los Alamos briefings: Hamilton to files, Nov. 8, 1949, no. LXXVI, and Hamilton to files, Nov. 10, 1949, box 6; and minutes, Jan. 9, 1950, no. CXXV, JCAE.
27. Minutes, Jan. 9, 1950, no. CXIII, JCAE.
28. McMahon to Truman, Nov. 21, 1949, in “Thermonuclear Weapons Program Chronology” (TWPC), n.d., 53–59, AEC/NARA.
29. Strauss (1962), 220; Borden to file, Nov. 28, 1949, no. LXXXI, JCAE.
30. Bradley to Truman, Jan. 13, 1950, 78–86, TWPC, AEC/NARA; Borden, “Questions for the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” Jan. 10, 1950, no. CVIII, JCAE.
31. Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 394.
32. Minutes, Jan. 9, 1950, no. CXXV, JCAE.
33. Pfau (1984), 121.
34. “You can’t expect morals from immoral people?” ventured Texas Congressman Paul Kilday. “This is the point, sir!” responded Strauss. Minutes, Jan. 27, 1950, no. CXVIII, JCAE.
35. Hewlett and Duncan (1990), 405.
36. Oppenheimer defended the GAC report: “We thought the beginning of wisdom was to stop, look and listen about weapons of
