a person were to profess, not that he could speak or dispute, but that he knew how to make and do all things, by a single art.
Theaetetus
All things?
Stranger
I see that you do not understand the first word that I utter, for you do not understand the meaning of “all.”
Theaetetus
No, I do not.
Stranger
Under all things, I include you and me, and also animals and trees.
Theaetetus
What do you mean?
Stranger
Suppose a person to say that he will make you and me, and all creatures.
Theaetetus
What would he mean by “making”? He cannot be a husbandman;—for you said that he is a maker of animals.
Stranger
Yes; and I say that he is also the maker of the sea, and the earth, and the heavens, and the gods, and of all other things; and, further, that he can make them in no time, and sell them for a few pence.
Theaetetus
That must be a jest.
Stranger
And when a man says that he knows all things, and can teach them to another at a small cost, and in a short time, is not that a jest?
Theaetetus
Certainly.
Stranger
And is there any more artistic or graceful form of jest than imitation?
Theaetetus
Certainly not; and imitation is a very comprehensive term, which includes under one class the most diverse sorts of things.
Stranger
We know, of course, that he who professes by one art to make all things is really a painter, and by the painter’s art makes resemblances of real things which have the same name with them; and he can deceive the less intelligent sort of young children, to whom he shows his pictures at a distance, into the belief that he has the absolute power of making whatever he likes.
Theaetetus
Certainly.
Stranger
And may there not be supposed to be an imitative art of reasoning? Is it not possible to enchant the hearts of young men by words poured through their ears, when they are still at a distance from the truth of facts, by exhibiting to them fictitious arguments, and making them think that they are true, and that the speaker is the wisest of men in all things?
Theaetetus
Yes; why should there not be another such art?
Stranger
But as time goes on, and their hearers advance in years, and come into closer contact with realities, and have learnt by sad experience to see and feel the truth of things, are not the greater part of them compelled to change many opinions which they formerly entertained, so that the great appears small to them, and the easy difficult, and all their dreamy speculations are overturned by the facts of life?
Theaetetus
That is my view, as far as I can judge, although, at my age, I may be one of those who see things at a distance only.
Stranger
And the wish of all of us, who are your friends, is and always will be to bring you as near to the truth as we can without the sad reality. And now I should like you to tell me, whether the Sophist is not visibly a magician and imitator of true being; or are we still disposed to think that he may have a true knowledge of the various matters about which he disputes?
Theaetetus
But how can he, Stranger? Is there any doubt, after what has been said, that he is to be located in one of the divisions of children’s play?
Stranger
Then we must place him in the class of magicians and mimics.
Theaetetus
Certainly we must.
Stranger
And now our business is not to let the animal out, for we have got him in a sort of dialectical net, and there is one thing which he decidedly will not escape.
Theaetetus
What is that?
Stranger
The inference that he is a juggler.
Theaetetus
Precisely my own opinion of him.
Stranger
Then, clearly, we ought as soon as possible to divide the image-making art, and go down into the net, and, if the Sophist does not run away from us, to seize him according to orders and deliver him over to reason, who is the lord of the hunt, and proclaim the capture of him; and if he creeps into the recesses of the imitative art, and secretes himself in one of them, to divide again and follow him up until in some subsection of imitation he is caught. For our method of tackling each and all is one which neither he nor any other creature will ever escape in triumph.
Theaetetus
Well said; and let us do as you propose.
Stranger
Well, then, pursuing the same analytic method as before, I think that I can discern two divisions of the imitative art, but I am not as yet able to see in which of them the desired form is to be found.
Theaetetus
Will you tell me first what are the two divisions of which you are speaking?
Stranger
One is the art of likeness-making;—generally a likeness of anything is made by producing a copy which is executed according to the proportions of the original, similar in length and breadth and depth, each thing receiving also its appropriate colour.
Theaetetus
Is not this always the aim of imitation?
Stranger
Not always; in works either of sculpture or of painting, which are of any magnitude, there is a certain degree of deception; for artists were to give the true proportions of their fair works, the upper part, which is farther off, would appear to be out of proportion in comparison with the lower, which is nearer; and so they give up the truth in their images and make only the proportions which appear to be beautiful, disregarding the real ones.
Theaetetus
Quite true.
Stranger
And that which being other is also like, may we not fairly call a likeness or image?
Theaetetus
Yes.
Stranger
And may we not, as I did just now, call that part of the imitative art which is concerned with making such images the art of likeness-making?
Theaetetus
Let that be the name.
Stranger
And what shall we call those resemblances of the
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