auspicious words, who says that you would not be willing to commit so horrible a deed, but rather him who affirms the contrary, if the act appear to you unfit even to be mentioned. Or do you think that Orestes, had he been in his senses and knew what was best for him to do, would ever have dared to venture on such a crime?
Alcibiades
Certainly not.
Socrates
Nor would anyone else, I fancy?
Alcibiades
No.
Socrates
That ignorance is bad then, it would appear, which is of the best and does not know what is best?
Alcibiades
So I think, at least.
Socrates
And both to the person who is ignorant and everybody else?
Alcibiades
Yes.
Socrates
Let us take another case. Suppose that you were suddenly to get into your head that it would be a good thing to kill Pericles, your kinsman and guardian, and were to seize a sword and, going to the doors of his house, were to enquire if he were at home, meaning to slay only him and no one else:—the servants reply, “Yes”: (Mind, I do not mean that you would really do such a thing; but there is nothing, you think, to prevent a man who is ignorant of the best, having occasionally the whim that what is worst is best?
Alcibiades
No.)
Socrates
—If, then, you went indoors, and seeing him, did not know him, but thought that he was someone else, would you venture to slay him?
Alcibiades
Most decidedly not (it seems to me).616
Socrates
For you designed to kill, not the first who offered, but Pericles himself?
Alcibiades
Certainly.
Socrates
And if you made many attempts, and each time failed to recognize Pericles, you would never attack him?
Alcibiades
Never.
Socrates
Well, but if Orestes in like manner had not known his mother, do you think that he would ever have laid hands upon her?
Alcibiades
No.
Socrates
He did not intend to slay the first woman he came across, nor anyone else’s mother, but only his own?
Alcibiades
True.
Socrates
Ignorance, then, is better for those who are in such a frame of mind, and have such ideas?
Alcibiades
Obviously.
Socrates
You acknowledge that for some persons in certain cases the ignorance of some things is a good and not an evil, as you formerly supposed?
Alcibiades
I do.
Socrates
And there is still another case which will also perhaps appear strange to you, if you will consider it?617
Alcibiades
What is that, Socrates?
Socrates
It may be, in short, that the possession of all the sciences, if unaccompanied by the knowledge of the best, will more often than not injure the possessor. Consider the matter thus:—Must we not, when we intend either to do or say anything, suppose that we know or ought to know that which we propose so confidently to do or say?
Alcibiades
Yes, in my opinion.
Socrates
We may take the orators for an example, who from time to time advise us about war and peace, or the building of walls and the construction of harbours, whether they understand the business in hand, or only think that they do. Whatever the city, in a word, does to another city, or in the management of her own affairs, all happens by the counsel of the orators.
Alcibiades
True.
Socrates
But now see what follows, if I can (make it clear to you).618 You would distinguish the wise from the foolish?
Alcibiades
Yes.
Socrates
The many are foolish, the few wise?
Alcibiades
Certainly.
Socrates
And you use both the terms, “wise” and “foolish,” in reference to something?
Alcibiades
I do.
Socrates
Would you call a person wise who can give advice, but does not know whether or when it is better to carry out the advice?
Alcibiades
Decidedly not.
Socrates
Nor again, I suppose, a person who knows the art of war, but does not know whether it is better to go to war or for how long?
Alcibiades
No.
Socrates
Nor, once more, a person who knows how to kill another or to take away his property or to drive him from his native land, but not when it is better to do so or for whom it is better?
Alcibiades
Certainly not.
Socrates
But he who understands anything of the kind and has at the same time the knowledge of the best course of action:—and the best and the useful are surely the same?—
Alcibiades
Yes.
Socrates
—Such an one, I say, we should call wise and a useful adviser both of himself and of the city. What do you think?
Alcibiades
I agree.
Socrates
And if anyone knows how to ride or to shoot with the bow or to box or to wrestle, or to engage in any other sort of contest or to do anything whatever which is in the nature of an art—what do you call him who knows what is best according to that art? Do you not speak of one who knows what is best in riding as a good rider?
Alcibiades
Yes.
Socrates
And in a similar way you speak of a good boxer or a good flute-player or a good performer in any other art?
Alcibiades
True.
Socrates
But is it necessary that the man who is clever in any of these arts should be wise also in general? Or is there a difference between the clever artist and the wise man?
Alcibiades
All the difference in the world.
Socrates
And what sort of a state do you think that would be which was composed of good archers and flute-players and athletes and masters in other arts, and besides them of those others about whom we spoke, who knew how to go to war and how to kill, as well as of orators puffed up with political pride, but in which not one of them all had this knowledge of the best, and there was no one who could tell when it was better to apply any of these arts or in regard to whom?
Alcibiades
I should call such a state bad, Socrates.
Socrates
You certainly would when you saw each of them rivalling the other and esteeming that of the greatest importance in
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