Dialogues

public and private, and favour some persons and not others? Alcibiades Certainly. Socrates Do you not imagine, then, that a man ought to be very careful, lest perchance without knowing it he implore great evils for himself, deeming that he is asking for good, especially if the Gods are in the mood to grant whatever he may request? There is the story of Oedipus, for instance, who prayed that his children might divide their inheritance between them by the sword: he did not, as he might have done, beg that his present evils might be averted, but called down new ones. And was not his prayer accomplished, and did not many and terrible evils thence arise, upon which I need not dilate? Alcibiades Yes, Socrates, but you are speaking of a madman: surely you do not think that anyone in his senses would venture to make such a prayer? Socrates Madness, then, you consider to be the opposite of discretion? Alcibiades Of course. Socrates And some men seem to you to be discreet, and others the contrary? Alcibiades They do. Socrates Well, then, let us discuss who these are. We acknowledge that some are discreet, some foolish, and that some are mad? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates And again, there are some who are in health? Alcibiades There are. Socrates While others are ailing? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates And they are not the same? Alcibiades Certainly not. Socrates Nor are there any who are in neither state? Alcibiades No. Socrates A man must either be sick or be well? Alcibiades That is my opinion. Socrates Very good: and do you think the same about discretion and want of discretion? Alcibiades How do you mean? Socrates Do you believe that a man must be either in or out of his senses; or is there some third or intermediate condition, in which he is neither one nor the other? Alcibiades Decidedly not. Socrates He must be either sane or insane? Alcibiades So I suppose. Socrates Did you not acknowledge that madness was the opposite of discretion? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates And that there is no third or middle term between discretion and indiscretion? Alcibiades True. Socrates And there cannot be two opposites to one thing? Alcibiades There cannot. Socrates Then madness and want of sense are the same? Alcibiades That appears to be the case. Socrates We shall be in the right, therefore, Alcibiades, if we say that all who are senseless are mad. For example, if among persons of your own age or older than yourself there are some who are senseless⁠—as there certainly are⁠—they are mad. For tell me, by heaven, do you not think that in the city the wise are few, while the foolish, whom you call mad, are many? Alcibiades I do. Socrates But how could we live in safety with so many crazy people? Should we not long since have paid the penalty at their hands, and have been struck and beaten and endured every other form of ill-usage which madmen are wont to inflict? Consider, my dear friend: may it not be quite otherwise? Alcibiades Why, Socrates, how is that possible? I must have been mistaken. Socrates So it seems to me. But perhaps we may consider the matter thus:⁠— Alcibiades How? Socrates I will tell you. We think that some are sick; do we not? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates And must every sick person either have the gout, or be in a fever, or suffer from ophthalmia? Or do you believe that a man may labour under some other disease, even although he has none of these complaints? Surely, they are not the only maladies which exist? Alcibiades Certainly not. Socrates And is every kind of ophthalmia a disease? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates And every disease ophthalmia? Alcibiades Surely not. But I scarcely understand what I mean myself. Socrates Perhaps, if you give me your best attention, “two of us” looking together, we may find what we seek. Alcibiades I am attending, Socrates, to the best of my power. Socrates We are agreed, then, that every form of ophthalmia is a disease, but not every disease ophthalmia? Alcibiades We are. Socrates And so far we seem to be right. For everyone who suffers from a fever is sick; but the sick, I conceive, do not all have fever or gout or ophthalmia, although each of these is a disease, which, according to those whom we call physicians, may require a different treatment. They are not all alike, nor do they produce the same result, but each has its own effect, and yet they are all diseases. May we not take an illustration from the artizans? Alcibiades Certainly. Socrates There are cobblers and carpenters and sculptors and others of all sorts and kinds, whom we need not stop to enumerate. All have their distinct employments and all are workmen, although they are not all of them cobblers or carpenters or sculptors. Alcibiades No, indeed. Socrates And in like manner men differ in regard to want of sense. Those who are most out of their wits we call “madmen,” while we term those who are less far gone “stupid” or “idiotic,” or, if we prefer gentler language, describe them as “romantic” or “simple-minded,” or, again, as “innocent” or “inexperienced” or “foolish.” You may even find other names, if you seek for them; but by all of them lack of sense is intended. They only differ as one art appeared to us to differ from another or one disease from another. Or what is your opinion? Alcibiades I agree with you. Socrates Then let us return to the point at which we digressed. We said at first that we should have to consider who were the wise and who the foolish. For we acknowledged that there are these two classes? Did we not? Alcibiades To be sure. Socrates And you regard those as sensible who know what ought to be done or said? Alcibiades Yes. Socrates The senseless are those who do not know this? Alcibiades True. Socrates The latter will say or do what they ought not without their own knowledge? Alcibiades Exactly. Socrates Oedipus, as I was saying, Alcibiades, was a person of this sort. And even nowadays you will find many who (have offered inauspicious prayers), although, unlike him, they were not in anger nor thought that they were asking evil. He neither sought,