Dialogues

two sorts of knowledge? Alcibiades Certainly. Socrates Then in their knowledge there is no agreement of women and men? Alcibiades There is not. Socrates Nor can there be friendship, if friendship is agreement? Alcibiades Plainly not. Socrates Then women are not loved by men when they do their own work? Alcibiades I suppose not. Socrates Nor men by women when they do their own work? Alcibiades No. Socrates Nor are states well administered, when individuals do their own work? Alcibiades I should rather think, Socrates, that the reverse is the truth.606 Socrates What! do you mean to say that states are well administered when friendship is absent, the presence of which, as we were saying, alone secures their good order? Alcibiades But I should say that there is friendship among them, for this very reason, that the two parties respectively do their own work. Socrates That was not what you were saying before; and what do you mean now by affirming that friendship exists when there is no agreement? How can there be agreement about matters which the one party knows, and of which the other is in ignorance? Alcibiades Impossible. Socrates And when individuals are doing their own work, are they doing what is just or unjust? Alcibiades What is just, certainly. Socrates And when individuals do what is just in the state, is there no friendship among them? Alcibiades I suppose that there must be, Socrates. Socrates Then what do you mean by this friendship or agreement about which we must be wise and discreet in order that we may be good men? I cannot make out where it exists or among whom; according to you, the same persons may sometimes have it, and sometimes not. Alcibiades But, indeed, Socrates, I do not know what I am saying; and I have long been, unconsciously to myself, in a most disgraceful state. Socrates Nevertheless, cheer up; at fifty, if you had discovered your deficiency, you would have been too old, and the time for taking care of yourself would have passed away, but yours is just the age at which the discovery should be made. Alcibiades And what should he do, Socrates, who would make the discovery? Socrates Answer questions, Alcibiades; and that is a process which, by the grace of God, if I may put any faith in my oracle, will be very improving to both of us. Alcibiades If I can be improved by answering, I will answer. Socrates And first of all, that we may not peradventure be deceived by appearances, fancying, perhaps, that we are taking care of ourselves when we are not, what is the meaning of a man taking care of himself? and when does he take care? Does he take care of himself when he takes care of what belongs to him? Alcibiades I should think so. Socrates When does a man take care of his feet? Does he not take care of them when he takes care of that which belongs to his feet? Alcibiades I do not understand. Socrates Let me take the hand as an illustration; does not a ring belong to the finger, and to the finger only? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates And the shoe in like manner to the foot? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates And when we take care of our shoes, do we not take care of our feet? Alcibiades I do not comprehend, Socrates. Socrates But you would admit, Alcibiades, that to take proper care of a thing is a correct expression? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates And taking proper care means improving? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates And what is the art which improves our shoes? Alcibiades Shoemaking. Socrates Then by shoemaking we take care of our shoes? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates And do we by shoemaking take care of our feet, or by some other art which improves the feet? Alcibiades By some other art. Socrates And the same art improves the feet which improves the rest of the body? Alcibiades Very true. Socrates Which is gymnastic? Alcibiades Certainly. Socrates Then by gymnastic we take care of our feet, and by shoemaking of that which belongs to our feet? Alcibiades Very true. Socrates And by gymnastic we take care of our hands, and by the art of graving rings of that which belongs to our hands? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates And by gymnastic we take care of the body, and by the art of weaving and the other arts we take care of the things of the body? Alcibiades Clearly. Socrates Then the art which takes care of each thing is different from that which takes care of the belongings of each thing? Alcibiades True. Socrates Then in taking care of what belongs to you, you do not take care of yourself? Alcibiades Certainly not. Socrates For the art which takes care of our belongings appears not to be the same as that which takes care of ourselves? Alcibiades Clearly not. Socrates And now let me ask you what is the art with which we take care of ourselves? Alcibiades I cannot say. Socrates At any rate, thus much has been admitted, that the art is not one which makes any of our possessions, but which makes ourselves better? Alcibiades True. Socrates But should we ever have known what art makes a shoe better, if we did not know a shoe? Alcibiades Impossible. Socrates Nor should we know what art makes a ring better, if we did not know a ring? Alcibiades That is true. Socrates And can we ever know what art makes a man better, if we do not know what we are ourselves? Alcibiades Impossible. Socrates And is self-knowledge such an easy thing, and was he to be lightly esteemed who inscribed the text on the temple at Delphi? Or is self-knowledge a difficult thing, which few are able to attain? Alcibiades At times I fancy, Socrates, that anybody can know himself; at other times the task appears to be very difficult. Socrates But whether easy or difficult, Alcibiades, still there is no other way; knowing what we are, we shall know how to take care of ourselves, and if we are ignorant we shall not know. Alcibiades That is true. Socrates Well, then, let us see in what way the self-existent can be discovered by us; that will give us a chance of discovering our own existence, which otherwise we can never know. Alcibiades You say truly. Socrates Come, now, I beseech