Dialogues

follow? Theaetetus I do after a fashion. Stranger When I introduced the word “is,” did I not contradict what I said before? Theaetetus Clearly. Stranger And in using the singular verb, did I not speak of not-being as one? Theaetetus Yes. Stranger And when I spoke of not-being as indescribable and unspeakable and unutterable, in using each of these words in the singular, did I not refer to not-being as one? Theaetetus Certainly. Stranger And yet we say that, strictly speaking, it should not be defined as one or many, and should not even be called “it,” for the use of the word “it” would imply a form of unity. Theaetetus Quite true. Stranger How, then, can anyone put any faith in me? For now, as always, I am unequal to the refutation of not-being. And therefore, as I was saying, do not look to me for the right way of speaking about not-being; but come, let us try the experiment with you. Theaetetus What do you mean? Stranger Make a noble effort, as becomes youth, and endeavour with all your might to speak of not-being in a right manner, without introducing into it either existence or unity or plurality. Theaetetus It would be a strange boldness in me which would attempt the task when I see you thus discomfited. Stranger Say no more of ourselves; but until we find some one or other who can speak of not-being without number, we must acknowledge that the Sophist is a clever rogue who will not be got out of his hole. Theaetetus Most true. Stranger And if we say to him that he professes an art of making appearances, he will grapple with us and retort our argument upon ourselves; and when we call him an image-maker he will say, “Pray what do you mean at all by an image?”⁠—and I should like to know, Theaetetus, how we can possibly answer the younker’s question? Theaetetus We shall doubtless tell him of the images which are reflected in water or in mirrors; also of sculptures, pictures, and other duplicates. Stranger I see, Theaetetus, that you have never made the acquaintance of the Sophist. Theaetetus Why do you think so? Stranger He will make believe to have his eyes shut, or to have none. Theaetetus What do you mean? Stranger When you tell him of something existing in a mirror, or in sculpture, and address him as though he had eyes, he will laugh you to scorn, and will pretend that he knows nothing of mirrors and streams, or of sight at all; he will say that he is asking about an idea. Theaetetus What can he mean? Stranger The common notion pervading all these objects, which you speak of as many, and yet call by the single name of image, as though it were the unity under which they were all included. How will you maintain your ground against him? Theaetetus How, Stranger, can I describe an image except as something fashioned in the likeness of the true? Stranger And do you mean this something to be some other true thing, or what do you mean? Theaetetus Certainly not another true thing, but only a resemblance. Stranger And you mean by true that which really is? Theaetetus Yes. Stranger And the not true is that which is the opposite of the true? Theaetetus Exactly. Stranger A resemblance, then, is not really real, if, as you say, not true? Theaetetus Nay, but it is in a certain sense. Stranger You mean to say, not in a true sense? Theaetetus Yes; it is in reality only an image. Stranger Then what we call an image is in reality really unreal. Theaetetus In what a strange complication of being and not-being we are involved! Stranger Strange! I should think so. See how, by his reciprocation of opposites, the many-headed Sophist has compelled us, quite against our will, to admit the existence of not-being. Theaetetus Yes, indeed, I see. Stranger The difficulty is how to define his art without falling into a contradiction. Theaetetus How do you mean? And where does the danger lie? Stranger When we say that he deceives us with an illusion, and that his art is illusory, do we mean that our soul is led by his art to think falsely, or what do we mean? Theaetetus There is nothing else to be said. Stranger Again, false opinion is that form of opinion which thinks the opposite of the truth:⁠—You would assent? Theaetetus Certainly. Stranger You mean to say that false opinion thinks what is not? Theaetetus Of course. Stranger Does false opinion think that things which are not are not, or that in a certain sense they are? Theaetetus Things that are not must be imagined to exist in a certain sense, if any degree of falsehood is to be possible. Stranger And does not false opinion also think that things which most certainly exist do not exist at all? Theaetetus Yes. Stranger And here, again, is falsehood? Theaetetus Falsehood⁠—yes. Stranger And in like manner, a false proposition will be deemed to be one which asserts the nonexistence of things which are, and the existence of things which are not. Theaetetus There is no other way in which a false proposition can arise. Stranger There is not; but the Sophist will deny these statements. And indeed how can any rational man assent to them, when the very expressions which we have just used were before acknowledged by us to be unutterable, unspeakable, indescribable, unthinkable? Do you see his point, Theaetetus? Theaetetus Of course he will say that we are contradicting ourselves when we hazard the assertion, that falsehood exists in opinion and in words; for in maintaining this, we are compelled over and over again to assert being of not-being, which we admitted just now to be an utter impossibility. Stranger How well you remember! And now it is high time to hold a consultation as to what we ought to do about the Sophist; for if we persist in looking for him in the class of false workers and magicians, you see that the handles for objection and the difficulties which will arise are very numerous and obvious. Theaetetus They are indeed. Stranger We have gone through but a very small portion of them, and they are really infinite.