Dialogues

epub:type="z3998:grapheme" xml:lang="grc">ν of length, because they are great letters: ο was the sign of roundness, and therefore there is plenty of ο mixed up in the word γογγύλον (round). Thus did the legislator, reducing all things into letters and syllables, and impressing on them names and signs, and out of them by imitation compounding other signs. That is my view, Hermogenes, of the truth of names; but I should like to hear what Cratylus has more to say. Hermogenes But, Socrates, as I was telling you before, Cratylus mystifies me; he says that there is a fitness of names, but he never explains what is this fitness, so that I cannot tell whether his obscurity is intended or not. Tell me now, Cratylus, here in the presence of Socrates, do you agree in what Socrates has been saying about names, or have you something better of your own? and if you have, tell me what your view is, and then you will either learn of Socrates, or Socrates and I will learn of you. Cratylus Well, but surely, Hermogenes, you do not suppose that you can learn, or I explain, any subject of importance all in a moment; at any rate, not such a subject as language, which is, perhaps, the very greatest of all. Hermogenes No, indeed; but, as Hesiod says, and I agree with him, “to add little to little” is worth while. And, therefore, if you think that you can add anything at all, however small, to our knowledge, take a little trouble and oblige Socrates, and me too, who certainly have a claim upon you. Socrates I am by no means positive, Cratylus, in the view which Hermogenes and myself have worked out; and therefore do not hesitate to say what you think, which if it be better than my own view I shall gladly accept. And I should not be at all surprised to find that you have found some better notion. For you have evidently reflected on these matters and have had teachers, and if you have really a better theory of the truth of names, you may count me in the number of your disciples. Cratylus

You are right, Socrates, in saying that I have made a study of these matters, and I might possibly convert you into a disciple. But I fear that the opposite is more probable, and I already find myself moved to say to you what Achilles in the “Prayers” says to Ajax⁠—

“Illustrious Ajax, son of Telamon, lord of the people,
You appear to have spoken in all things much to my mind.”

And you, Socrates, appear to me to be an oracle, and to give answers much to my mind, whether you are inspired by Euthyphro, or whether some Muse may have long been an inhabitant of your breast, unconsciously to yourself.

Socrates Excellent Cratylus, I have long been wondering at my own wisdom; I cannot trust myself. And I think that I ought to stop and ask myself What am I saying? for there is nothing worse than self-deception⁠—when the deceiver is always at home and always with you⁠—it is quite terrible, and therefore I ought often to retrace my steps and endeavour to “look fore and aft,” in the words of the aforesaid Homer. And now let me see; where are we? Have we not been saying that the correct name indicates the nature of the thing:⁠—has this proposition been sufficiently proven? Cratylus Yes, Socrates, what you say, as I am disposed to think, is quite true. Socrates Names, then, are given in order to instruct? Cratylus Certainly. Socrates And naming is an art, and has artificers? Cratylus Yes. Socrates And who are they? Cratylus The legislators, of whom you spoke at first. Socrates And does this art grow up among men like other arts? Let me explain what I mean: of painters, some are better and some worse? Cratylus Yes. Socrates The better painters execute their works, I mean their figures, better, and the worse execute them worse; and of builders also, the better sort build fairer houses, and the worse build them worse. Cratylus True. Socrates And among legislators, there are some who do their work better and some worse? Cratylus No; there I do not agree with you. Socrates Then you do not think that some laws are better and others worse? Cratylus No, indeed. Socrates Or that one name is better than another? Cratylus Certainly not. Socrates Then all names are rightly imposed? Cratylus Yes, if they are names at all. Socrates Well, what do you say to the name of our friend Hermogenes, which was mentioned before:⁠—assuming that he has nothing of the nature of Hermes in him, shall we say that this is a wrong name, or not his name at all? Cratylus I should reply that Hermogenes is not his name at all, but only appears to be his, and is really the name of somebody else, who has the nature which corresponds to it. Socrates And if a man were to call him Hermogenes, would he not be even speaking falsely? For there may be a doubt whether you can call him Hermogenes, if he is not. Cratylus What do you mean? Socrates Are you maintaining that falsehood is impossible? For if this is your meaning I should answer, that there have been plenty of liars in all ages. Cratylus Why, Socrates, how can a man say that which is not?⁠—say something and yet say nothing? For is not falsehood saying the thing which is not? Socrates Your argument, friend, is too subtle for a man of my age. But I should like to know whether you are one of those philosophers who think that falsehood may be spoken but not said? Cratylus Neither spoken nor said. Socrates Nor uttered nor addressed? For example: If a person, saluting you in a foreign country, were to take your hand and say: “Hail, Athenian stranger, Hermogenes, son of Smicrion”⁠—these words, whether spoken, said, uttered, or addressed, would have no application to you but only to our friend Hermogenes, or perhaps to nobody at all? Cratylus In