Dialogues

that if I had not spoken first, you were on the point of coming to me, and enquiring why I only remained? Alcibiades That is true. Socrates The reason was that I loved you for your own sake, whereas other men love what belongs to you; and your beauty, which is not you, is fading away, just as your true self is beginning to bloom. And I will never desert you, if you are not spoiled and deformed by the Athenian people; for the danger which I most fear is that you will become a lover of the people and will be spoiled by them. Many a noble Athenian has been ruined in this way. For the demus of the greathearted Erechteus is of a fair countenance, but you should see him naked; wherefore observe the caution which I give you. Alcibiades What caution? Socrates Practise yourself, sweet friend, in learning what you ought to know, before you enter on politics; and then you will have an antidote which will keep you out of harm’s way. Alcibiades Good advice, Socrates, but I wish that you would explain to me in what way I am to take care of myself. Socrates Have we not made an advance? for we are at any rate tolerably well agreed as to what we are, and there is no longer any danger, as we once feared, that we might be taking care not of ourselves, but of something which is not ourselves. Alcibiades That is true. Socrates And the next step will be to take care of the soul, and look to that? Alcibiades Certainly. Socrates Leaving the care of our bodies and of our properties to others? Alcibiades Very good. Socrates But how can we have a perfect knowledge of the things of the soul?⁠—For if we know them, then I suppose we shall know ourselves. Can we really be ignorant of the excellent meaning of the Delphian inscription, of which we were just now speaking? Alcibiades What have you in your thoughts, Socrates? Socrates I will tell you what I suspect to be the meaning and lesson of that inscription. Let me take an illustration from sight, which I imagine to be the only one suitable to my purpose. Alcibiades What do you mean? Socrates Consider; if someone were to say to the eye, “See thyself,” as you might say to a man, “Know thyself,” what is the nature and meaning of this precept? Would not his meaning be:⁠—That the eye should look at that in which it would see itself? Alcibiades Clearly. Socrates And what are the objects in looking at which we see ourselves? Alcibiades Clearly, Socrates, in looking at mirrors and the like. Socrates Very true; and is there not something of the nature of a mirror in our own eyes? Alcibiades Certainly. Socrates Did you ever observe that the face of the person looking into the eye of another is reflected as in a mirror; and in the visual organ which is over against him, and which is called the pupil, there is a sort of image of the person looking? Alcibiades That is quite true. Socrates Then the eye, looking at another eye, and at that in the eye which is most perfect, and which is the instrument of vision, will there see itself? Alcibiades That is evident. Socrates But looking at anything else either in man or in the world, and not to what resembles this, it will not see itself? Alcibiades Very true. Socrates Then if the eye is to see itself, it must look at the eye, and at that part of the eye where sight which is the virtue of the eye resides? Alcibiades True. Socrates And if the soul, my dear Alcibiades, is ever to know herself, must she not look at the soul; and especially at that part of the soul in which her virtue resides, and to any other which is like this? Alcibiades I agree, Socrates. Socrates And do we know of any part of our souls more divine than that which has to do with wisdom and knowledge? Alcibiades There is none. Socrates Then this is that part of the soul which resembles the divine; and he who looks at this and at the whole class of things divine, will be most likely to know himself? Alcibiades Clearly. Socrates And self-knowledge we agree to be wisdom? Alcibiades True. Socrates But if we have no self-knowledge and no wisdom, can we ever know our own good and evil? Alcibiades How can we, Socrates? Socrates You mean, that if you did not know Alcibiades, there would be no possibility of your knowing that what belonged to Alcibiades was really his? Alcibiades It would be quite impossible. Socrates Nor should we know that we were the persons to whom anything belonged, if we did not know ourselves? Alcibiades How could we? Socrates And if we did not know our own belongings, neither should we know the belongings of our belongings? Alcibiades Clearly not. Socrates Then we were not altogether right in acknowledging just now that a man may know what belongs to him and yet not know himself; nay, rather he cannot even know the belongings of his belongings; for the discernment of the things of self, and of the things which belong to the things of self, appear all to be the business of the same man, and of the same art. Alcibiades So much may be supposed. Socrates And he who knows not the things which belong to himself, will in like manner be ignorant of the things which belong to others? Alcibiades Very true. Socrates And if he knows not the affairs of others, he will not know the affairs of states? Alcibiades Certainly not. Socrates Then such a man can never be a statesman? Alcibiades He cannot. Socrates Nor an economist? Alcibiades He cannot. Socrates He will not know what he is doing? Alcibiades He will not. Socrates And will not he who is ignorant fall into error? Alcibiades Assuredly. Socrates And if he falls into error will he not fail both in his public and private capacity? Alcibiades Yes, indeed. Socrates And failing, will he not be miserable? Alcibiades Very. Socrates And what will become of those for whom he is acting? Alcibiades They will be miserable also. Socrates Then he who is