Dialogues

beautiful, which appear such owing to the unfavourable position of the spectator, whereas if a person had the power of getting a correct view of works of such magnitude, they would appear not even like that to which they profess to be like? May we not call these “appearances,” since they appear only and are not really like? Theaetetus Certainly. Stranger There is a great deal of this kind of thing in painting, and in all imitation. Theaetetus Of course. Stranger And may we not fairly call the sort of art, which produces an appearance and not an image, fantastic art? Theaetetus Most fairly. Stranger These then are the two kinds of image-making⁠—the art of making likenesses, and fantastic or the art of making appearances? Theaetetus True. Stranger I was doubtful before in which of them I should place the Sophist, nor am I even now able to see clearly; verily he is a wonderful and inscrutable creature. And now in the cleverest manner he has got into an impossible place. Theaetetus Yes, he has. Stranger Do you speak advisedly, or are you carried away at the moment by the habit of assenting into giving a hasty answer? Theaetetus May I ask to what you are referring? Stranger My dear friend, we are engaged in a very difficult speculation⁠—there can be no doubt of that; for how a thing can appear and seem, and not be, or how a man can say a thing which is not true, has always been and still remains a very perplexing question. Can anyone say or think that falsehood really exists, and avoid being caught in a contradiction? Indeed, Theaetetus, the task is a difficult one. Theaetetus Why? Stranger

He who says that falsehood exists has the audacity to assert the being of not-being; for this is implied in the possibility of falsehood. But, my boy, in the days when I was a boy, the great Parmenides protested against this doctrine, and to the end of his life he continued to inculcate the same lesson⁠—always repeating both in verse and out of verse:

“Keep your mind from this way of enquiry, for never will you show328 that not-being is.”

Such is his testimony, which is confirmed by the very expression when sifted a little. Would you object to begin with the consideration of the words themselves?

Theaetetus Never mind about me; I am only desirous that you should carry on the argument in the best way, and that you should take me with you. Stranger Very good; and now say, do we venture to utter the forbidden word “not-being”? Theaetetus Certainly we do. Stranger Let us be serious then, and consider the question neither in strife nor play: suppose that one of the hearers of Parmenides was asked, “To what is the term ‘not-being’ to be applied?”⁠—do you know what sort of object he would single out in reply, and what answer he would make to the enquirer? Theaetetus That is a difficult question, and one not to be answered at all by a person like myself. Stranger There is at any rate no difficulty in seeing that the predicate “not-being” is not applicable to any being. Theaetetus None, certainly. Stranger And if not to being, then not to something. Theaetetus Of course not. Stranger It is also plain, that in speaking of something we speak of being, for to speak of an abstract something naked and isolated from all being is impossible. Theaetetus Impossible. Stranger You mean by assenting to imply that he who says something must say some one thing? Theaetetus Yes. Stranger Some in the singular (τὶ) you would say is the sign of one, some in the dual (τινὲ) of two, some in the plural (τινὲς) of many? Theaetetus Exactly. Stranger Then he who says “not something” must say absolutely nothing. Theaetetus Most assuredly. Stranger And as we cannot admit that a man speaks and says nothing, he who says “not-being” does not speak at all. Theaetetus The difficulty of the argument can no further go. Stranger Not yet, my friend, is the time for such a word; for there still remains of all perplexities the first and greatest, touching the very foundation of the matter. Theaetetus What do you mean? Do not be afraid to speak. Stranger To that which is, may be attributed some other thing which is? Theaetetus Certainly. Stranger But can anything which is, be attributed to that which is not? Theaetetus Impossible. Stranger And all number is to be reckoned among things which are? Theaetetus Yes, surely number, if anything, has a real existence. Stranger Then we must not attempt to attribute to not-being number either in the singular or plural? Theaetetus The argument implies that we should be wrong in doing so. Stranger But how can a man either express in words or even conceive in thought things which are not or a thing which is not without number? Theaetetus How indeed? Stranger When we speak of things which are not, are we not attributing plurality to not-being? Theaetetus Certainly. Stranger But, on the other hand, when we say “what is not,” do we not attribute unity? Theaetetus Manifestly. Stranger Nevertheless, we maintain that you may not and ought not to attribute being to not-being? Theaetetus Most true. Stranger Do you see, then, that not-being in itself can neither be spoken, uttered, or thought, but that it is unthinkable, unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable? Theaetetus Quite true. Stranger But, if so, I was wrong in telling you just now that the difficulty which was coming is the greatest of all. Theaetetus What! is there a greater still behind? Stranger Well, I am surprised, after what has been said already, that you do not see the difficulty in which he who would refute the notion of not-being is involved. For he is compelled to contradict himself as soon as he makes the attempt. Theaetetus What do you mean? Speak more clearly. Stranger Do not expect clearness from me. For I, who maintain that not-being has no part either in the one or many, just now spoke and am still speaking of not-being as one; for I say “not-being.” Do you understand? Theaetetus Yes. Stranger And a little while ago I said that not-being is unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable: do you